Understanding why neural networks make certain decisions is pivotal for their use in safety-critical applications. Feature-Guided Analysis (FGA) extracts slices of neural networks relevant to their tasks. Existing feature-guided approaches typically monitor the activation of the neural network neurons to extract the relevant rules. Preliminary results are encouraging and demonstrate the feasibility of this solution by assessing the precision and recall of Feature-Guided Analysis on two pilot case studies. However, the applicability in industrial contexts needs additional empirical evidence. To mitigate this need, this paper assesses the applicability of FGA on a benchmark made by the MNIST and LSC datasets. We assessed the effectiveness of FGA in computing rules that explain the behavior of the neural network. Our results show that FGA has a higher precision on our benchmark than the results from the literature. We also evaluated how the selection of the neural network architecture, training, and feature selection affect the effectiveness of FGA. Our results show that the selection significantly affects the recall of FGA, while it has a negligible impact on its precision.

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Autonomous systems, such as self-driving cars and drones, have made significant strides in recent years by leveraging visual inputs and machine learning for decision-making and control. Despite their impressive performance, these vision-based controllers can make erroneous predictions when faced with novel or out-of-distribution inputs. Such errors can cascade to catastrophic system failures and compromise system safety. In this work, we introduce a run-time anomaly monitor to detect and mitigate such closed-loop, system-level failures. Specifically, we leverage a reachability-based framework to stress-test the vision-based controller offline and mine its system-level failures. This data is then used to train a classifier that is leveraged online to flag inputs that might cause system breakdowns. The anomaly detector highlights issues that transcend individual modules and pertain to the safety of the overall system. We also design a fallback controller that robustly handles these detected anomalies to preserve system safety. We validate the proposed approach on an autonomous aircraft taxiing system that uses a vision-based controller for taxiing. Our results show the efficacy of the proposed approach in identifying and handling system-level anomalies, outperforming methods such as prediction error-based detection, and ensembling, thereby enhancing the overall safety and robustness of autonomous systems.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly used in safety-critical autonomous systems as perception components processing high-dimensional image data. Formal analysis of these systems is particularly challenging due to the complexity of the perception DNNs, the sensors (cameras), and the environment conditions. We present a case study applying formal probabilistic analysis techniques to an experimental autonomous system that guides airplanes on taxiways using a perception DNN. We address the above challenges by replacing the camera and the network with a compact probabilistic abstraction built from the confusion matrices computed for the DNN on a representative image data set. We also show how to leverage local, DNN-specific analyses as run-time guards to increase the safety of the overall system. Our findings are applicable to other autonomous systems that use complex DNNs for perception.

We demonstrate a unified approach to rigorous design of safety-critical autonomous systems using the VerifAI toolkit for formal analysis of AI-based systems. VerifAI provides an integrated toolchain for tasks spanning the design process, including modeling, falsification, debugging, and ML component retraining. We evaluate all of these applications in an industrial case study on an experimental autonomous aircraft taxiing system developed by Boeing, which uses a neural network to track the centerline of a runway. We define runway scenarios using the Scenic probabilistic programming language, and use them to drive tests in the X-Plane flight simulator. We first perform falsification, automatically finding environment conditions causing the system to violate its specification by deviating significantly from the centerline (or even leaving the runway entirely). Next, we use counterexample analysis to identify distinct failure cases, and confirm their root causes with specialized testing. Finally, we use the results of falsification and debugging to retrain the network, eliminating several failure cases and improving the overall performance of the closed-loop system.