Intoyenvironments, Attainable Utility Preservation (AUP)avoided side effects by penalizing shifts in the ability to achieve randomly generated goals [22]. We scale this approach to large, randomly generated environments based onConway'sGame ofLife.

The rapid advancement of open-source foundation models has brought transparency and accessibility to this groundbreaking technology. However, this openness has also enabled the development of highly-capable, unsafe models, as exemplified by recent instances such as WormGPT and FraudGPT, which are specifically designed to facilitate criminal activity. As the capabilities of open foundation models continue to grow, potentially outpacing those of closed-source models, the risk of misuse by bad actors poses an increasingly serious threat to society. This paper addresses the critical question of how open foundation model developers should approach model safety in light of these challenges. Our analysis reveals that open-source foundation model companies often provide less restrictive acceptable use policies (AUPs) compared to their closed-source counterparts, likely due to the inherent difficulties in enforcing such policies once the models are released. To tackle this issue, we introduce PRISM, a design framework for open-source foundation model safety that emphasizes Private, Robust, Independent Safety measures, at Minimal marginal cost of compute. The PRISM framework proposes the use of modular functions that moderate prompts and outputs independently of the core language model, offering a more adaptable and resilient approach to safety compared to the brittle reinforcement learning methods currently used for value alignment. By focusing on identifying AUP violations and engaging the developer community in establishing consensus around safety design decisions, PRISM aims to create a safer open-source ecosystem that maximizes the potential of these powerful technologies while minimizing the risks to individuals and society as a whole.

AI objectives are often hard to specify properly. Some approaches tackle this problem by regularizing the AI's side effects: Agents must weigh off "how much of a mess they make" with an imperfectly specified proxy objective. We propose a formal criterion for side effect regularization via the assistance game framework. In these games, the agent solves a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) representing its uncertainty about the objective function it should optimize. We consider the setting where the true objective is revealed to the agent at a later time step. We show that this POMDP is solved by trading off the proxy reward with the agent's ability to achieve a range of future tasks. We empirically demonstrate the reasonableness of our problem formalization via ground-truth evaluation in two gridworld environments.

Reward function specification can be difficult, even in simple environments. Realistic environments contain millions of states. Rewarding the agent for making a widget may be easy, but penalizing the multitude of possible negative side effects is hard. In toy environments, Attainable Utility Preservation (AUP) avoids side effects by penalizing shifts in the ability to achieve randomly generated goals. We scale this approach to large, randomly generated environments based on Conway's Game of Life. By preserving optimal value for a single randomly generated reward function, AUP incurs modest overhead, completes the specified task, and avoids side effects.