We study a class of classification problems best exemplified by the \emph{bank loan} problem, where a lender decides whether or not to issue a loan. The lender only observes whether a customer will repay a loan if the loan is issued to begin with, and thus modeled decisions affect what data is available to the lender for future decisions. As a result, it is possible for the lender's algorithm to ``get stuck'' with a self-fulfilling model. This model never corrects its false negatives, since it never sees the true label for rejected data, thus accumulating infinite regret. In the case of linear models, this issue can be addressed by adding optimism directly into the model predictions. However, there are few methods that extend to the function approximation case using Deep Neural Networks.

Algorithmic fairness has emerged as a central issue in ML, and it has become standard practice to adjust ML algorithms so that they will satisfy fairness requirements such as Equal Opportunity. In this paper we consider the effects of adopting such fair classifiers on the overall level of ecosystem fairness. Specifically, we introduce the study of fairness with competing firms, and demonstrate the failure of fair classifiers in yielding fair ecosystems. Our results quantify the loss of fairness in systems, under a variety of conditions, based on classifiers' correlation and the level of their data overlap. We show that even if competing classifiers are individually fair, the ecosystem's outcome may be unfair; and that adjusting biased algorithms to improve their individual fairness may lead to an overall decline in ecosystem fairness. In addition to these theoretical results, we also provide supporting experimental evidence. Together, our model and results provide a novel and essential call for action.

Elon Musk's artificial intelligence firm xAI has acquired his social media platform X in an all-stock transaction that values the company at 33 billion, including 12 billion worth of debt, the centibillionaire announced Friday. The sale comes just weeks after Musk reportedly raised an additional roughly 1 billion in debt financing for X that valued the company at 44 billion--the same price Musk paid for it three years ago. "xAI and X's futures are intertwined," Musk wrote in an X post. "Today, we officially take the step to combine the data, models, compute, distribution and talent. This combination will unlock immense potential by blending xAI's advanced AI capability and expertise with X's massive reach."

We study a class of classification problems best exemplified by the \emph{bank loan} problem, where a lender decides whether or not to issue a loan. The lender only observes whether a customer will repay a loan if the loan is issued to begin with, and thus modeled decisions affect what data is available to the lender for future decisions. As a result, it is possible for the lender's algorithm to get stuck'' with a self-fulfilling model. This model never corrects its false negatives, since it never sees the true label for rejected data, thus accumulating infinite regret. In the case of linear models, this issue can be addressed by adding optimism directly into the model predictions.

Securities lending is an important part of the financial market structure, where agent lenders help long term institutional investors to lend out their securities to short sellers in exchange for a lending fee. Agent lenders within the market seek to optimize revenue by lending out securities at the highest rate possible. Typically, this rate is set by hard-coded business rules or standard supervised machine learning models. These approaches are often difficult to scale and are not adaptive to changing market conditions. Unlike a traditional stock exchange with a centralized limit order book, the securities lending market is organized similarly to an e-commerce marketplace, where agent lenders and borrowers can transact at any agreed price in a bilateral fashion. This similarity suggests that the use of typical methods for addressing dynamic pricing problems in e-commerce could be effective in the securities lending market. We show that existing contextual bandit frameworks can be successfully utilized in the securities lending market. Using offline evaluation on real historical data, we show that the contextual bandit approach can consistently outperform typical approaches by at least 15% in terms of total revenue generated.

Most days she is able to live comfortably without a car. She works remotely often but occasionally she needs to go into the office. That's where her situation gets a bit challenging. Her workspace is not easily accessible by public transportation. Because she doesn't need to drive often she applied for the car-sharing platform Zipcar to fulfill her occasional need.

In this study, we aim to extend the capabilities of diffusion-based text-to-image (T2I) generation models by incorporating diverse modalities beyond textual description, such as sketch, box, color palette, and style embedding, within a single model. We thus design a multimodal T2I diffusion model, coined as DiffBlender, by separating the channels of conditions into three types, i.e., image forms, spatial tokens, and non-spatial tokens. The unique architecture of DiffBlender facilitates adding new input modalities, pioneering a scalable framework for conditional image generation. Notably, we achieve this without altering the parameters of the existing generative model, Stable Diffusion, only with updating partial components. Our study establishes new benchmarks in multimodal generation through quantitative and qualitative comparisons with existing conditional generation methods. We demonstrate that DiffBlender faithfully blends all the provided information and showcase its various applications in the detailed image synthesis.

Interest-free promotions are a prevalent strategy employed by credit card lenders to attract new customers, yet the research exploring their effects on both consumers and lenders remains relatively sparse. The process of selecting an optimal promotion strategy is intricate, involving the determination of an interest-free period duration and promotion-availability window, all within the context of competing offers, fluctuating market dynamics, and complex consumer behaviour. In this paper, we introduce an agent-based model that facilitates the exploration of various credit card promotions under diverse market scenarios. Our approach, distinct from previous agent-based models, concentrates on optimising promotion strategies and is calibrated using benchmarks from the UK credit card market from 2019 to 2020, with agent properties derived from historical distributions of the UK population from roughly the same period. We validate our model against stylised facts and time-series data, thereby demonstrating the value of this technique for investigating pricing strategies and understanding credit card customer behaviour. Our experiments reveal that, in the absence of competitor promotions, lender profit is maximised by an interest-free duration of approximately 12 months while market share is maximised by offering the longest duration possible. When competitors do not offer promotions, extended promotion availability windows yield maximum profit for lenders while also maximising market share. In the context of concurrent interest-free promotions, we identify that the optimal lender strategy entails offering a more competitive interest-free period and a rapid response to competing promotional offers. Notably, a delay of three months in responding to a rival promotion corresponds to a 2.4% relative decline in income.

Sequential fundraising in two sided online platforms enable peer to peer lending by sequentially bringing potential contributors, each of whose decisions impact other contributors in the market. However, understanding the dynamics of sequential contributions in online platforms for peer lending has been an open ended research question. The centralized investment mechanism in these platforms makes it difficult to understand the implicit competition that borrowers face from a single lender at any point in time. Matching markets are a model of pairing agents where the preferences of agents from both sides in terms of their preferred pairing for transactions can allow to decentralize the market. We study investment designs in two sided platforms using matching markets when the investors or lenders also face restrictions on the investments based on borrower preferences. This situation creates an implicit competition among the lenders in addition to the existing borrower competition, especially when the lenders are uncertain about their standing in the market and thereby the probability of their investments being accepted or the borrower loan requests for projects reaching the reserve price. We devise a technique based on sequential decision making that allows the lenders to adjust their choices based on the dynamics of uncertainty from competition over time. We simulate two sided market matchings in a sequential decision framework and show the dynamics of the lender regret amassed compared to the optimal borrower-lender matching and find that the lender regret depends on the initial preferences set by the lenders which could affect their learning over decision making steps.

Motivated by recent applications of sequential decision making in matching markets, in this paper we attempt at formulating and abstracting market designs for P2P lending. We describe a paradigm to set the stage for how peer to peer investments can be conceived from a matching market perspective, especially when both borrower and lender preferences are respected. We model these specialized markets as an optimization problem and consider different utilities for agents on both sides of the market while also understanding the impact of equitable allocations to borrowers. We devise a technique based on sequential decision making that allow the lenders to adjust their choices based on the dynamics of uncertainty from competition over time and that also impacts the rewards in return for their investments. Using simulated experiments we show the dynamics of the regret based on the optimal borrower-lender matching and find that the lender regret depends on the initial preferences set by the lenders which could affect their learning over decision making steps.