Making theory-of-mind inferences from human dialogue is a strong indicator of a model's underlying social abilities, which are fundamental for adept AI assistants. However, large language and reasoning models struggle to understand sophisticated social phenomena in transcript data, such as sarcasm and irony. To assess the weaknesses of current models and to identify their solutions, we introduce SocialNLI (SoNLI) -- the first social dialogue inference dataset. SoNLI consists of a collection of dialogue transcripts hand-picked to center complex social nuances like irony and sarcasm, paired with inferences, corresponding likelihood scores, and human-written explanations. We explore social inference analysis as a facet of theory-of-mind, and evaluate LLM and reasoning model theory-of-mind ability through multi-step counterfactual reasoning.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for large language models (LLMs), which often lack the capability for dynamic logical reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves verifiable ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and verifiable dynamic logical reasoning. We use data generated automatically via a DEL simulator to train a verifier, which we call the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step. During inference, the PBM evaluates candidate belief traces from the LLM and selects the highest-scoring one. This allows LLMs to allocate extra inference-time compute to yield more transparent reasoning. Experiments across model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision significantly enhances LLMs' ToM capabilities without retraining. Code is available at https://github.com/joel-wu/DEL-ToM.

Developing collaborative AI hinges on Theory of Mind (ToM) - the ability to reason about the beliefs of others to build and maintain common ground. Existing ToM benchmarks, however, are restricted to passive observer settings or lack an assessment of how agents establish and maintain common ground over time. To address these gaps, we introduce the Yokai Learning Environment (YLE) - a multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) environment based on the cooperative card game Yokai. In the YLE, agents take turns peeking at hidden cards and moving them to form clusters based on colour. Success requires tracking evolving beliefs, remembering past observations, using hints as grounded communication, and maintaining common ground with teammates. Our evaluation yields two key findings: First, current RL agents struggle to solve the YLE, even when given access to perfect memory. Second, while belief modelling improves performance, agents are still unable to effectively generalise to unseen partners or form accurate beliefs over longer games, exposing a reliance on brittle conventions rather than robust belief tracking. We use the YLE to investigate research questions in belief modelling, memory, partner generalisation, and scaling to higher-order ToM.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand the mental states of oneself and others, remains a challenging area for large language models (LLMs), which often fail to predict human mental states accurately. In this paper, we introduce UniToMBench, a unified benchmark that integrates the strengths of SimToM and TOMBENCH to systematically improve and assess ToM capabilities in LLMs by integrating multi-interaction task designs and evolving story scenarios. Supported by a custom dataset of over 1,000 hand-written scenarios, UniToMBench combines perspective-taking techniques with diverse evaluation metrics to better stimulate social cognition in LLMs. Through evaluation, we observe that while models like GPT-4o and GPT-4o Mini show consistently high accuracy in tasks involving emotional and belief-related scenarios, with results usually above 80%, there is significant variability in their performance across knowledge-based tasks. These results highlight both the strengths and limitations of current LLMs in ToM-related tasks, underscoring the value of UniToMBench as a comprehensive tool for future development. Our code is publicly available here: https://github.com/Shamant/unifiedtombenchmark.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' perceptions and mental states, is fundamental to human interaction but remains a challenging task for Large Language Models (LLMs). While existing ToM reasoning methods show promise with reasoning via perceptual perspective-taking, they often rely excessively on LLMs, reducing their efficiency and limiting their applicability to high-order ToM reasoning, which requires multi-hop reasoning about characters' beliefs. To address these issues, we present EnigmaToM, a novel neuro-symbolic framework that enhances ToM reasoning by integrating a Neural Knowledge Base of entity states (Enigma) for (1) a psychology-inspired iterative masking mechanism that facilitates accurate perspective-taking and (2) knowledge injection that elicits key entity information. Enigma generates structured representations of entity states, which construct spatial scene graphs -- leveraging spatial information as an inductive bias -- for belief tracking of various ToM orders and enhancing events with fine-grained entity state details. Experimental results on multiple benchmarks, including ToMi, HiToM, and FANToM, show that EnigmaToM significantly improves ToM reasoning across LLMs of varying sizes, particularly excelling in high-order reasoning scenarios.

