Goto

Collaborating Authors

 tee


Oblivious Sampling Algorithms for Private Data Analysis

Sajin Sasy, Olga Ohrimenko

Neural Information Processing Systems

Trusted execution environments (TEEs) canbeused to protect the content of the data during query computation, while supporting differential-private (DP) queries in TEEs provides record privacy when query output isrevealed.


DistilLock: Safeguarding LLMs from Unauthorized Knowledge Distillation on the Edge

Mohanty, Asmita, Kang, Gezheng, Gao, Lei, Annavaram, Murali

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance across diverse tasks, but fine-tuning them typically relies on cloud-based, centralized infrastructures. This requires data owners to upload potentially sensitive data to external servers, raising serious privacy concerns. An alternative approach is to fine-tune LLMs directly on edge devices using local data; however, this introduces a new challenge: the model owner must transfer proprietary models to the edge, which risks intellectual property (IP) leakage. To address this dilemma, we propose DistilLock, a TEE-assisted fine-tuning framework that enables privacy-preserving knowledge distillation on the edge. In DistilLock, a proprietary foundation model is executed within a trusted execution environment (TEE) enclave on the data owner's device, acting as a secure black-box teacher. This setup preserves both data privacy and model IP by preventing direct access to model internals. Furthermore, DistilLock employs a model obfuscation mechanism to offload obfuscated weights to untrusted accelerators for efficient knowledge distillation without compromising security. We demonstrate that DistilLock prevents unauthorized knowledge distillation processes and model-stealing attacks while maintaining high computational efficiency, but offering a secure and practical solution for edge-based LLM personalization.



Are You Getting What You Pay For? Auditing Model Substitution in LLM APIs

Cai, Will, Shi, Tianneng, Zhao, Xuandong, Song, Dawn

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Commercial Large Language Model (LLM) APIs create a fundamental trust problem: users pay for specific models but have no guarantee that providers deliver them faithfully. Providers may covertly substitute cheaper alternatives (e.g., quantized versions, smaller models) to reduce costs while maintaining advertised pricing. We formalize this model substitution problem and systematically evaluate detection methods under realistic adversarial conditions. Our empirical analysis reveals that software-only methods are fundamentally unreliable: statistical tests on text outputs are query-intensive and fail against subtle substitutions, while methods using log probabilities are defeated by inherent inference nondeterminism in production environments. We argue that this verification gap can be more effectively closed with hardware-level security. We propose and evaluate the use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as one practical and robust solution. Our findings demonstrate that TEEs can provide provable cryptographic guarantees of model integrity with only a modest performance overhead, offering a clear and actionable path to ensure users get what they pay for. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit


Emerging Paradigms for Securing Federated Learning Systems

Abouelmagd, Amr Akmal, Hilal, Amr

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Federated Learning (FL) facilitates collaborative model training while keeping raw data decentralized, making it a conduit for leveraging the power of IoT devices while maintaining privacy of the locally collected data. However, existing privacy- preserving techniques present notable hurdles. Methods such as Multi-Party Computation (MPC), Homomorphic Encryption (HE), and Differential Privacy (DP) often incur high compu- tational costs and suffer from limited scalability. This survey examines emerging approaches that hold promise for enhancing both privacy and efficiency in FL, including Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs), Quantum Computing (QC), Chaos-Based Encryption (CBE), Neuromorphic Computing (NC), and Swarm Intelligence (SI). For each paradigm, we assess its relevance to the FL pipeline, outlining its strengths, limitations, and practical considerations. We conclude by highlighting open challenges and prospective research avenues, offering a detailed roadmap for advancing secure and scalable FL systems.


Confidential LLM Inference: Performance and Cost Across CPU and GPU TEEs

Chrapek, Marcin, Copik, Marcin, Mettaz, Etienne, Hoefler, Torsten

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on converged Cloud and High-Performance Computing (HPC) infrastructure. However, as LLMs handle confidential inputs and are fine-tuned on costly, proprietary datasets, their heightened security requirements slow adoption in privacy-sensitive sectors such as healthcare and finance. We investigate methods to address this gap and propose Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a solution for securing end-to-end LLM inference. We validate their practicality by evaluating these compute-intensive workloads entirely within CPU and GPU TEEs. On the CPU side, we conduct an in-depth study running full Llama2 inference pipelines (7B, 13B, 70B) inside Intel's TDX and SGX, accelerated by Advanced Matrix Extensions (AMX). We derive 12 insights, including that across various data types, batch sizes, and input lengths, CPU TEEs impose under 10% throughput and 20% latency overheads, further reduced by AMX. We run LLM inference on NVIDIA H100 Confidential Compute GPUs, contextualizing our CPU findings and observing throughput penalties of 4-8% that diminish as batch and input sizes grow. By comparing performance, cost, and security trade-offs, we show how CPU TEEs can be more cost-effective or secure than their GPU counterparts. To our knowledge, our work is the first to comprehensively demonstrate the performance and practicality of modern TEEs across both CPUs and GPUs for enabling confidential LLMs (cLLMs).


