Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs--a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multiagent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses about user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Moral Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses about user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Moral Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

We introduce EgoToM, a new video question-answering benchmark that extends Theory-of-Mind (ToM) evaluation to egocentric domains. Using a causal ToM model, we generate multi-choice video QA instances for the Ego4D dataset to benchmark the ability to predict a camera wearer's goals, beliefs, and next actions. We study the performance of both humans and state of the art multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on these three interconnected inference problems. Our evaluation shows that MLLMs achieve close to human-level accuracy on inferring goals from egocentric videos. However, MLLMs (including the largest ones we tested with over 100B parameters) fall short of human performance when inferring the camera wearers' in-the-moment belief states and future actions that are most consistent with the unseen video future. We believe that our results will shape the future design of an important class of egocentric digital assistants which are equipped with a reasonable model of the user's internal mental states.

In this paper we present ToMCAT (Theory-of-Mind for Cooperative Agents in Teams), a new framework for generating ToM-conditioned trajectories. It combines a meta-learning mechanism, that performs ToM reasoning over teammates' underlying goals and future behavior, with a multiagent denoising-diffusion model, that generates plans for an agent and its teammates conditioned on both the agent's goals and its teammates' characteristics, as computed via ToM. We implemented an online planning system that dynamically samples new trajectories (replans) from the diffusion model whenever it detects a divergence between a previously generated plan and the current state of the world. We conducted several experiments using ToMCAT in a simulated cooking domain. Our results highlight the importance of the dynamic replanning mechanism in reducing the usage of resources without sacrificing team performance. We also show that recent observations about the world and teammates' behavior collected by an agent over the course of an episode combined with ToM inferences are crucial to generate team-aware plans for dynamic adaptation to teammates, especially when no prior information is provided about them.

"Thinking is for Doing." Humans can infer other people's mental states from observations--an ability called Theory-of-Mind (ToM)--and subsequently act pragmatically on those inferences. Existing question answering benchmarks such as ToMi ask models questions to make inferences about beliefs of characters in a story, but do not test whether models can then use these inferences to guide their actions. We propose a new evaluation paradigm for large language models (LLMs): Thinking for Doing (T4D), which requires models to connect inferences about others' mental states to actions in social scenarios. Experiments on T4D demonstrate that LLMs such as GPT-4 and PaLM 2 seemingly excel at tracking characters' beliefs in stories, but they struggle to translate this capability into strategic action. Our analysis reveals the core challenge for LLMs lies in identifying the implicit inferences about mental states without being explicitly asked about as in ToMi, that lead to choosing the correct action in T4D. To bridge this gap, we introduce a zero-shot prompting framework, Foresee and Reflect (FaR), which provides a reasoning structure that encourages LLMs to anticipate future challenges and reason about potential actions. FaR boosts GPT-4's performance from 50% to 71% on T4D, outperforming other prompting methods such as Chain-of-Thought and Self-Ask. Moreover, FaR generalizes to diverse out-of-distribution story structures and scenarios that also require ToM inferences to choose an action, consistently outperforming other methods including few-shot in-context learning.

Intuitive psychology is a pillar of common-sense reasoning. The replication of this reasoning in machine intelligence is an important stepping-stone on the way to human-like artificial intelligence. Several recent tasks and benchmarks for examining this reasoning in Large-Large Models have focused in particular on belief attribution in Theory-of-Mind tasks. These tasks have shown both successes and failures. We consider in particular a recent purported success case (1), and show that small variations that maintain the principles of ToM turn the results on their head. We argue that in general, the zero-hypothesis for model evaluation in intuitive psychology should be skeptical, and that outlying failure cases should outweigh average success rates. We also consider what possible future successes on Theory-of-Mind tasks by more powerful LLMs would mean for ToM tasks with people.

We present a new explainable AI (XAI) framework aimed at increasing justified human trust and reliance in the AI machine through explanations. We pose explanation as an iterative communication process, i.e. dialog, between the machine and human user. More concretely, the machine generates sequence of explanations in a dialog which takes into account three important aspects at each dialog turn: (a) human's intention (or curiosity); (b) human's understanding of the machine; and (c) machine's understanding of the human user. To do this, we use Theory of Mind (ToM) which helps us in explicitly modeling human's intention, machine's mind as inferred by the human as well as human's mind as inferred by the machine. In other words, these explicit mental representations in ToM are incorporated to learn an optimal explanation policy that takes into account human's perception and beliefs. Furthermore, we also show that ToM facilitates in quantitatively measuring justified human trust in the machine by comparing all the three mental representations. We applied our framework to three visual recognition tasks, namely, image classification, action recognition, and human body pose estimation. We argue that our ToM based explanations are practical and more natural for both expert and non-expert users to understand the internal workings of complex machine learning models. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to derive explanations using ToM. Extensive human study experiments verify our hypotheses, showing that the proposed explanations significantly outperform the state-of-the-art XAI methods in terms of all the standard quantitative and qualitative XAI evaluation metrics including human trust, reliance, and explanation satisfaction.