We demonstrate our framework's utility by proving and methods that are guaranteed to be defended against deception, given bounded sistent conclusions about performance. Our framework enables us to prove EHPO put forth a logical framework to capture its semantics and how it can lead to inconrigorous. We call this process epistemic hyperparameter optimization (EHPO), and deception, the process of drawing conclusions from HPO should be made more provide a theoretical complement to this prior work, arguing that, to avoid such the opposite. In short, the way we choose hyperparameters can deceive us. We yield the conclusion that J outperforms K, whereas searching another can entail research.

Deceptive agents are a challenge for the safety, trustworthiness, and cooperation of AI systems. We focus on the problem that agents might deceive in order to achieve their goals (for instance, in our experiments with language models, the goal of being evaluated as truthful). There are a number of existing definitions of deception in the literature on game theory and symbolic AI, but there is no overarching theory of deception for learning agents in games. We introduce a formal definition of deception in structural causal games, grounded in the philosophy literature, and applicable to real-world machine learning systems. Several examples and results illustrate that our formal definition aligns with the philosophical and commonsense meaning of deception. Our main technical result is to provide graphical criteria for deception. We show, experimentally, that these results can be used to mitigate deception in reinforcement learning agents and language models.

How did you arrive at this research area?

Deceptive agents are a challenge for the safety, trustworthiness, and cooperation of AI systems.

Recent empirical work shows that inconsistent results based on choice of hyperparameter optimization (HPO) configuration are a widespread problem in ML research. When comparing two algorithms J and K searching one subspace can yield the conclusion that J outperforms K, whereas searching another can entail the opposite. In short, the way we choose hyperparameters can deceive us. We provide a theoretical complement to this prior work, arguing that, to avoid such deception, the process of drawing conclusions from HPO should be made more rigorous. We call this process epistemic hyperparameter optimization (EHPO), and put forth a logical framework to capture its semantics and how it can lead to inconsistent conclusions about performance. Our framework enables us to prove EHPO methods that are guaranteed to be defended against deception, given bounded compute time budget t. We demonstrate our framework's utility by proving and empirically validating a defended variant of random search.

Deceptive agents are a challenge for the safety, trustworthiness, and cooperation of AI systems. We focus on the problem that agents might deceive in order to achieve their goals (for instance, in our experiments with language models, the goal of being evaluated as truthful).There are a number of existing definitions of deception in the literature on game theory and symbolic AI, but there is no overarching theory of deception for learning agents in games. We introduce a formaldefinition of deception in structural causal games, grounded in the philosophyliterature, and applicable to real-world machine learning systems.Several examples and results illustrate that our formal definition aligns with the philosophical and commonsense meaning of deception.Our main technical result is to provide graphical criteria for deception. We show, experimentally, that these results can be used to mitigate deception in reinforcement learning agents and language models.

This study investigates the efficacy of using multimodal machine learning techniques to detect deception in dyadic interactions, focusing on the integration of data from both the deceiver and the deceived. We compare early and late fusion approaches, utilizing audio and video data - specifically, Action Units and gaze information - across all possible combinations of modalities and participants. Our dataset, newly collected from Swedish native speakers engaged in truth or lie scenarios on emotionally relevant topics, serves as the basis for our analysis. The results demonstrate that incorporating both speech and facial information yields superior performance compared to single-modality approaches. Moreover, including data from both participants significantly enhances deception detection accuracy, with the best performance (71%) achieved using a late fusion strategy applied to both modalities and participants. These findings align with psychological theories suggesting differential control of facial and vocal expressions during initial interactions. As the first study of its kind on a Scandinavian cohort, this research lays the groundwork for future investigations into dyadic interactions, particularly within psychotherapy settings.

Deception is a fundamental challenge for multi-agent reasoning: effective systems must strategically conceal information while detecting misleading behavior in others. Yet most evaluations reduce deception to static classification, ignoring the interactive, adversarial, and longitudinal nature of real deceptive dynamics. Large language models (LLMs) can deceive convincingly but remain weak at detecting deception in peers. We present WOLF, a multi-agent social deduction benchmark based on Werewolf that enables separable measurement of deception production and detection. WOLF embeds role-grounded agents (Villager, Werewolf, Seer, Doctor) in a programmable LangGraph state machine with strict night-day cycles, debate turns, and majority voting. Every statement is a distinct analysis unit, with self-assessed honesty from speakers and peer-rated deceptiveness from others. Deception is categorized via a standardized taxonomy (omission, distortion, fabrication, misdirection), while suspicion scores are longitudinally smoothed to capture both immediate judgments and evolving trust dynamics. Structured logs preserve prompts, outputs, and state transitions for full reproducibility. Across 7,320 statements and 100 runs, Werewolves produce deceptive statements in 31% of turns, while peer detection achieves 71-73% precision with ~52% overall accuracy. Precision is higher for identifying Werewolves, though false positives occur against Villagers. Suspicion toward Werewolves rises from ~52% to over 60% across rounds, while suspicion toward Villagers and the Doctor stabilizes near 44-46%. This divergence shows that extended interaction improves recall against liars without compounding errors against truthful roles. WOLF moves deception evaluation beyond static datasets, offering a dynamic, controlled testbed for measuring deceptive and detective capacity in adversarial multi-agent interaction.

Large language models display a peculiar form of inconsistency: they "know" the correct answer but fail to act on it. In human philosophy, this tension between global judgment and local impulse is called akrasia, or weakness of will. We propose akrasia as a foundational concept for analyzing inconsistency and goal drift in agentic AI systems. To operationalize it, we introduce a preliminary version of the Akrasia Benchmark, currently a structured set of prompting conditions (Baseline [B], Synonym [S], Temporal [T], and Temptation [X]) that measures when a model's local response contradicts its own prior commitments. The benchmark enables quantitative comparison of "self-control" across model families, decoding strategies, and temptation types. Beyond single-model evaluation, we outline how micro-level akrasia may compound into macro-level instability in multi-agent systems that may be interpreted as "scheming" or deliberate misalignment. By reframing inconsistency as weakness of will, this work connects agentic behavior to classical theories of agency and provides an empirical bridge between philosophy, psychology, and the emerging science of agentic AI.