Large language models exhibit intelligence without genuine epistemic understanding, exposing a key gap: the absence of epistemic architecture. This paper introduces the Structured Cognitive Loop (SCL) as an executable epistemological framework for emergent intelligence. Unlike traditional AI research asking "what is intelligence?" (ontological), SCL asks "under what conditions does cognition emerge?" (epistemological). Grounded in philosophy of mind and cognitive phenomenology, SCL bridges conceptual philosophy and implementable cognition. Drawing on process philosophy, enactive cognition, and extended mind theory, we define intelligence not as a property but as a performed process -- a continuous loop of judgment, memory, control, action, and regulation. SCL makes three contributions. First, it operationalizes philosophical insights into computationally interpretable structures, enabling "executable epistemology" -- philosophy as structural experiment. Second, it shows that functional separation within cognitive architecture yields more coherent and interpretable behavior than monolithic prompt based systems, supported by agent evaluations. Third, it redefines intelligence: not representational accuracy but the capacity to reconstruct its own epistemic state through intentional understanding. This framework impacts philosophy of mind, epistemology, and AI. For philosophy, it allows theories of cognition to be enacted and tested. For AI, it grounds behavior in epistemic structure rather than statistical regularity. For epistemology, it frames knowledge not as truth possession but as continuous reconstruction within a phenomenologically coherent loop. We situate SCL within debates on cognitive phenomenology, emergence, normativity, and intentionality, arguing that real progress requires not larger models but architectures that realize cognitive principles structurally.

The determination of sample size in qualitative research has traditionally relied on the subjective and often ambiguous principle of data saturation, which can lead to inconsistencies and threaten methodological rigor. This study introduces a new, systematic model based on machine learning (ML) to make this process more objective. Utilizing a dataset derived from five fundamental qualitative research approaches - namely, Case Study, Grounded Theory, Phenomenology, Narrative Research, and Ethnographic Research - we developed an ensemble learning model. Ten critical parameters, including research scope, information power, and researcher competence, were evaluated using an ordinal scale and used as input features. After thorough preprocessing and outlier removal, multiple ML algorithms were trained and compared. The K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Gradient Boosting (GB), Random Forest (RF), XGBoost, and Decision Tree (DT) algorithms showed the highest explanatory power (Test R2 ~ 0.85), effectively modeling the complex, non-linear relationships involved in qualitative sampling decisions. Feature importance analysis confirmed the vital roles of research design type and information power, providing quantitative validation of key theoretical assumptions in qualitative methodology. The study concludes by proposing a conceptual framework for a web-based computational application designed to serve as a decision support system for qualitative researchers, journal reviewers, and thesis advisors. This model represents a significant step toward standardizing sample size justification, enhancing transparency, and strengthening the epistemological foundation of qualitative inquiry through evidence-based, systematic decision-making.

Whether artificial intelligence (AI) systems can possess consciousness is a contentious question because of the inherent challenges of defining and operationalizing subjective experience. This paper proposes a framework to reframe the question of artificial consciousness into empirically tractable tests. We introduce three evaluative criteria - S (subjective-linguistic), L (latent-emergent), and P (phenomenological-structural) - collectively termed SLP-tests, which assess whether an AI system instantiates interface representations that facilitate consciousness-like properties.

This Ph.D. proposal introduces a plan to develop a computational framework to identify Self-aspects in text. The Self is a multifaceted construct and it is reflected in language. While it is described across disciplines like cognitive science and phenomenology, it remains underexplored in natural language processing (NLP). Many of the aspects of the Self align with psychological and other well-researched phenomena (e.g., those related to mental health), highlighting the need for systematic NLP-based analysis. In line with this, we plan to introduce an ontology of Self-aspects and a gold-standard annotated dataset. Using this foundation, we will develop and evaluate conventional discriminative models, generative large language models, and embedding-based retrieval approaches against four main criteria: interpretability, ground-truth adherence, accuracy, and computational efficiency. Top-performing models will be applied in case studies in mental health and empirical phenomenology.

