We provide additional results for EGT A applied to networked MARL system control for CPR management. Specifically, we investigate the consequence of different reward structures. Potential Nash equilibria are shaded in blue. NeurComm (across all values of α), which is likely due to its consensus update mechanism. The orange ovals in these diagrams indicate which system configurations correspond to the highest expected payoff for all agents.

Cooperation between self-interested individuals is a widespread phenomenon in the natural world, but remains elusive in interactions between artificially intelligent agents. An emerging literature on opponent shaping has demonstrated the ability to reach prosocial outcomes by influencing the learning of other agents. However, such methods differentiate through the learning step of other agents or optimize for meta-game dynamics, which rely on privileged access to opponents' learning algorithms or exponential sample complexity, respectively. To provide a learning rule-agnostic and sample-efficient alternative, we introduce Reciprocators, reinforcement learning agents which are intrinsically motivated to reciprocate the influence of opponents' actions on their returns. This approach seeks to modify other agents' Q -values by increasing their return following beneficial actions (with respect to the Reciprocator) and decreasing it after detrimental actions, guiding them towards mutually beneficial actions without directly differentiating through a model of their policy.

Safe, agile, and socially compliant multi-robot navigation in cluttered and constrained environments remains a critical challenge. This is especially difficult with self-interested agents in decentralized settings, where there is no central authority to resolve conflicts induced by spatial symmetry. We address this challenge by proposing a novel approach, GameChat, which facilitates safe, agile, and deadlock-free navigation for both cooperative and self-interested agents. Key to our approach is the use of natural language communication to resolve conflicts, enabling agents to prioritize more urgent tasks and break spatial symmetry in a socially optimal manner. Our algorithm ensures subgame perfect equilibrium, preventing agents from deviating from agreed-upon behaviors and supporting cooperation. Furthermore, we guarantee safety through control barrier functions and preserve agility by minimizing disruptions to agents' planned trajectories. We evaluate GameChat in simulated environments with doorways and intersections. The results show that even in the worst case, GameChat reduces the time for all agents to reach their goals by over 35% from a naive baseline and by over 20% from SMG-CBF in the intersection scenario, while doubling the rate of ensuring the agent with a higher priority task reaches the goal first, from 50% (equivalent to random chance) to a 100% perfect performance at maximizing social welfare.

We propose a framework for adaptive data-centric collaborative learning among self-interested agents, coordinated by an arbiter. Designed to handle the incremental nature of real-world data, the framework operates in an online manner: at each step, the arbiter collects a batch of data from agents, trains a machine learning model, and provides each agent with a distinct model reflecting its data contributions. This setup establishes a feedback loop where shared data influence model updates, and the resulting models guide future data-sharing strategies. Agents evaluate and partition their data, selecting a partition to share using a stochastic parameterized policy optimized via policy gradient methods to optimize the utility of the received model as defined by agent-specific evaluation functions. On the arbiter side, the expected loss function over the true data distribution is optimized, incorporating agent-specific weights to account for distributional differences arising from diverse sources and selective sharing. A bilevel optimization algorithm jointly learns the model parameters and agent-specific weights. Mean-zero noise, computed using a distortion function that adjusts these agent-specific weights, is introduced to generate distinct agent-specific models, promoting valuable data sharing without requiring separate training. Our framework is underpinned by non-asymptotic analyses, ensuring convergence of the agent-side policy optimization to an approximate stationary point of the evaluation functions and convergence of the arbiter-side optimization to an approximate stationary point of the expected loss function.

In the coming years, AI agents will be used for making more complex decisions, including in situations involving many different groups of people. One big challenge is that AI agent tends to act in its own interest, unlike humans who often think about what will be the best for everyone in the long run. In this paper, we explore a method to get self-interested agents to work towards goals that benefit society as a whole. We propose a method to add a manager agent to mediate agent interactions by assigning incentives to certain actions. We tested our method with a supply-chain management problem and showed that this framework (1) increases the raw reward by 22.2%, (2) increases the agents' reward by 23.8%, and (3) increases the manager's reward by 20.1%.

