With the practical implementation of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), the traffic system is expected to remain a mix of CAVs and human-driven vehicles (HVs) for the foreseeable future. To enhance safety and traffic efficiency, the trajectory planning strategies of CAVs must account for the influence of HVs, necessitating accurate HV trajectory prediction. Current research often assumes that human drivers have perfect knowledge of all vehicles' objectives, an unrealistic premise. This paper bridges the gap by leveraging hypergame theory to account for cognitive and perception limitations in HVs. We model human bounded rationality without assuming them to be merely passive followers and propose a hierarchical cognition modeling framework that captures cognitive relationships among vehicles. We further analyze the cognitive stability of the system, proving that the strategy profile where all vehicles adopt cognitively equilibrium strategies constitutes a hyper Nash equilibrium when CAVs accurately learn HV parameters. To achieve this, we develop an inverse learning algorithm for distributed intention interpretation via vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, which extends the framework to both offline and online scenarios. Additionally, we introduce a distributed trajectory prediction and planning approach for CAVs, leveraging the learned parameters in real time. Simulations in highway lane-changing scenarios demonstrate the proposed method's accuracy in parameter learning, robustness to noisy trajectory observations, and safety in HV trajectory prediction. The results validate the effectiveness of our method in both offline and online implementations.

Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested beliefs. To overcome these limitations, researchers have proposed extensions that incorporate models of cognitive constraints, subjective beliefs, and heterogeneous reasoning. Among these, hypergame theory extends the classical paradigm by explicitly modeling agents' subjective perceptions of the strategic scenario, known as perceptual games, in which agents may hold divergent beliefs about the structure, payoffs, or available actions. We present a systematic review of agent-compatible applications of hypergame theory, examining how its descriptive capabilities have been adapted to dynamic and interactive MAS contexts. We analyze 44 selected studies from cybersecurity, robotics, social simulation, communications, and general game-theoretic modeling. Building on a formal introduction to hypergame theory and its two major extensions - hierarchical hypergames and HNF - we develop agent-compatibility criteria and an agent-based classification framework to assess integration patterns and practical applicability. Our analysis reveals prevailing tendencies, including the prevalence of hierarchical and graph-based models in deceptive reasoning and the simplification of extensive theoretical frameworks in practical applications. We identify structural gaps, including the limited adoption of HNF-based models, the lack of formal hypergame languages, and unexplored opportunities for modeling human-agent and agent-agent misalignment. By synthesizing trends, challenges, and open research directions, this review provides a new roadmap for applying hypergame theory to enhance the realism and effectiveness of strategic modeling in dynamic multi-agent environments.

In strategic multi-agent sequential interactions, detecting dynamic coalition structures is crucial for understanding how self-interested agents coordinate to influence outcomes. However, natural-language-based interactions introduce unique challenges to coalition detection due to ambiguity over intents and difficulty in modeling players' subjective perspectives. We propose a new method that leverages recent advancements in large language models and game theory to predict dynamic multilateral coalition formation in Diplomacy, a strategic multi-agent game where agents negotiate coalitions using natural language. The method consists of two stages. The first stage extracts the set of agreements discussed by two agents in their private dialogue, by combining a parsing-based filtering function with a fine-tuned language model trained to predict player intents. In the second stage, we define a new metric using the concept of subjective rationalizability from hypergame theory to evaluate the expected value of an agreement for each player. We then compute this metric for each agreement identified in the first stage by assessing the strategic value of the agreement for both players and taking into account the subjective belief of one player that the second player would honor the agreement. We demonstrate that our method effectively detects potential coalition structures in online Diplomacy gameplay by assigning high values to agreements likely to be honored and low values to those likely to be violated. The proposed method provides foundational insights into coalition formation in multi-agent environments with language-based negotiation and offers key directions for future research on the analysis of complex natural language-based interactions between agents.

LLM-driven multi-agent-based simulations have been gaining traction with applications in game-theoretic and social simulations. While most implementations seek to exploit or evaluate LLM-agentic reasoning, they often do so with a weak notion of agency and simplified architectures. We implement a role-based multi-agent strategic interaction framework tailored to sophisticated recursive reasoners, providing the means for systematic in-depth development and evaluation of strategic reasoning. Our game environment is governed by the umpire responsible for facilitating games, from matchmaking through move validation to environment management. Players incorporate state-of-the-art LLMs in their decision mechanism, relying on a formal hypergame-based model of hierarchical beliefs. We use one-shot, 2-player beauty contests to evaluate the recursive reasoning capabilities of the latest LLMs, providing a comparison to an established baseline model from economics and data from human experiments. Furthermore, we introduce the foundations of an alternative semantic measure of reasoning to the k-level theory. Our experiments show that artificial reasoners can outperform the baseline model in terms of both approximating human behaviour and reaching the optimal solution.