Stroboscopic light stimulation (SLS) on closed eyes typically induces simple visual hallucinations (VHs), characterised by vivid, geometric and colourful patterns. A dataset of 862 sentences, extracted from 422 open subjective reports, was recently compiled as part of the Dreamachine programme (Collective Act, 2022), an immersive multisensory experience that combines SLS and spatial sound in a collective setting. Although open reports extend the range of reportable phenomenology, their analysis presents significant challenges, particularly in systematically identifying patterns. To address this challenge, we implemented a data-driven approach leveraging Large Language Models and Topic Modelling to uncover and interpret latent experiential topics directly from the Dreamachine's text-based reports. Our analysis confirmed the presence of simple VHs typically documented in scientific studies of SLS, while also revealing experiences of altered states of consciousness and complex hallucinations. Building on these findings, our computational approach expands the systematic study of subjective experience by enabling data-driven analyses of open-ended phenomenological reports, capturing experiences not readily identified through standard questionnaires. By revealing rich and multifaceted aspects of experiences, our study broadens our understanding of stroboscopically-induced phenomena while highlighting the potential of Natural Language Processing and Large Language Models in the emerging field of computational (neuro)phenomenology. More generally, this approach provides a practically applicable methodology for uncovering subtle hidden patterns of subjective experience across diverse research domains.

There is a general concern that present developments in artificial intelligence (AI) research will lead to sentient AI systems, and these may pose an existential threat to humanity. But why cannot sentient AI systems benefit humanity instead? This paper endeavours to put this question in a tractable manner. I ask whether a putative AI system will develop an altruistic or a malicious disposition towards our society, or what would be the nature of its agency? Given that AI systems are being developed into formidable problem solvers, we can reasonably expect these systems to preferentially take on conscious aspects of human problem solving. I identify the relevant phenomenal aspects of agency in human problem solving. The functional aspects of conscious agency can be monitored using tools provided by functionalist theories of consciousness. A recent expert report (Butlin et al. 2023) has identified functionalist indicators of agency based on these theories. I show how to use the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness, to monitor the phenomenal nature of this agency. If we are able to monitor the agency of AI systems as they develop, then we can dissuade them from becoming a menace to society while encouraging them to be an aid.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still face challenges in tasks requiring understanding implicit instructions and applying common-sense knowledge. In such scenarios, LLMs may require multiple attempts to achieve human-level performance, potentially leading to inaccurate responses or inferences in practical environments, affecting their long-term consistency and behavior. This paper introduces the Internal Time-Consciousness Machine (ITCM), a computational consciousness structure to simulate the process of human consciousness. We further propose the ITCM-based Agent (ITCMA), which supports action generation and reasoning in open-world settings, and can independently complete tasks. ITCMA enhances LLMs' ability to understand implicit instructions and apply common-sense knowledge by considering agents' interaction and reasoning with the environment. Evaluations in the Alfworld environment show that trained ITCMA outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) by 9% on the seen set. Even untrained ITCMA achieves a 96% task completion rate on the seen set, 5% higher than SOTA, indicating its superiority over traditional intelligent agents in utility and generalization. In real-world tasks with quadruped robots, the untrained ITCMA achieves an 85% task completion rate, which is close to its performance in the unseen set, demonstrating its comparable utility and universality in real-world settings.

We propose a non-representationalist framework for deep learning relying on a novel method: computational phenomenology, a dialogue between the first-person perspective (relying on phenomenology) and the mechanisms of computational models. We thereby reject the modern cognitivist interpretation of deep learning, according to which artificial neural networks encode representations of external entities. This interpretation mainly relies on neuro-representationalism, a position that combines a strong ontological commitment towards scientific theoretical entities and the idea that the brain operates on symbolic representations of these entities. We proceed as follows: after offering a review of cognitivism and neuro-representationalism in the field of deep learning, we first elaborate a phenomenological critique of these positions; we then sketch out computational phenomenology and distinguish it from existing alternatives; finally we apply this new method to deep learning models trained on specific tasks, in order to formulate a conceptual framework of deep-learning, that allows one to think of artificial neural networks' mechanisms in terms of lived experience.

Phenomenology is the rigorous descriptive study of conscious experience. Recent attempts to formalize Husserlian phenomenology provide us with a mathematical model of perception as a function of prior knowledge and expectation. In this paper, we re-examine elements of Husserlian phenomenology through the lens of active inference. In doing so, we aim to advance the project of computational phenomenology, as recently outlined by proponents of active inference. We propose that key aspects of Husserl's descriptions of consciousness can be mapped onto aspects of the generative models associated with the active inference approach. We first briefly review active inference. We then discuss Husserl's phenomenology, with a focus on time consciousness. Finally, we present our mapping from Husserlian phenomenology to active inference.

We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience, and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.