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) involves determining paths for multiple agents to travel simultaneously through a shared area toward particular goal locations. This problem is computationally complex, especially when dealing with large numbers of agents, as is common in realistic applications like autonomous vehicle coordination. Finding an optimal solution is often computationally infeasible, making the use of approximate algorithms essential. Adding to the complexity, agents might act in a self-interested and strategic way, possibly misrepresenting their goals to the MAPF algorithm if it benefits them. Although the field of mechanism design offers tools to align incentives, using these tools without careful consideration can fail when only having access to approximately optimal outcomes. Since approximations are crucial for scalable MAPF algorithms, this poses a significant challenge. In this work, we introduce the problem of scalable mechanism design for MAPF and propose three strategyproof mechanisms, two of which even use approximate MAPF algorithms. We test our mechanisms on realistic MAPF domains with problem sizes ranging from dozens to hundreds of agents. Our findings indicate that they improve welfare beyond a simple baseline.

Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is the study of multi-agent interactions in a shared environment. Communication for cooperation is a fundamental construct for sharing information in partially observable environments. Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (CoMARL) is a learning framework where we learn agent policies either with cooperative mechanisms or policies that exhibit cooperative behavior. Explicitly, there are works on learning to communicate messages from CoMARL agents; however, non-cooperative agents, when capable of access a cooperative team's communication channel, have been shown to learn adversarial communication messages, sabotaging the cooperative team's performance particularly when objectives depend on finite resources. To address this issue, we propose a technique which leverages local formulations of Theory-of-Mind (ToM) to distinguish exhibited cooperative behavior from non-cooperative behavior before accepting messages from any agent. We demonstrate the efficacy and feasibility of the proposed technique in empirical evaluations in a centralized training, decentralized execution (CTDE) CoMARL benchmark. Furthermore, while we propose our explicit ToM defense for test-time, we emphasize that ToM is a construct for designing a cognitive defense rather than be the objective of the defense.

Many real-world problems require the coordination of multiple autonomous agents. Recent work has shown the promise of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) to learn explicit communication strategies that enable complex multi-agent coordination. These works use models of cooperative multi-agent systems whereby agents strive to achieve a shared global goal. When considering agents with self-interested local objectives, the standard design choice is to model these as separate learning systems (albeit sharing the same environment). Such a design choice, however, precludes the existence of a single, differentiable communication channel, and consequently prohibits the learning of inter-agent communication strategies. In this work, we address this gap by presenting a learning model that accommodates individual non-shared rewards and a differentiable communication channel that is common among all agents. We focus on the case where agents have self-interested objectives, and develop a learning algorithm that elicits the emergence of adversarial communications. We perform experiments on multi-agent coverage and path planning problems, and employ a post-hoc interpretability technique to visualize the messages that agents communicate to each other. We show how a single self-interested agent is capable of learning highly manipulative communication strategies that allows it to significantly outperform a cooperative team of agents.

Interactive Decision Making for Autonomous V ehicles in Dense Traffic David Isele 1 Abstract -- Dense urban traffic environments can produce situations where accurate prediction and dynamic models are insufficient for successful autonomous vehicle motion planning. We investigate how an autonomous agent can safely negotiate with other traffic participants, enabling the agent to handle potential deadlocks. Specifically we consider merges where the gap between cars is smaller than the size of the ego vehicle. We propose a game theoretic framework capable of generating and responding to interactive behaviors. Our main contribution is to show how game-tree decision making can be executed by an autonomous vehicle, including approximations and reasoning that make the tree-search computationally tractable. Additionally, to test our model we develop a stochastic rule-based traffic agent capable of generating interactive behaviors that can be used as a benchmark for simulating traffic participants in a crowded merge setting. I NTRODUCTION Much of the long tail around autonomous driving behavior relates to complex interactions between self-interested agents. Since other traffic participants exhibit a great deal of variety and are often neither purely adversarial, nor purely cooperative, it can be difficult to reason about their behavior. However this type of reasoning is essential to numerous traffic situations in congested traffic such as overcrowded merge scenarios depicted in Figure 1.

Incentive mechanisms play a pivotal role in collecting correct and reliable information from self-interested agents. Peer-prediction mechanisms are game-theoretic mechanisms that incentivize agents for reporting the information truthfully, even when the information is unverifiable in nature. Traditionally, a trusted third party implements these mechanisms. We built Infochain, a decentralized system for information elicitation. Infochain ensures transparent, trustless and cost-efficient collection of information from self-interested agents without compromising the game-theoretical guarantees of the peer-prediction mechanisms. In this paper, we address various non-trivial challenges in implementing these mechanisms in Ethereum and provide experimental analysis.