Why Are Some Women Training for Pregnancy Like It's a Marathon? A growing legion of "zero trimester" influencers are convincing followers that healthy pregnancies are a choice--and that raw milk, watching sunsets, and pricey specialized courses can help. Three years ago, Esther Rohr and her husband decided to start thinking about pregnancy. The 26-year-old Oregon-based wedding photographer made small but intentional lifestyle changes--going to bed earlier, drinking more water and less alcohol, dialing in her fitness, loading up on protein, and taking supplements like beef organ capsules and Vitamin D3. They started charging their phones in the kitchen for better sleep and unplugging their Wi-Fi at night, because her research suggested it might affect cellular health. Concerned about their exposure to reproductive toxins, Rohr began the slow, painstaking task of swapping out all their synthetic workout clothes, nonstick pans, and scented personal care products that might contain phthalates or other endocrine-disrupting chemicals. She bought an air purifier and hopes to eventually replace their LED bulbs with incandescents, because she worries they might be affecting her circadian rhythm.

World models have garnered substantial interest in the AI community. These are internal representations that simulate aspects of the external world, track entities and states, capture causal relationships, and enable prediction of consequences. This contrasts with representations based solely on statistical correlations. A key motivation behind this research direction is that humans possess such mental world models, and finding evidence of similar representations in AI models might indicate that these models "understand" the world in a human-like way. In this paper, we use case studies from the philosophy of science literature to critically examine whether the world model framework adequately characterizes human-level understanding. We focus on specific philosophical analyses where the distinction between world model capabilities and human understanding is most pronounced. While these represent particular views of understanding rather than universal definitions, they help us explore the limits of world models.

This paper proposes to revisit the Turing test through the concept of normality. Its core argument is that the Turing test is a test of normal intelligence as assessed by a normal judge. First, in the sense that the Turing test targets normal/average rather than exceptional human intelligence, so that successfully passing the test requires machines to "make mistakes" and display imperfect behavior just like normal/average humans. Second, in the sense that the Turing test is a statistical test where judgments of intelligence are never carried out by a single "average" judge (understood as non-expert) but always by a full jury. As such, the notion of "average human interrogator" that Turing talks about in his original paper should be understood primarily as referring to a mathematical abstraction made of the normalized aggregate of individual judgments of multiple judges. Its conclusions are twofold. First, it argues that large language models such as ChatGPT are unlikely to pass the Turing test as those models precisely target exceptional rather than normal/average human intelligence. As such, they constitute models of what it proposes to call artificial smartness rather than artificial intelligence, insofar as they deviate from the original goal of Turing for the modeling of artificial minds. Second, it argues that the objectivization of normal human behavior in the Turing test fails due to the game configuration of the test which ends up objectivizing normative ideals of normal behavior rather than normal behavior per se.

What does it mean for a machine to recognize beauty? While beauty remains a culturally and experientially compelling but philosophically elusive concept, deep learning systems increasingly appear capable of modeling aesthetic judgment. In this paper, we explore the capacity of neural networks to represent beauty despite the immense formal diversity of objects for which the term applies. By drawing on recent work on cross-model representational convergence, we show how aesthetic content produces more similar and aligned representations between models which have been trained on distinct data and modalities - while unaesthetic images do not produce more aligned representations. This finding implies that the formal structure of beautiful images has a realist basis - rather than only as a reflection of socially constructed values. Furthermore, we propose that these realist representations exist because of a joint grounding of aesthetic form in physical and cultural substance. We argue that human perceptual and creative acts play a central role in shaping these the latent spaces of deep learning systems, but that a realist basis for aesthetics shows that machines are not mere creative parrots but can produce novel creative insights from the unique vantage point of scale. Our findings suggest that human-machine co-creation is not merely possible, but foundational - with beauty serving as a teleological attractor in both cultural production and machine perception.

Artificial intelligence is set to revolutionize social and political life in unpredictable ways, raising questions about the principles that ought to guide its development and regulation. By examining digital advertising and social media algorithms, this article highlights how artificial intelligence already poses a significant threat to the republican conception of liberty -- or freedom from unaccountable power -- and thereby highlights the necessity of protecting republican liberty when integrating artificial intelligence into society. At an individual level, these algorithms can subconsciously influence behavior and thought, and those subject to this influence have limited power over the algorithms they engage. At the political level, these algorithms give technology company executives and other foreign parties the power to influence domestic political processes, such as elections; the multinational nature of algorithm-based platforms and the speed with which technology companies innovate make incumbent state institutions ineffective at holding these actors accountable. At both levels, artificial intelligence has thus created a new form of unfreedom: digital domination. By drawing on the works of Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, and other republican theorists, this article asserts that individuals must have mechanisms to hold algorithms (and those who develop them) accountable in order to be truly free.

