medical imaging system
Hammering the Diagnosis: Rowhammer-Induced Stealthy Trojan Attacks on ViT-Based Medical Imaging
Latibari, Banafsheh Saber, Nazari, Najmeh, Sayadi, Hossein, Homayoun, Houman, Mahalanobis, Abhijit
Abstract--Vision Transformers (ViTs) have emerged as powerful architectures in medical image analysis, excelling in tasks such as disease detection, segmentation, and classification. However, their reliance on large, attention-driven models makes them vulnerable to hardware-level attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel threat model referred to as Med-Hammer that combines the Rowhammer hardware fault injection with neural Trojan attacks to compromise the integrity of ViT -based medical imaging systems. Specifically, we demonstrate how malicious bit flips induced via Rowhammer can trigger implanted neural Trojans, leading to targeted misclassification or suppression of critical diagnoses (e.g., tumors or lesions) in medical scans. Through extensive experiments on benchmark medical imaging datasets such as ISIC, Brain T umor, and MedMNIST, we show that such attacks can remain stealthy while achieving high attack success rates about 82.51% and 92.56% in MobileViT and SwinTrans-former, respectively. We further investigate how architectural properties, such as model sparsity, attention weight distribution, and number of features of the layer, impact attack effectiveness. Our findings highlight a critical and underexplored intersection between hardware-level faults and deep learning security in healthcare applications, underscoring the urgent need for robust defenses spanning both model architectures and underlying hardware platforms. In clinical practice, medical imaging plays a central role in detecting, diagnosing, and monitoring a wide range of conditions.
AdverX-Ray: Ensuring X-Ray Integrity Through Frequency-Sensitive Adversarial VAEs
Caetano, Francisco, Viviers, Christiaan, Filatova, Lena, de With, Peter H. N., van der Sommen, Fons
Ensuring the quality and integrity of medical images is crucial for maintaining diagnostic accuracy in deep learning-based Computer-Aided Diagnosis and Computer-Aided Detection (CAD) systems. Covariate shifts are subtle variations in the data distribution caused by different imaging devices or settings and can severely degrade model performance, similar to the effects of adversarial attacks. Therefore, it is vital to have a lightweight and fast method to assess the quality of these images prior to using CAD models. AdverX-Ray addresses this need by serving as an image-quality assessment layer, designed to detect covariate shifts effectively. This Adversarial Variational Autoencoder prioritizes the discriminator's role, using the suboptimal outputs of the generator as negative samples to fine-tune the discriminator's ability to identify high-frequency artifacts. Images generated by adversarial networks often exhibit severe high-frequency artifacts, guiding the discriminator to focus excessively on these components. This makes the discriminator ideal for this approach. Trained on patches from X-ray images of specific machine models, AdverX-Ray can evaluate whether a scan matches the training distribution, or if a scan from the same machine is captured under different settings. Extensive comparisons with various OOD detection methods show that AdverX-Ray significantly outperforms existing techniques, achieving a 96.2% average AUROC using only 64 random patches from an X-ray. Its lightweight and fast architecture makes it suitable for real-time applications, enhancing the reliability of medical imaging systems. The code and pretrained models are publicly available.
Cyber Threats to Medical Imaging Systems and How to Address Them
A recent report by ProPublica showed that medical imaging data of over 5 million patients in the United States are publicly available on the internet. As a result of 187 misconfigured servers, medical imaging data, often containing identifiable patient information that should be protected, is "sitting unprotected on the internet and available to anyone with basic computer expertise." Researchers discovered over 13.7 million medical tests, including 400,000 with downloadable images. These imaging records were stored on servers, including systems used for archiving medical images, without a robust solution in place to monitor for unauthorized changes or to ensure the servers were securely configured and in compliance with regulatory standards. These medical images include MRI, X-Rays and accompanying identifiable patient data that could be used for blackmail.