Digital communication has become the cornerstone of modern interaction, enabling rapid, accessible, and interactive exchanges. However, individuals with lower academic literacy often face significant barriers, exacerbating the "digital divide". In this work, we introduce a novel, universal ideographic metalanguage designed as an innovative communication framework that transcends academic, linguistic, and cultural boundaries. Our approach leverages principles of Neuro-symbolic AI, combining neural-based large language models (LLMs) enriched with world knowledge and symbolic knowledge heuristics grounded in the linguistic theory of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM). This enables the semantic decomposition of complex ideas into simpler, atomic concepts. Adopting a human-centric, collaborative methodology, we engaged over 200 semi-literate participants in defining the problem, selecting ideographs, and validating the system. With over 80\% semantic comprehensibility, an accessible learning curve, and universal adaptability, our system effectively serves underprivileged populations with limited formal education.

We present ELQA, a corpus of questions and answers in and about the English language. Collected from two online forums, the >70k questions (from English learners and others) cover wide-ranging topics including grammar, meaning, fluency, and etymology. The answers include descriptions of general properties of English vocabulary and grammar as well as explanations about specific (correct and incorrect) usage examples. Unlike most NLP datasets, this corpus is metalinguistic -- it consists of language about language. As such, it can facilitate investigations of the metalinguistic capabilities of NLU models, as well as educational applications in the language learning domain. To study this, we define a free-form question answering task on our dataset and conduct evaluations on multiple LLMs (Large Language Models) to analyze their capacity to generate metalinguistic answers.

Most judicial decisions involve the interpretation of legal texts; as such, judicial opinion requires the use of language as a medium to comment on or draw attention to other language. Language used this way is called metalanguage. We develop an annotation schema for categorizing types of legal metalanguage and apply our schema to a set of U.S. Supreme Court opinions, yielding a corpus totaling 59k tokens. We remark on several patterns observed in the kinds of metalanguage used by the justices.

Inferential relations govern our concept use. In order to understand a concept it has to be located in a space of implications. There are different kinds of conditions for statements, i.e. that the conditions represent different kinds of explanations, e.g. causal or conceptual explanations. The crucial questions is: How can the conditionality of language use be represented. The conceptual background of representation in models is discussed and in the end I propose how implications of propositional logic and conceptual determinations can be represented in a model of a neural network.

The difference between object-language and metalanguage is crucial for logical analysis, but has yet not been examined for the field of computer science. In this paper the difference is examined with regard to inferential relations. It is argued that inferential relations in a metalanguage (like a calculus for propositional logic) cannot represent conceptual relations of natural language. Inferential relations govern our concept use and understanding. Several approaches in the field of Natural Language Understanding (NLU) and Natural Language Inference (NLI) take this insight in account, but do not consider, how an inference can be assessed as a good inference. I present a logical analysis that can assesss the normative dimension of inferences, which is a crucial part of logical understanding and goes beyond formal understanding of metalanguages.

The following is an excerpt to Chapter 4: Expert Systems – Language Mapping of MindMeld: CEO & AI Merging of Mental & Metal book available now from iBooks – Available on iPhone, iPad, iPod touch, and Mac. Book Review – "As the CEO of a energy industrial company and actively involved in CEO Leadership Forums I have been following AI for more than a decade. Indeed the promises for improving many technical tasks are interesting yet in reality often prove more complex to manage than proposed. MindMeld was very profound in proposing that AI starts not at the bottom of the organization but with CXO decision-making and worth reading by anyone in or rising to the boardroom." For interviews, professional guidance, product/market research or evaluations, articles, speeches or presentations as well as CEO Executive Seminar on AI, please contact cross@gocross.com

We are interested in constructing a computer agent whose behaviour will be intelligent enough to perform cooperative tasks involving other agents like itself. The construction of such agents has been a major goal of artificial intelligence research. One of the key tasks such an agent must perform is to form plans to carry out its intentions in a complex world in which other planning agents also exist. To construct such agents, it will be necessary to address a number of issues that concern the interaction of knowledge, actions, and planning. Briefly stated, an agent at planning time must take into account what his future states of knowledge will be if he is to form plans that he can execute; and if he must incorporate the plans of other agents into his own, then he must also be able to reason about the knowledge and plans of other agents in an appropriate way.

The existence of a non-algorithmic side of the mind, conjectured by Penrose on the basis of G\"odel's first incompleteness theorem, is investigated here in terms of a quantum metalanguage. We suggest that, besides human ordinary thought, which can be formalized in a computable, logical language, there is another important kind of human thought, which is Turing-non-computable. This is methatought, the process of thinking about ordinary thought. Metathought can be formalized as a metalanguage, which speaks about and controls the logical language of ordinary thought. Ordinary thought has two computational modes, the quantum mode and the classical mode, the latter deriving from decoherence of the former. In order to control the logical language of the quantum mode, one needs to introduce a quantum metalanguage, which in turn requires a quantum version of Tarski Convention T.

Description Logics (DLs) provide a clear and broadly accepted paradigm for modeling and reasoning about terminological knowledge. However, it has been often noted, that although DLs are well-suited for representing a single, global viewpoint on an application domain, they offer no formal grounding for dealing with knowledge pertaining to multiple heterogeneous viewpoints — a scenario ever more often approached in practical applications, e.g. concerned with reasoning over distributed knowledge sources on the Semantic Web. In this paper, we study a natural extension of DLs, in the style of two-dimensional modal logics, which supports declarative modeling of viewpoints as contexts, in the sense of McCarthy, and their semantic interoperability. The formalism is based on two-dimensional semantics, where one dimension represents a usual object domain and the other a (possibly infinite) domain of viewpoints, addressed by additional modal operators and a metalanguage, on the syntactic level. We systematically introduce a number of expressive fragments of the proposed logic, study their computational complexity and connections to related formalisms.

The most important requirements, for an operator to be viewed as a proposition, is that it must be hermitian and idempotent (which, in the Hilbert case corresponds to projectors). We interpret the above restrictions as follows. Hermitian operators have real eigenvalues. In particular, idempotent operators have eigenvalues 0 or 1, that is, they allow for asserting or negating in the classical way. When the operator is not hermitian, it is true that there is no way to interpret it directly as a logical proposition, because its eigenvalues are not real numbers, and the proposition cannot be asserted as usual.