In many security applications of cyber-physical systems, a system designer must guarantee that critical missions are satisfied against attacks in the sensors and actuators of the CPS. Traditional security design of CPSs often assume that attackers have complete knowledge of the system. In this article, we introduce a class of deception techniques and study how to leverage asymmetric information created by deception to strengthen CPS security. Consider an adversarial interaction between a CPS defender and an attacker, who can perform sensor jamming attacks. To mitigate such attacks, the defender introduces asymmetrical information by deploying a "hidden sensor," whose presence is initially undisclosed but can be revealed if queried. We introduce hypergames on graphs to model this game with asymmetric information. Building on the solution concept called subjective rationalizable strategies in hypergames, we identify two stages in the game: An initial game stage where the defender commits to a strategy perceived rationalizable by the attacker until he deviates from the equilibrium in the attacker's perceptual game; Upon the deviation, a delay-attack game stage starts where the defender plays against the attacker, who has a bounded delay in attacking the sensor being revealed. Based on backward induction, we develop an algorithm that determines, for any given state, if the defender can benefit from hiding a sensor and revealing it later. If the answer is affirmative, the algorithm outputs a sensor revealing strategy to determine when to reveal the sensor during dynamic interactions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our deceptive strategies through two case studies related to CPS security applications.

Semantic communications (SC) is an emerging communication paradigm in which wireless devices can send only relevant information from a source of data while relying on computing resources to regenerate missing data points. However, the design of a multi-user SC system becomes more challenging because of the computing and communication overhead required for coordination. Existing solutions for learning the semantic language and performing resource allocation often fail to capture the computing and communication tradeoffs involved in multiuser SC. To address this gap, a novel framework for decentralized computing and communication resource allocation in multiuser SC systems is proposed. The challenge of efficiently allocating communication and computing resources (for reasoning) in a decentralized manner to maximize the quality of task experience for the end users is addressed through the application of Stackelberg hyper game theory. Leveraging the concept of second-level hyper games, novel analytical formulations are developed to model misperceptions of the users about each other's communication and control strategies. Further, equilibrium analysis of the learned resource allocation protocols examines the convergence of the computing and communication strategies to a local Stackelberg equilibria, considering misperceptions. Simulation results show that the proposed Stackelberg hyper game results in efficient usage of communication and computing resources while maintaining a high quality of experience for the users compared to state-of-the-art that does not account for the misperceptions.

A particular challenge for both autonomous and human driving is dealing with risk associated with dynamic occlusion, i.e., occlusion caused by other vehicles in traffic. Based on the theory of hypergames, we develop a novel multi-agent dynamic occlusion risk (DOR) measure for assessing situational risk in dynamic occlusion scenarios. Furthermore, we present a white-box, scenario-based, accelerated safety validation framework for assessing safety of strategic planners in AV. Based on evaluation over a large naturalistic database, our proposed validation method achieves a 4000% speedup compared to direct validation on naturalistic data, a more diverse coverage, and ability to generalize beyond the dataset and generate commonly observed dynamic occlusion crashes in traffic in an automated manner.

In this chapter, we present an approach using formal methods to synthesize reactive defense strategy in a cyber network, equipped with a set of decoy systems. We first generalize formal graphical security models--attack graphs--to incorporate defender's countermeasures in a game-theoretic model, called an attack-defend game on graph. This game captures the dynamic interactions between the defender and the attacker and their defense/attack objectives in formal logic. Then, we introduce a class of hypergames to model asymmetric information created by decoys in the attacker-defender interactions. Given qualitative security specifications in formal logic, we show that the solution concepts from hypergames and reactive synthesis in formal methods can be extended to synthesize effective dynamic defense strategy using cyber deception. The strategy takes the advantages of the misperception of the attacker to ensure security specification is satisfied, which may not be satisfiable when the information is symmetric.

General Game Playing is the design of AI systems able to understand the rules of new games and to use such descriptions to play those games effectively. Games with imperfectinformation have recently been added as a new challenge forexisting general game-playing systems. The HyperPlay technique presents a solution to this challenge by maintaining a collection of models of the true game as a foundation for reasoning, and move selection. The technique provides existing game players with a bolt-on solution to convert from perfect-information games to imperfect-information games. In this paper we describe the HyperPlay technique, show how it was adapted for use with a Monte Carlo decision making process and give experimental results for its performance.