In this paper, we present a field report of the mapping of the Athabasca Glacier, using a custom-made lidar-inertial mapping platform. With the increasing autonomy of robotics, a wider spectrum of applications emerges. Among these, the surveying of environmental areas presents arduous and hazardous challenges for human operators. Leveraging automated platforms for data collection holds the promise of unlocking new applications and a deeper comprehension of the environment. Over the course of a week-long deployment, we collected glacier data using a tailor-made measurement platform and reflected on the inherent challenges associated with such experiments. We focus on the insights gained and the forthcoming challenges that robotics must surmount to effectively map these terrains.

For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of agents assigned their first choices, together with Pareto efficiency (PE). Our mechanisms also provide guarantees of ex-ante and ex-post fairness. The generalized eager Boston mechanism is ex-ante envy-free, and ex-post envy-free up to one item (EF1). The generalized probabilistic Boston mechanism is also ex-post EF1, and satisfies ex-ante efficiency instead of fairness. We also show that no strategyproof mechanism satisfies ex-post PE, EF1, and FCM simultaneously. In doing so, we expand the frontiers of simultaneously providing efficiency and both ex-ante and ex-post fairness guarantees for the assignment problem.

When aggregating preferences of agents via voting, two desirable goals are to incentivize agents to participate in the voting process and then identify outcomes that are Pareto efficient. We consider participation as formalized by Brandl, Brandt, and Hofbauer (2015) based on the stochastic dominance (SD) relation. We formulate a new rule called RMEC (Rank Maximal Equal Contribution) that is polynomial-time computable, ex post efficient and satisfies the strongest notion of participation. It also satisfies many other desirable fairness properties. The rule suggests a general approach to achieving very strong participation, ex post efficiency and fairness.

One drab afternoon a few years ago something very unusual happened to me. I was lounging under a tree in a packed east London park when I experienced a sudden feeling of vertigo, followed immediately by an overwhelming and intense sense of familiarity. The people around me vanished and I found myself lying on a tartan picnic blanket amid a field of high golden wheat. The memory was rich and detailed. I could hear the sway of the wheat ears as a gentle breeze brushed through them. I felt warm sunlight on the back of my neck and watched as birds wheeled and floated above me. It was a pleasant and extremely vivid recollection. The problem was that it never actually happened. What I was experiencing was an extreme form of a very common mental illusion: déjà vu.

A French robotics startup has raised €3.3 million ($3.5 million) to build and grow a fleet of mobile robots that help warehouses prepare orders for delivery. The company was founded in 2015 by former GE Healthcare software architect Renaud Heitz and BA Systèmes technical director Romain Moulin, and Exotec Solutions ("Exotec") robots have already been tested across a number of industries. With $3.5 million more in its coffers, the company expects to launch its first robot -- called Exo -- into the wild in early 2017. The most recent round was raised from 360 Capital Partners, Breega Capital, and a handful of its existing investors. The miniature robots are being targeted at any logistics operator that relies on humans to traverse large warehouses picking items off shelves, and it promises to cut employees' average daily distance covered from 15km to 4km per day and to "[double] the productivity" of each worker.

We study an important crowdsourcing setting where agents evaluate one another and, based on these evaluations, a subset of agents are selected. This setting is ubiquitous when peer review is used for distributing awards in a team, allocating funding to scientists, and selecting publications for conferences. The fundamental challenge when applying crowdsourcing in these settings is that agents may misreport their reviews of others to increase their chances of being selected. We propose a new strategyproof (impartial) mechanism called Dollar Partition that satisfies desirable axiomatic properties. We then show, using a detailed experiment with parameter values derived from target real world domains, that our mechanism performs better on average, and in the worst case, than other strategyproof mechanisms in the literature.

The probabilistic serial rule is one of the most well-established and desirable rules for the random assignment problem. We present the egalitarian simultaneous reservation social decision scheme – an extension of probabilistic serial to the more general setting of randomized social choice. We consider various desirable fairness, efficiency, and strategic properties of social decision schemes and show that egalitarian simultaneous reservation compares favorably against existing rules. Finally, we define a more general class of social decision schemes called simultaneous reservation, that contains egalitarian simultaneous reservation as well as the serial dictatorship rules. We show that outcomes of simultaneous reservation characterize efficiency with respect to a natural refinement of stochastic dominance.

Efficiency--no agent can be made better off without making another one worse off--and strategyproofness--no agent can obtain a more preferred outcome by misrepresenting his preferences--are two cornerstones of economics and ubiquitous in important areas such as voting, auctions, or matching markets. Within the context of random assignment, Bogomolnaia and Moulin have shown that two particular notions of efficiency and strategyproofness based on stochastic dominance are incompatible. However, there are various other possibilities of lifting preferences over alternatives to preferences over lotteries apart from stochastic dominance. In this paper, we give an overview of common preference extensions, propose two new ones, and show that the above-mentioned incompatibility can be extended to various other notions of strategyproofness and efficiency in randomized social choice.