Reward allocation, also known as the credit assignment problem, has been an important topic ineconomics, engineering, andmachine learning.

This work provides performance guarantees for the greedy solution of experimental design problems. In particular, it focuses on A-and E-optimal designs, for which typical guarantees do not apply since the mean-square error and the maximum eigenvalue of the estimation error covariance matrix are not supermodular. To do so, it leverages the concept of approximate supermodularity to derive non-asymptotic worst-case suboptimality bounds for these greedy solutions. These bounds reveal that as the SNR of the experiments decreases, these cost functions behave increasingly as supermodular functions.

Submodular and supermodular functions have found wide applicability in machine learning, capturing notions such as diversity and regularity, respectively. These notions have deep consequences for optimization, and the problem of (approximately) optimizing submodular functions has received much attention. However, beyond optimization, these notions allow specifying expressive probabilistic models that can be used to quantify predictive uncertainty via marginal inference. Prominent, well-studied special cases include Ising models and determinan-tal point processes, but the general class of log-submodular and log-supermodular models is much richer and little studied. In this paper, we investigate the use of Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling to perform approximate inference in general log-submodular and log-supermodular models. In particular, we consider a simple Gibbs sampling procedure, and establish two sufficient conditions, the first guaranteeing polynomial-time, and the second fast ( O ( n log n)) mixing. We also evaluate the efficiency of the Gibbs sampler on three examples of such models, and compare against a recently proposed variational approach.

When solving PDEs, classical numerical solvers are often computationally expensive, while machine learning methods can suffer from spectral bias, failing to capture high-frequency components. Designing an optimal hybrid iterative solver--where, at each iteration, a solver is selected from an ensemble of solvers to leverage their complementary strengths--poses a challenging combinatorial problem. While the greedy selection strategy is desirable for its constant-factor approximation guarantee to the optimal solution, it requires knowledge of the true error at each step, which is generally unavailable in practice. We address this by proposing an approximate greedy router that efficiently mimics a greedy approach to solver selection. Empirical results on the Poisson and Helmholtz equations demonstrate that our method outperforms single-solver baselines and existing hybrid solver approaches, such as HINTS, achieving faster and more stable convergence.

This work provides performance guarantees for the greedy solution of experimental design problems. In particular, it focuses on A-and E-optimal designs, for which typical guarantees do not apply since the mean-square error and the maximum eigenvalue of the estimation error covariance matrix are not supermodular. To do so, it leverages the concept of approximate supermodularity to derive nonasymptotic worst-case suboptimality bounds for these greedy solutions. These bounds reveal that as the SNR of the experiments decreases, these cost functions behave increasingly as supermodular functions.

Submodular and supermodular functions have found wide applicability in machine learning, capturing notions such as diversity and regularity, respectively. These notions have deep consequences for optimization, and the problem of (approximately) optimizing submodular functions has received much attention. However, beyond optimization, these notions allow specifying expressive probabilistic models that can be used to quantify predictive uncertainty via marginal inference. Prominent, well-studied special cases include Ising models and determinantal point processes, but the general class of log-submodular and log-supermodular models is much richer and little studied. In this paper, we investigate the use of Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling to perform approximate inference in general log-submodular and log-supermodular models. In particular, we consider a simple Gibbs sampling procedure, and establish two sufficient conditions, the first guaranteeing polynomial-time, and the second fast (O(n log n)) mixing. We also evaluate the efficiency of the Gibbs sampler on three examples of such models, and compare against a recently proposed variational approach.

Cooperative game theory has diverse applications in contemporary artificial intelligence, including domains like interpretable machine learning, resource allocation, and collaborative decision-making. However, specifying a cooperative game entails assigning values to exponentially many coalitions, and obtaining even a single value can be resource-intensive in practice. Yet simply leaving certain coalition values undisclosed introduces ambiguity regarding individual contributions to the collective grand coalition. This ambiguity often leads to players holding overly optimistic expectations, stemming from either inherent biases or strategic considerations, frequently resulting in collective claims exceeding the actual grand coalition value. In this paper, we present a framework aimed at optimizing the sequence for revealing coalition values, with the overarching goal of efficiently closing the gap between players' expectations and achievable outcomes in cooperative games. Our contributions are threefold: (i) we study the individual players' optimistic completions of games with missing coalition values along with the arising gap, and investigate its analytical characteristics that facilitate more efficient optimization; (ii) we develop methods to minimize this gap over classes of games with a known prior by disclosing values of additional coalitions in both offline and online fashion; and (iii) we empirically demonstrate the algorithms' performance in practical scenarios, together with an investigation into the typical order of revealing coalition values.

Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum unit price p. The market clears at the price at which the aggregate demand intersects the total supply and firms are paid the bid prices. We study a game theoretic model of competition among such firms and focus on its equilibria (Supply function equilibrium). The game we consider is a generalization of both models where firms can either set a fixed quantity (Cournot model) or set a fixed price (Bertrand model). Our main result is to prove existence and provide a characterization of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in the space of K-Lipschitz supply functions.

R { } is equipped with the standard maximum and sum operations, respectively. It has been used to represent various nonlinear processes, in areas such as scheduling and synchronization [2], [6], [9], geometry [22], control theory and optimization [1], [4], morphological image and signal analysis [15], [24], [28], and machine learning [7], [8], [29], [32], [33]. Max-plus algebra is obtained from the conventional linear algebra if we replace addition with maximum and multiplication with addition, as an extension of the max-plus semiring to multiple dimensions. Hence, many of the aforementioned nonlinear processes enjoy some linear-like properties when described in terms of the max-plus algebra. In this paper we are interested in sparse max-plus representations, i.e. vectors which consist of as many uninformative () elements as possible.

We study the problem of collaborative machine learning markets where multiple parties can achieve improved performance on their machine learning tasks by combining their training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine learning markets in terms of fair revenue distribution and potential threats, including data replication. We then instantiate a collaborative market for cases where parties share a common machine learning task and where parties' tasks are different. Our marketplace incentivizes parties to submit high quality training and true validation data. To this end, we introduce a novel payment division function that is robust-to- replication and customized output models that perform well only on requested machine learning tasks. In experiments, we validate the assumptions underlying our theoretical analysis and show that these are approximately satisfied for commonly used machine learning models.