AI co-writing systems challenge long held ideals about agency and ownership in the creative process, thereby hindering widespread adoption. In order to address this, we investigate conceptions of agency and ownership in AI creative co-writing. Drawing on insights from a review of commercial systems, we developed three co-writing systems with identical functionality but distinct interface metaphors: agentic, tool-like, and magical. Through interviews with professional and non-professional writers (n = 18), we explored how these metaphors influenced participants' sense of control and authorship. Our analysis resulted in a taxonomy of agency and ownership subtypes and underscore how tool-like metaphors shift writers' expected points of control while agentic metaphors foreground conceptual contributions. We argue that interface metaphors not only guide expectations of control but also frame conceptions of authorship. We conclude with recommendations for the design of AI co-writing systems, emphasizing how metaphor shapes user experience and creative practice.

Generative AI is changing our way of interacting with technology, others, and ourselves. Systems such as Microsoft copilot, Gemini and the expected Apple intelligence still awaits our prompt for action. Y et, it is likely that AI assistant systems will only become better at predicting our behaviour and acting on our behalf. Imagine new generations of generative and predictive AI deciding what you might like best at a new restaurant, picking an outfit that increases your chances on your date with a partner also chosen by the same or a similar system. Far from a science fiction scenario, the goal of several research programs is to build systems capable of assisting us in exactly this manner. The prospect urges us to rethink human-technology relations, but it also invites us to question how such systems might change the way we relate to ourselves. Building on our conception of the relational self, we question the possible effects of generative AI with respect to what we call the sphere of externalised output, the contextual sphere and the sphere of self-relating. In this paper, we attempt to deepen the existential considerations accompanying the AI revolution by outlining how generative AI enables the fulfilment of tasks and also increasingly anticipates, i.e. intercepts, our initiatives in these different spheres.

In June, at a conference set in the picturesque Italian town of Campagna, south-east of Naples, two physicists in a seemingly endless argument over a long-sought theory of fundamental reality caught my attention. From the sidelines, an unassuming figure politely interrupted them. "I've got a slide that might help. Can I put it up?" asked Frank Wilczek. The slide, concisely describing the realms in which this theory may act, swiftly ended the dispute.

This paper argues that explainability is only one facet of a broader ideal that shapes our expectations towards artificial intelligence (AI). Fundamentally, the issue is to what extent AI exhibits systematicity--not merely in being sensitive to how thoughts are composed of recombinable constituents, but in striving towards an integrated body of thought that is consistent, coherent, comprehensive, and parsimoniously principled. This richer conception of systematicity has been obscured by the long shadow of the "systematicity challenge" to connectionism, according to which network architectures are fundamentally at odds with what Fodor and colleagues termed "the systematicity of thought." I offer a conceptual framework for thinking about "the systematicity of thought" that distinguishes four senses of the phrase. I use these distinctions to defuse the perceived tension between systematicity and connectionism and show that the conception of systematicity that historically shaped our sense of what makes thought rational, authoritative, and scientific is more demanding than the Fodorian notion. To determine whether we have reason to hold AI models to this ideal of systematicity, I then argue, we must look to the rationales for systematization and explore to what extent they transfer to AI models. I identify five such rationales and apply them to AI. This brings into view the "hard systematicity challenge." However, the demand for systematization itself needs to be regulated by the rationales for systematization. This yields a dynamic understanding of the need to systematize thought, which tells us how systematic we need AI models to be and when.

Mots clés : c hinois l angue étrangère , i ntelligence a rtificielle , c onception de programmes d'enseignement avec ChatGPT , t âche communicative basée sur les conflits Title: Designing conflict - based communicative tasks in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language with ChatGPT Abstract: In developing the teaching program for a course in Oral Expression in Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language at the university level, the teacher designs communicative tasks based on conflicts to encourage learners to engage in interactive dynamics and dev elop their oral interaction skills. During the design of these tasks, the teacher uses ChatGPT to assist in finalizing the program.