In e-commerce advertising, selecting the most compelling combination of creative elements -- such as titles, images, and highlights -- is critical for capturing user attention and driving conversions. However, existing methods often evaluate creative components individually, failing to navigate the exponentially large search space of possible combinations. To address this challenge, we propose a novel framework named GenCO that integrates generative modeling with multi-instance reward learning. Our unified two-stage architecture first employs a generative model to efficiently produce a diverse set of creative combinations. This generative process is optimized with reinforcement learning, enabling the model to effectively explore and refine its selections. Next, to overcome the challenge of sparse user feedback, a multi-instance learning model attributes combination-level rewards, such as clicks, to the individual creative elements. This allows the reward model to provide a more accurate feedback signal, which in turn guides the generative model toward creating more effective combinations. Deployed on a leading e-commerce platform, our approach has significantly increased advertising revenue, demonstrating its practical value. Additionally, we are releasing a large-scale industrial dataset to facilitate further research in this important domain.

This paper studies the pool strategy for price-makers under imperfect information. In this occasion, market participants cannot obtain essential transmission parameters of the power system. Thus, price-makers should estimate the market results with respect to their offer curves using available historical information. The linear programming model of economic dispatch is analyzed with the theory of rim multi-parametric linear programming (rim-MPLP). The characteristics of system patterns (combinations of status flags for generating units and transmission lines) are revealed. A multi-class classification model based on support vector machine (SVM) is trained to map the offer curves to system patterns, which is then integrated into the decision framework of the price-maker. The performance of the proposed method is validated on the IEEE 30-bus system, Illinois synthetic 200-bus system, and South Carolina synthetic 500-bus system.

Generating diverse objects (e.g., images) using generative models (such as GAN or VAE) has achieved impressive results in the recent years, to help solve many design problems that are traditionally done by humans. Going beyond image generation, we aim to find solutions to more general design problems, in which both the diversity of the design and conformity of constraints are important. Such a setting has applications in computer graphics, animation, industrial design, material science, etc, in which we may want the output of the generator to follow discrete/combinatorial constraints and penalize any deviation, which is non-trivial with existing generative models and optimization solvers. To address this, we propose GenCO, a novel framework that conducts end-to-end training of deep generative models integrated with embedded combinatorial solvers, aiming to uncover high-quality solutions aligned with nonlinear objectives. While structurally akin to conventional generative models, GenCO diverges in its role - it focuses on generating instances of combinatorial optimization problems rather than final objects (e.g., images). This shift allows finer control over the generated outputs, enabling assessments of their feasibility and introducing an additional combinatorial loss component. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on a variety of generative tasks characterized by combinatorial intricacies, including game level generation and map creation for path planning, consistently demonstrating its capability to yield diverse, high-quality solutions that reliably adhere to user-specified combinatorial properties.

In real time electricity markets, the objective of generation companies while bidding is to maximize their profit. The strategies for learning optimal bidding have been formulated through game theoretical approaches and stochastic optimization problems. Similar studies in reactive power markets have not been reported so far because the network voltage operating conditions have an increased impact on reactive power markets than on active power markets. Contrary to active power markets, the bids of rivals are not directly related to fuel costs in reactive power markets. Hence, the assumption of a suitable probability distribution function is unrealistic, making the strategies adopted in active power markets unsuitable for learning optimal bids in reactive power market mechanisms. Therefore, a bidding strategy is to be learnt from market observations and experience in imperfect oligopolistic competition-based markets. In this paper, a pioneer work on learning optimal bidding strategies from observation and experience in a three-stage reactive power market is reported.

Decentralized electricity markets are often dominated by a small set of generator companies who control the majority of the capacity. In this paper, we explore the effect of the total controlled electricity capacity by a single, or group, of generator companies can have on the average electricity price. We demonstrate this through the use of ElecSim, a simulation of a country-wide energy market. We develop a strategic agent, representing a generation company, which uses a deep deterministic policy gradient reinforcement learning algorithm to bid in a uniform pricing electricity market. A uniform pricing market is one where all players are paid the highest accepted price. ElecSim is parameterized to the United Kingdom for the year 2018. This work can help inform policy on how to best regulate a market to ensure that the price of electricity remains competitive. We find that capacity has an impact on the average electricity price in a single year. If any single generator company, or a collaborating group of generator companies, control more than ${\sim}$11$\%$ of generation capacity and bid strategically, prices begin to increase by ${\sim}$25$\%$. The value of ${\sim}$25\% and ${\sim}$11\% may vary between market structures and countries. For instance, different load profiles may favour a particular type of generator or a different distribution of generation capacity. Once the capacity controlled by a generator company, which bids strategically, is higher than ${\sim}$35\%, prices increase exponentially. We observe that the use of a market cap of approximately double the average market price has the effect of significantly decreasing this effect and maintaining a competitive market. A fair and competitive electricity market provides value to consumers and enables a more competitive economy through the utilisation of electricity by both industry and consumers.