However,such assumption does not always hold inreality. Itisoften the case that arm pulls are performed by multiple different agents whose individual goals are not aligned with the system, and the principal can only observeagents' actions. One typical example is the individual buyers (agents) and the online shopping platform (the principal).

We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the principal and the agent can have arbitrary and potentially different valuations for the actions taken, possibly also depending on the actual state of the world. Moreover, at any time, the state of the world may evolve arbitrarily depending on the action taken by the principal. The goal is to compute an optimal mechanism which maximizes the principal's utility in the face of the self-interested strategic agent.We give an efficient algorithm for computing optimal mechanisms, with or without payments, under different individual-rationality constraints, when the time horizon is constant. Our algorithm is based on a sophisticated linear program formulation, which can be customized in various ways to accommodate richer constraints.

Algorithmic decision making is increasingly prevalent, but often vulnerable to strategic manipulation by agents seeking a favorable outcome. Prior research has shown that classifier abstention (allowing a classifier to decline making a decision due to insufficient confidence) can significantly increase classifier accuracy. This paper studies abstention within a strategic classification context, exploring how its introduction impacts strategic agents' responses and how principals should optimally leverage it. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg game where a principal, acting as the classifier, first announces its decision policy, and then strategic agents, acting as followers, manipulate their features to receive a desired outcome. Here, we focus on binary classifiers where agents manipulate observable features rather than their true features, and show that optimal abstention ensures that the principal's utility (or loss) is no worse than in a non-abstention setting, even in the presence of strategic agents. We also show that beyond improving accuracy, abstention can also serve as a deterrent to manipulation, making it costlier for agents, especially those less qualified, to manipulate to achieve a positive outcome when manipulation costs are significant enough to affect agent behavior. These results highlight abstention as a valuable tool for reducing the negative effects of strategic behavior in algorithmic decision making systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to domains that require reasoning about other agents' behavior, such as negotiation, policy design, and market simulation, yet existing research has mostly evaluated their adherence to equilibrium play or their exhibited depth of reasoning. Whether they display genuine strategic thinking, understood as the coherent formation of beliefs about other agents, evaluation of possible actions, and choice based on those beliefs, remains unexplored. We develop a framework to identify this ability by disentangling beliefs, evaluation, and choice in static, complete-information games, and apply it across a series of non-cooperative environments. By jointly analyzing models' revealed choices and reasoning traces, and introducing a new context-free game to rule out imitation from memorization, we show that current frontier models exhibit belief-coherent best-response behavior at targeted reasoning depths. When unconstrained, they self-limit their depth of reasoning and form differentiated conjectures about human and synthetic opponents, revealing an emergent form of meta-reasoning. Under increasing complexity, explicit recursion gives way to internally generated heuristic rules of choice that are stable, model-specific, and distinct from known human biases. These findings indicate that belief coherence, meta-reasoning, and novel heuristic formation can emerge jointly from language modeling objectives, providing a structured basis for the study of strategic cognition in artificial agents.

The agents' valuations for the item in each round are

An important observation of this work is that strategic agents' intrinsic needs of learning

In this work, we argue that the order of play in strategic classification is fundamentally determined by the relative frequencies at which the decision-maker and the agents adapt to each other's actions.

The increasing vulnerability of electrical distribution systems to extreme weather events and cyber threats necessitates the development of economically viable frameworks for resilience enhancement. While existing approaches focus primarily on technical resilience metrics and enhancement strategies, there remains a significant gap in establishing market-driven mechanisms that can effectively commercialize resilience features while optimizing their deployment through intelligent decision-making. Moreover, traditional optimization approaches for distribution network reconfiguration often fail to dynamically adapt to both normal and emergency conditions. This paper introduces a novel framework integrating dual-agent Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) with market-based mechanisms, achieving an average resilience score of 0.85 0.08 over 10 test episodes. The proposed architecture leverages a dual-agent PPO scheme, where a strategic agent selects optimal DER-driven switching configurations, while a tactical agent fine-tunes individual switch states and grid preferences under budget and weather constraints. These agents interact within a custom-built dynamic simulation environment that models stochastic calamity events, budget limits, and resilience-cost trade-offs. A comprehensive reward function is designed that balances resilience enhancement objectives with market profitability (with up to 200x reward incentives, resulting in 85% of actions during calamity steps selecting configurations with 4 DERs), incorporating factors such as load recovery speed, system robustness, and customer satisfaction. Over 10 test episodes, the framework achieved a benefit-cost ratio of 0.12 0.01, demonstrating sustainable market incentives for resilience investment. This framework creates sustainable market incentives