We revisit this problem when the learner is also given as advice the parameters of a product distribution Q. We show that there is an efficient algorithm to learn P within TV distance εthat has sample complexity O(d1 η/ε2), if p q 1 < εd0.5 Ω(η). Here, p and q are the mean vectors of P and Q respectively, and no bound on p q 1 is known to the algorithm a priori.

We give an algorithm for learning O(logn)juntas in polynomial-time with respect to Markov Random Fields (MRFs) in a smoothed analysis framework where only the external field has been randomly perturbed. This is a broad generalization1 of the work of Kalai and Teng, who gave an algorithm that succeeded with respect to smoothed product distributions (i.e., MRFs whose dependency graph has no edges). Our algorithm has two phases: (1) an unsupervised structure learning phase and (2) a greedy supervised learning algorithm. This is the first example where algorithms for learning the structure of undirected graphical models have downstream applications to supervised learning.

Correlated equilibria--and their generalizations known as Φ-equilibria--are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of equilibrium computation are well-understood in some settings, fundamental questions are still open in generalized games, that is, games in which the set of strategies allowed to each player depends on the other players' strategies. These classes of games model fundamental settings in economics, and have been a cornerstone of economics research since the seminal paper of Arrow and Debreu [1954]. Recently, there has been growing interest, both in economics and in computer science, in studying correlated equilibria in generalized games. It is known that finding a social welfare maximizing correlated equilibrium in generalized games is NP-hard. However, the existence of efficient algorithms to find any equilibrium remains an important open question.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms when agents' valuation functions are drawn from unknown and correlated prior distributions. In particular, we are given a prior distribution D, and we are interested in designing a (truthful) mechanism that has good performance for all "true distributions" that are close to Din Total Variation (TV) distance. We show that DSIC and BIC mechanisms in this setting are strongly robust with respect to TV distance, for any bounded objective function O, extending a recent result of Brustle et al. ([BCD20], EC 2020). At the heart of our result is a fundamental duality property of total variation distance. As direct applications of our result, we (i) demonstrate how to find approximately revenue-optimal and approximately BIC mechanisms for weakly dependent prior distributions; (ii) show how to find correlation-robust mechanisms when only "noisy" versions of marginals are accessible, extending recent results of Bei et.

Despite its popularity in practice, theoretical guarantees for high-dimensional problems are only available under strong structural assumptions (e.g., sparsity).