Recent work on deriving O(log T) anytime regret bounds for stochastic dueling bandit problems has considered mostly Condorcet winners, which do not always exist, and more recently, winners defined by the Copeland set, which do always exist. In this work, we consider a broad notion of winners defined by tournament solutions in social choice theory, which include the Copeland set as a special case but also include several other notions of winners such as the top cycle, uncovered set, and Banks set, and which, like the Copeland set, always exist. We develop a family of UCB-style dueling bandit algorithms for such general tournament solutions, and show O(log T) anytime regret bounds for them. Experiments confirm the ability of our algorithms to achieve low regret relative to the target winning set of interest.

Recent work on deriving $O(\log T)$ anytime regret bounds for stochastic dueling bandit problems has considered mostly Condorcet winners, which do not always exist, and more recently, winners defined by the Copeland set, which do always exist. In this work, we consider a broad notion of winners defined by tournament solutions in social choice theory, which include the Copeland set as a special case but also include several other notions of winners such as the top cycle, uncovered set, and Banks set, and which, like the Copeland set, always exist. We develop a family of UCB-style dueling bandit algorithms for such general tournament solutions, and show $O(\log T)$ anytime regret bounds for them. Experiments confirm the ability of our algorithms to achieve low regret relative to the target winning set of interest.

Voting systems are highly prevalent in our daily lives. Examples range from large scale democratic elections to company or family-wide decision making, recommender systems and product design[Boutilieretal.,2015].

Recent work on deriving $O(\log T)$ anytime regret bounds for stochastic dueling bandit problems has considered mostly Condorcet winners, which do not always exist, and more recently, winners defined by the Copeland set, which do always exist. In this work, we consider a broad notion of winners defined by tournament solutions in social choice theory, which include the Copeland set as a special case but also include several other notions of winners such as the top cycle, uncovered set, and Banks set, and which, like the Copeland set, always exist. We develop a family of UCB-style dueling bandit algorithms for such general tournament solutions, and show $O(\log T)$ anytime regret bounds for them. Experiments confirm the ability of our algorithms to achieve low regret relative to the target winning set of interest.

We measure LLMs' output error at pairwise text comparison, noting the probability of error in their preferences. Our method does not rely on the ground truth and supports two scenarios: (i) uniform error rate regardless of the order of comparison, estimated with two comparisons for each text pair with either text placed first; (ii) binary positional bias assuming distinct error rates for the two orders of comparison, estimated with repeated comparisons between the texts. The Copeland counting constructs a ranking over the compared texts from pairwise preferences; the ranking reveals the poor scalability of LLM-based pairwise comparison and helps yield the estimates for LLMs' error rates. We apply the method to six LLMs (ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Gemini, Grok, Qwen) with five types of text input and obtain consistent estimates of LLMs' error. In general, the measured two positional bias terms are similar, close to the uniform error. Considering both the error rates and the robustness to the variation of prompts, Claude obtained the most desirable performance in this experiment. Our model outperforms the biased Bradley-Terry model and the commutativity score in indicating LLMs' error at this task.

Breakthroughs, discoveries, and DIY tips sent every weekday. The ticking tyranny of 2 a.m. after you climbed into bed–responsibly–at 11. As the minutes go by, all you can think about is the importance of good sleep for function, mood, and productivity. What's worse, the big white letters on your sleep score will read "poor" like a middle school quiz. And while health-tracking devices have helped many gain insight into their bodies, hyperfixation on sleep metrics can backfire.

Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the inquiry to improvement feedback, where voters express incremental adjustments rather than complete preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the positional scoring rules that can be computed given improvement feedback. Interestingly, while plurality is learnable under improvement feedback--unlike with pairwise feedback--strong impossibility results persist for many other positional scoring rules. Furthermore, we show that improvement feedback, unlike pairwise feedback, does not suffice for the computation of any Condorcet-consistent rule. We complement our theoretical findings with experimental results, providing further insights into the practical implications of improvement feedback for preference aggregation.

Can neural networks be applied in voting theory, while satisfying the need for transparency in collective decisions? We propose axiomatic deep voting: a framework to build and evaluate neural networks that aggregate preferences, using the well-established axiomatic method of voting theory. Our findings are: (1) Neural networks, despite being highly accurate, often fail to align with the core axioms of voting rules, revealing a disconnect between mimicking outcomes and reasoning. (2) Training with axiom-specific data does not enhance alignment with those axioms. (3) By solely optimizing axiom satisfaction, neural networks can synthesize new voting rules that often surpass and substantially differ from existing ones. This offers insights for both fields: For AI, important concepts like bias and value-alignment are studied in a mathematically rigorous way; for voting theory, new areas of the space of voting rules are explored.

We consider the problem of recovering the ground truth ordering (ranking, top-$k$, or others) over a large number of alternatives. The wisdom of crowd is a heuristic approach based on Condorcet's Jury theorem to address this problem through collective opinions. This approach fails to recover the ground truth when the majority of the crowd is misinformed. The surprisingly popular (SP) algorithm cite{prelec2017solution} is an alternative approach that is able to recover the ground truth even when experts are in minority. The SP algorithm requires the voters to predict other voters' report in the form of a full probability distribution over all rankings of alternatives. However, when the number of alternatives, $m$, is large, eliciting the prediction report or even the vote over $m$ alternatives might be too costly. In this paper, we design a scalable alternative of the SP algorithm which only requires eliciting partial preferences from the voters, and propose new variants of the SP algorithm. In particular, we propose two versions -- Aggregated-SP and Partial-SP -- that ask voters to report vote and prediction on a subset of size $k$ ($\ll m$) in terms of top alternative, partial rank, or an approval set. Through a large-scale crowdsourcing experiment on MTurk, we show that both of our approaches outperform conventional preference aggregation algorithms for the recovery of ground truth rankings, when measured in terms of Kendall-Tau distance and Spearman's $\rho$. We further analyze the collected data and demonstrate that voters' behavior in the experiment, including the minority of the experts, and the SP phenomenon, can be correctly simulated by a concentric mixtures of Mallows model. Finally, we provide theoretical bounds on the sample complexity of SP algorithms with partial rankings to demonstrate the theoretical guarantees of the proposed methods.