Theory of Mind (ToM)-the cognitive ability to reason about mental states of ourselves and others, is the foundation of social interaction. Although ToM comes naturally to humans, it poses a significant challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Due to the complex logical chains in ToM reasoning, especially in higher-order ToM questions, simply utilizing reasoning methods like Chain of Thought (CoT) will not improve the ToM capabilities of LLMs. We present TimeToM, which constructs a temporal space and uses it as the foundation to improve the ToM capabilities of LLMs in multiple scenarios. Specifically, within the temporal space, we construct Temporal Belief State Chain (TBSC) for each character and inspired by the cognition perspective of the social world model, we divide TBSC into self-world beliefs and social world beliefs, aligning with first-order ToM (first-order beliefs) and higher-order ToM (higher-order beliefs) questions, respectively. Moreover, we design a novel tool-belief solver that, by considering belief communication between characters in temporal space, can transform a character's higher-order beliefs into another character's first-order beliefs under belief communication period. Experimental results indicate that TimeToM can dramatically improve the reasoning performance of LLMs on ToM questions while taking a big step towards coherent and robust ToM reasoning.

Can large multimodal models have a human-like ability for emotional and social reasoning, and if so, how does it work? Recent research has discovered emergent theory-of-mind (ToM) reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs). LLMs can reason about people's mental states by solving various text-based ToM tasks that ask questions about the actors' ToM (e.g., human belief, desire, intention). However, human reasoning in the wild is often grounded in dynamic scenes across time. Thus, we consider videos a new medium for examining spatio-temporal ToM reasoning ability. Specifically, we ask explicit probing questions about videos with abundant social and emotional reasoning content. We develop a pipeline for multimodal LLM for ToM reasoning using video and text. We also enable explicit ToM reasoning by retrieving key frames for answering a ToM question, which reveals how multimodal LLMs reason about ToM.

Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning entails recognizing that other individuals possess their own intentions, emotions, and thoughts, which is vital for guiding one's own thought processes. Although large language models (LLMs) excel in tasks such as summarization, question answering, and translation, they still face challenges with ToM reasoning, especially in open-ended questions. Despite advancements, the extent to which LLMs truly understand ToM reasoning and how closely it aligns with human ToM reasoning remains inadequately explored in open-ended scenarios. Motivated by this gap, we assess the abilities of LLMs to perceive and integrate human intentions and emotions into their ToM reasoning processes within open-ended questions. Our study utilizes posts from Reddit's ChangeMyView platform, which demands nuanced social reasoning to craft persuasive responses. Our analysis, comparing semantic similarity and lexical overlap metrics between responses generated by humans and LLMs, reveals clear disparities in ToM reasoning capabilities in open-ended questions, with even the most advanced models showing notable limitations. To enhance LLM capabilities, we implement a prompt tuning method that incorporates human intentions and emotions, resulting in improvements in ToM reasoning performance. However, despite these improvements, the enhancement still falls short of fully achieving human-like reasoning. This research highlights the deficiencies in LLMs' social reasoning and demonstrates how integrating human intentions and emotions can boost their effectiveness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently shown a promise and emergence of Theory of Mind (ToM) ability and even outperform humans in certain ToM tasks. To evaluate and extend the boundaries of the ToM reasoning ability of LLMs, we propose a novel concept, taxonomy, and framework, the ToM reasoning with Zero, Finite, and Infinite Belief History and develop a multi-round text-based game, called $\textit{Pick the Right Stuff}$, as a benchmark. We have evaluated six LLMs with this game and found their performance on Zero Belief History is consistently better than on Finite Belief History. In addition, we have found two of the models with small parameter sizes outperform all the evaluated models with large parameter sizes. We expect this work to pave the way for future ToM benchmark development and also for the promotion and development of more complex AI agents or systems which are required to be equipped with more complex ToM reasoning ability.

Existing approaches to Theory of Mind (ToM) in Artificial Intelligence (AI) overemphasize prompted, or cue-based, ToM, which may limit our collective ability to develop Artificial Social Intelligence (ASI). Drawing from research in computer science, cognitive science, and related disciplines, we contrast prompted ToM with what we call spontaneous ToM -- reasoning about others' mental states that is grounded in unintentional, possibly uncontrollable cognitive functions. We argue for a principled approach to studying and developing AI ToM and suggest that a robust, or general, ASI will respond to prompts \textit{and} spontaneously engage in social reasoning.