The machines gain possibly different utilities by processing different jobs, and alljobs assigned tothesame machine should beprocessed without overlap.

Modern machine learning models are trained on diverse datasets and tasks to improve generalization. A key challenge in multitask learning is determining the optimal data mixing and sampling strategy across different data sources. Prior research in this multi-task learning setting has primarily focused on mitigating gradient conflicts between tasks. However, we observe that many real-world multitask learning scenarios--such as multilingual training and multi-domain learning in large foundation models--exhibit predominantly positive task interactions with minimal or no gradient conflict. Building on this insight, we introduce PiKE (Positive gradient interaction-based K-task weights Estimator), an adaptive data mixing algorithm that dynamically adjusts task contributions throughout training. PiKE optimizes task sampling to minimize overall loss, effectively leveraging positive gradient interactions with almost no additional computational overhead. We establish theoretical convergence guarantees for PiKE and demonstrate its superiority over static and non-adaptive mixing strategies. Additionally, we extend PiKE to promote fair learning across tasks, ensuring balanced progress and preventing task underrepresentation. Empirical evaluations on large-scale language model pretraining show that PiKE consistently outperforms existing heuristic and static mixing strategies, leading to faster convergence and improved downstream task performance.

Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open questions. The problem becomes much harder in the presence of strategic agents. Ideally, one would want to design truthful mechanisms that produce allocations with fairness guarantees. However, in the standard setting without monetary transfers, it is generally impossible to have truthful mechanisms that provide non-trivial fairness guarantees. Recently, Amanatidis et al. [2021] suggested the study of mechanisms that produce fair allocations in their equilibria. Specifically, when the agents have additive valuation functions, the simple Round-Robin algorithm always has pure Nash equilibria and the corresponding allocations are envy-free up to one good (EF1) with respect to the agents' true valuation functions. Following this agenda, we show that this outstanding property of the Round-Robin mechanism extends much beyond the above default assumption of additivity. In particular, we prove that for agents with cancelable valuation functions (a natural class that contains, e.g., additive and budget-additive functions), this simple mechanism always has equilibria and even its approximate equilibria correspond to approximately EF1 allocations with respect to the agents' true valuation functions. Further, we show that the approximate EF1 fairness of approximate equilibria surprisingly holds for the important class of submodular valuation functions as well, even though exact equilibria fail to exist!

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported -- rather than the true -- values of the agents. Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for the allocations that correspond to these equilibria. We focus on two relaxations of envy-freeness, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX), and we positively answer the above question. In particular, we study two algorithms that are known to produce such allocations in the non-strategic setting: Round-Robin (EF1 allocations for any number of agents) and a cut-and-choose algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden [SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics, 2020] (EFX allocations for two agents). For Round-Robin we show that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are EF1 with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are EFX but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-strategic setting! Further, we show that a weaker version of the latter result holds for any mechanism for two agents that always has pure Nash equilibria which all induce EFX allocations.

Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are pairs of artificial neural networks that are trained one against each other. The outputs from a generator are mixed with the real-world inputs to the discriminator and both networks are trained until an equilibrium is reached, where the discriminator cannot distinguish generated inputs from real ones. Since their introduction, GANs have allowed for the generation of impressive imitations of real-life films, images and texts, whose fakeness is barely noticeable to humans. Despite their impressive performance, training GANs remains to this day more of an art than a reliable procedure, in a large part due to training process stability. Generators are susceptible to mode dropping and convergence to random patterns, which have to be mitigated by computationally expensive multiple restarts. Curiously, GANs bear an uncanny similarity to a co-evolution of a pathogen and its host's immune system in biology. In a biological context, the majority of potential pathogens indeed never make it and are kept at bay by the hots' immune system. Yet some are efficient enough to present a risk of a serious condition and recurrent infections. Here, we explore that similarity to propose a more robust algorithm for GANs training. We empirically show the increased stability and a better ability to generate high-quality images while using less computational power.

Classical learning assumes the learner is given a labeled data sample, from which it learns a model. The field of Active Learning deals with the situation where the learner begins not with a training sample, but instead with resources that it can use to obtain information to help identify the optimal model. To better understand this task, this paper presents and analyses the simplified "(budgeted) active model selection" version, which captures the pure exploration aspect of many active learning problems in a clean and simple problem formulation. Here the learner can use a fixed budget of "model probes" (where each probe evaluates the specified model on a random indistinguishable instance) to identify which of a given set of possible models has the highest expected accuracy. Our goal is a policy that sequentially determines which model to probe next, based on the information observed so far. We present a formal description of this task, and show that it is NPhard in general. We then investigate a number of algorithms for this task, including several existing ones (eg, "Round-Robin", "Interval Estimation", "Gittins") as well as some novel ones (e.g., "Biased-Robin"), describing first their approximation properties and then their empirical performance on various problem instances. We observe empirically that the simple biased-robin algorithm significantly outperforms the other algorithms in the case of identical costs and priors.