Methods to quantify uncertainty in predictions from arbitrary models are in demand in high-stakes domains like medicine and finance. Conformal prediction has emerged as a popular method for producing a set of predictions with specified average coverage, in place of a single prediction and confidence value. However, the value of conformal prediction sets to assist human decisions remains elusive due to the murky relationship between coverage guarantees and decision makers' goals and strategies. How should we think about conformal prediction sets as a form of decision support? We outline a decision theoretic framework for evaluating predictive uncertainty as informative signals, then contrast what can be said within this framework about idealized use of calibrated probabilities versus conformal prediction sets. Informed by prior empirical results and theories of human decisions under uncertainty, we formalize a set of possible strategies by which a decision maker might use a prediction set. We identify ways in which conformal prediction sets and posthoc predictive uncertainty quantification more broadly are in tension with common goals and needs in human-AI decision making. We give recommendations for future research in predictive uncertainty quantification to support human decision makers.

Humans and AIs are often paired on decision tasks with the expectation of achieving complementary performance -- where the combination of human and AI outperforms either one alone. However, how to improve performance of a human-AI team is often not clear without knowing more about what particular information and strategies each agent employs. In this paper, we propose a model based in statistically decision theory to analyze human-AI collaboration from the perspective of what information could be used to improve a human or AI decision. We demonstrate our model on a deepfake detection task to investigate seven video-level features by their unexploited value of information. We compare the human alone, AI alone and human-AI team and offer insights on how the AI assistance impacts people's usage of the information and what information that the AI exploits well might be useful for improving human decisions.

Whenever a binary classifier is used to provide decision support, it typically provides both a label prediction and a confidence value. Then, the decision maker is supposed to use the confidence value to calibrate how much to trust the prediction. In this context, it has been often argued that the confidence value should correspond to a well calibrated estimate of the probability that the predicted label matches the ground truth label. However, multiple lines of empirical evidence suggest that decision makers have difficulties at developing a good sense on when to trust a prediction using these confidence values. In this paper, our goal is first to understand why and then investigate how to construct more useful confidence values. We first argue that, for a broad class of utility functions, there exist data distributions for which a rational decision maker is, in general, unlikely to discover the optimal decision policy using the above confidence values -- an optimal decision maker would need to sometimes place more (less) trust on predictions with lower (higher) confidence values. However, we then show that, if the confidence values satisfy a natural alignment property with respect to the decision maker's confidence on her own predictions, there always exists an optimal decision policy under which the level of trust the decision maker would need to place on predictions is monotone on the confidence values, facilitating its discoverability. Further, we show that multicalibration with respect to the decision maker's confidence on her own predictions is a sufficient condition for alignment. Experiments on four different AI-assisted decision making tasks where a classifier provides decision support to real human experts validate our theoretical results and suggest that alignment may lead to better decisions.

In game theory and artificial intelligence, decision making models often involve maximizing expected utility, which does not respect ordinal invariance. In this paper, the author discusses the possibility of preserving ordinal invariance and still making a rational decision under uncertainty.