Towards Confidential and Efficient LLM Inference with Dual Privacy Protection

Yu, Honglan, Wang, Yibin, Dai, Feifei, Liu, Dong, Fan, Haihui, Gu, Xiaoyan

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

CPU-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) and differential privacy (DP) have gained wide applications for private inference. Due to high inference latency in TEEs, researchers use partition-based approaches that offload linear model components to GPUs. However, dense nonlinear layers of large language models (LLMs) result in significant communication overhead between TEEs and GPUs. DP-based approaches apply random noise to protect data privacy, but this compromises LLM performance and semantic understanding. To overcome the above drawbacks, this paper proposes CMIF, a Confidential and efficient Model Inference Framework. CMIF confidentially deploys the embedding layer in the client-side TEE and subsequent layers on GPU servers. Meanwhile, it optimizes the Report-Noisy-Max mechanism to protect sensitive inputs with a slight decrease in model performance. Extensive experiments on Llama-series models demonstrate that CMIF reduces additional inference overhead in TEEs while preserving user data privacy.


Securing Transformer-based AI Execution via Unified TEEs and Crypto-protected Accelerators

Xue, Jiaqi, Zhao, Yifei, Zheng, Mengxin, Yao, Fan, Solihin, Yan, Lou, Qian

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Recent advances in Transformer models, e.g., large language models (LLMs), have brought tremendous breakthroughs in various artificial intelligence (AI) tasks, leading to their wide applications in many security-critical domains. Due to their unprecedented scale and prohibitively high development cost, these models have become highly valuable intellectual property for AI stakeholders and are increasingly deployed via machine learning as a service (MLaaS). However, MLaaS often runs on untrusted cloud infrastructure, exposing data and models to potential breaches. Mainstream protection mechanisms leverage trusted execution environments (TEEs) where confidentiality and integrity for secretive data are shielded using hardware-based encryption and integrity checking. Unfortunately, running model inference entirely within TEEs is subject to non-trivial slowdown, which is further exacerbated in LLMs due to the substantial computation and memory footprint involved. Recent studies reveal that the hybrid TEE-based scheme offloading partial model inference operations to the untrusted accelerators (e.g., GPU) is a promising solution. However, prior offloading schemes fail to ensure dual protection of data and model in Transformer inference, as they cannot securely offload critical operations, i.e., Attention and SoftMax, forcing these computations to remain confined within TEEs. To address these challenges, we propose TwinShield, a framework enabling secure Transformer inference in heterogeneous TEE and accelerator systems with dual protection for both model and data. TwinShield offloads ~87% of computation to GPUs and delivers 4.0x - 6.1x speedups over previous approaches across various Transformer models.


Attestable Audits: Verifiable AI Safety Benchmarks Using Trusted Execution Environments

Schnabl, Christoph, Hugenroth, Daniel, Marino, Bill, Beresford, Alastair R.

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Benchmarks are important measures to evaluate safety and compliance of AI models at scale. However, they typically do not offer verifiable results and lack confidentiality for model IP and benchmark datasets. We propose Attestable Audits, which run inside Trusted Execution Environments and enable users to verify interaction with a compliant AI model. Our work protects sensitive data even when model provider and auditor do not trust each other. This addresses verification challenges raised in recent AI governance frameworks. We build a prototype demonstrating feasibility on typical audit benchmarks against Llama-3.1.


GOD model: Privacy Preserved AI School for Personal Assistant

PIN AI Team, null, Sun, Bill, Guo, Gavin, Peng, Regan, Zhang, Boliang, Wang, Shouqiao, Florescu, Laura, Wang, Xi, Crapis, Davide, Wu, Ben

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Personal AI assistants (e.g., Apple Intelligence, Meta AI) offer proactive recommendations that simplify everyday tasks, but their reliance on sensitive user data raises concerns about privacy and trust. To address these challenges, we introduce the Guardian of Data (GOD), a secure, privacy-preserving framework for training and evaluating AI assistants directly on-device. Unlike traditional benchmarks, the GOD model measures how well assistants can anticipate user needs-such as suggesting gifts-while protecting user data and autonomy. Functioning like an AI school, it addresses the cold start problem by simulating user queries and employing a curriculum-based approach to refine the performance of each assistant. Running within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), it safeguards user data while applying reinforcement and imitation learning to refine AI recommendations. A token-based incentive system encourages users to share data securely, creating a data flywheel that drives continuous improvement. Specifically, users mine with their data, and the mining rate is determined by GOD's evaluation of how well their AI assistant understands them across categories such as shopping, social interactions, productivity, trading, and Web3. By integrating privacy, personalization, and trust, the GOD model provides a scalable, responsible path for advancing personal AI assistants. For community collaboration, part of the framework is open-sourced at https://github.com/PIN-AI/God-Model.