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Supplement to Amortized Projection Optimization for Sliced Wasserstein Generative Models

Neural Information Processing Systems

PRW can be seen as the generalization of Max-SW since PRW with k =1 is equivalent to Max-SW. Similar to Max-SW, the optimization of PRW is solved by using projected gradient ascent. The detailed of the algorithm is given in Algorithm 4. We would like to recall that other methods of optimization have also been used to solved PRW such as Riemannian optimization [28], block coordinate descent [21]. However, in this paper, we consider the original and simplest method which is projected gradient ascent.


Learning a High Fidelity Pose Invariant Model for High-resolution Face Frontalization

Neural Information Processing Systems

Face frontalization refers to the process of synthesizing the frontal view of a face from a given profile. Due to self-occlusion and appearance distortion in the wild, it is extremely challenging to recover faithful results and preserve texture details in a high-resolution. This paper proposes a High Fidelity Pose Invariant Model (HF-PIM) to produce photographic and identity-preserving results.








Backdoors in Conditional Diffusion: Threats to Responsible Synthetic Data Pipelines

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence

Text-to-image diffusion models achieve high-fidelity image generation from natural language prompts. ControlNets extend these models by enabling conditioning on structural inputs (e.g., edge maps, depth, pose), providing fine-grained control over outputs. Yet their reliance on large, publicly scraped datasets and community fine-tuning makes them vulnerable to data poisoning. We introduce a model-poisoning attack that embeds a covert backdoor into a ControlNet, causing it to produce attacker-specified content when exposed to visual triggers, without textual prompts. Experiments show that poisoning only 1% of the fine-tuning corpus yields a 90-98% attack success rate, while 5% further strengthens the backdoor, all while preserving normal generation quality. To mitigate this risk, we propose clean fine-tuning (CFT): freezing the diffusion backbone and fine-tuning only the ControlNet on a sanitized dataset with a reduced learning rate. CFT lowers attack success rates on held-out data. These results expose a critical security weakness in open-source, ControlNet-guided diffusion pipelines and demonstrate that CFT offers a practical defense for responsible synthetic-data pipelines.