Misty Williams checks into the emergency room at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center from time to time for treatment of debilitating pain from sickle cell disease, which causes red blood cells to stiffen and block the flow of blood. After pain medication and hydration are ordered, the 41-year-old Los Angeles resident makes an unusual request: access to a virtual reality headset with an artificial intelligence-powered chatbot that can carry on a dialogue with her. With the headset on, Williams finds herself in a virtual garden, butterflies drifting around her. A humanoid robot greets her with a soothing female voice. My name is Xaia, and I'm your mental health ally," it says. After a session, Williams' pain eases and her mind is calmer. "Mentally and physically, I feel more at peace," Williams said. Xaia (pronounced ZAI-uh) is just one of many ways that artificial intelligence technology is barreling its way into the burgeoning sector known as digital health.

Structural Equation Models (SEM) are the standard approach to representing causal dependencies between variables in causal models. In this paper we propose a new interpretation of SEMs when reasoning about Actual Causality, in which SEMs are viewed as mechanisms transforming the dynamics of exogenous variables into the dynamics of endogenous variables. This allows us to combine counterfactual causal reasoning with existing temporal logic formalisms, and to introduce a temporal logic, CPLTL, for causal reasoning about such structures. We show that the standard restriction to so-called \textit{recursive} models (with no cycles in the dependency graph) is not necessary in our approach, allowing us to reason about mutually dependent processes and feedback loops. Finally, we introduce new notions of model equivalence for temporal causal models, and show that CPLTL has an efficient model-checking procedure.

Since the proposal by Halpern and Pearl, reasoning about actual causality has gained increasing attention in artificial intelligence, ranging from domains such as model-checking and verification to reasoning about actions and knowledge. More recently, Batusov and Soutchanski proposed a notion of actual achievement cause in the situation calculus, amongst others, they can determine the cause of quantified effects in a given action history. While intuitively appealing, this notion of cause is not defined in a counterfactual perspective. In this paper, we propose a notion of cause based on counterfactual analysis. In the context of action history, we show that our notion of cause generalizes naturally to a notion of achievement cause. We analyze the relationship between our notion of the achievement cause and the achievement cause by Batusov and Soutchanski. Finally, we relate our account of cause to Halpern and Pearl's account of actual causality. Particularly, we note some nuances in applying a counterfactual viewpoint to disjunctive goals, a common thorn to definitions of actual causes.

Existing algorithms for explaining the output of image classifiers use different definitions of explanations and a variety of techniques to extract them. However, none of the existing tools use a principled approach based on formal definitions of causes and explanations for the explanation extraction. In this paper we present a novel black-box approach to computing explanations grounded in the theory of actual causality. We prove relevant theoretical results and present an algorithm for computing approximate explanations based on these definitions. We prove termination of our algorithm and discuss its complexity and the amount of approximation compared to the precise definition. We implemented the framework in a tool rex and we present experimental results and a comparison with state-of-the-art tools. We demonstrate that rex is the most efficient tool and produces the smallest explanations, in addition to outperforming other black-box tools on standard quality measures.

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems increasingly influence decision-making across various fields, the need to attribute responsibility for undesirable outcomes has become essential, though complicated by the complex interplay between humans and AI. Existing attribution methods based on actual causality and Shapley values tend to disproportionately blame agents who contribute more to an outcome and rely on real-world measures of blameworthiness that may misalign with responsible AI standards. This paper presents a causal framework using Structural Causal Models (SCMs) to systematically attribute responsibility in human-AI systems, measuring overall blameworthiness while employing counterfactual reasoning to account for agents' expected epistemic levels. Two case studies illustrate the framework's adaptability in diverse human-AI collaboration scenarios.

As autonomous systems rapidly become ubiquitous, there is a growing need for a legal and regulatory framework toaddress when and how such a system harms someone. There have been several attempts within the philosophy literature to define harm, but none of them has proven capable of dealing with with the many examples that have been presented, leading some to suggest that the notion of harm should be abandoned and replaced by more well-behaved notions''. As harm is generally something that is caused, most of these definitions have involved causality at some level. Yet surprisingly, none of them makes use of causal models and the definitions of actual causality that they can express. In this paper we formally define a qualitative notion of harm that uses causal models and is based on a well-known definition of actual causality (Halpern, 2016).

I generalize acyclic deterministic structural equation models to the nondeterministic case and argue that it offers an improved semantics for counterfactuals. The standard, deterministic, semantics developed by Halpern (and based on the initial proposal of Galles & Pearl) assumes that for each assignment of values to parent variables there is a unique assignment to their child variable, and it assumes that the actual world (an assignment of values to all variables of a model) specifies a unique counterfactual world for each intervention. Both assumptions are unrealistic, and therefore I drop both of them in my proposal. I do so by allowing multi-valued functions in the structural equations. In addition, I adjust the semantics so that the solutions to the equations that obtained in the actual world are preserved in any counterfactual world. I motivate the resulting logic by comparing it to the standard one by Halpern and to more recent proposals that are closer to mine. Finally, I extend these models to the probabilistic case and show that they open up the way to identifying counterfactuals even in Causal Bayesian Networks.

We address causal reasoning in multivariate time series data generated by stochastic processes. Existing approaches are largely restricted to static settings, ignoring the continuity and emission of variations across time. In contrast, we propose a learning paradigm that directly establishes causation between events in the course of time. We present two key lemmas to compute causal contributions and frame them as reinforcement learning problems. Our approach offers formal and computational tools for uncovering and quantifying causal relationships in diffusion processes, subsuming various important settings such as discrete-time Markov decision processes. Finally, in fairly intricate experiments and through sheer learning, our framework reveals and quantifies causal links, which otherwise seem inexplicable.

We focus on explaining image classifiers, taking the work of Mothilal et al. [2021] (MMTS) as our point of departure. We observe that, although MMTS claim to be using the definition of explanation proposed by Halpern [2016], they do not quite do so. Roughly speaking, Halpern's definition has a necessity clause and a sufficiency clause. MMTS replace the necessity clause by a requirement that, as we show, implies it. Halpern's definition also allows agents to restrict the set of options considered. While these difference may seem minor, as we show, they can have a nontrivial impact on explanations. We also show that, essentially without change, Halpern's definition can handle two issues that have proved difficult for other approaches: explanations of absence (when, for example, an image classifier for tumors outputs "no tumor") and explanations of rare events (such as tumors).

We show that it is possible to understand and identify a decision maker's subjective causal judgements by observing her preferences over interventions. Following Pearl [2000], we represent causality using causal models (also called structural equations models), where the world is described by a collection of variables, related by equations. We show that if a preference relation over interventions satisfies certain axioms (related to standard axioms regarding counterfactuals), then we can define (i) a causal model, (ii) a probability capturing the decision-maker's uncertainty regarding the external factors in the world and (iii) a utility on outcomes such that each intervention is associated with an expected utility and such that intervention $A$ is preferred to $B$ iff the expected utility of $A$ is greater than that of $B$. In addition, we characterize when the causal model is unique. Thus, our results allow a modeler to test the hypothesis that a decision maker's preferences are consistent with some causal model and to identify causal judgements from observed behavior.