A Sneaky Hacking Tool Targeting AI Infrastructure Is Lurking in Victims' Blind Spots A new type of malware can worm deep into AI coding systems to steal data and logins--and can flip a "death switch" to destroy files and keep out real users. As AI tools proliferate and become deeply ingrained in software development around the world, new research from the cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike shows how attackers are actively targeting the AI toolchain to steal access credentials, gain deeper access to a target environment, exfiltrate sensitive data, and even destroy target files and systems--all while finding new ways to cover their tracks. Researchers discovered a worm in the wild while investigating AI software supply chain attacks. Adam Meyers, CrowdStrike's senior vice president of counter adversary work, says that the company has not yet attributed the activity to a specific actor, but that it fits into larger evolutions in how attackers like TeamPCP (which Crowdstrike tracks as "Altered Spider") and North Korean groups are targeting the AI software supply chain. "This is one of the campaigns that we've seen showing that this is an emerging attack class," Meyers tells WIRED.

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Microsoft discovered GigaWiper malware that overwrites hard drives multiple times and renders entire systems unusable by deleting partition entries and storage contents. PCWorld reports this sophisticated threat primarily targets organizations rather than home users, combining surveillance capabilities with irreversible data destruction. The malware integrates components from older threats like Crucio ransomware and includes a Go-based backdoor for remote system control and stealth operations. Microsoft has discovered a new piece of malware that not only spies on data but also renders entire systems unusable. The malware, known as GigaWiper, combines several destructive functions with a powerful backdoor for attackers. Security researchers at Microsoft Threat Intelligence first detected the activity back in October 2025. The recently published analysis reveals the full extent of the malware's capabilities.

However, this iterative thinking mechanism introduces a new vulnerability surface. We present the Deadlock Attack, a resource exhaustion method that hijacks an LRM's generative control flow by training a malicious adversarial embedding to induce perpetual reasoning loops. Specifically, the optimized embedding encourages transitional tokens (e.g., "Wait", "But") after reasoning steps, preventing the model from concluding its answer. A key challenge we identify is the continuous-to-discrete projection gap: naïve projections of adversarial embeddings to token sequences nullify the attack. To overcome this, we introduce a backdoor implantation strategy, enabling reliable activation through specific trigger tokens. Our method achieves a 100% attack success rate across four advanced LRMs (Phi-RM, Nemotron-Nano, R1-Qwen, R1-Llama) and three math reasoning benchmarks, forcing models to generate up to their maximum token limits. The attack is also stealthy (in terms of causing negligible utility loss on benign user inputs) and remains robust against existing strategies trying to mitigate the overthinking issue. Our findings expose a critical and underexplored security vulnerability in LRMs from the perspective of reasoning (in)efficiency.

We consider the problem of federated learning (FL) with graph-structured data distributed across multiple clients. In particular, we address the prevalent scenario of interconnected subgraphs, where interconnections between clients significantly influence the learning process. Existing approaches suffer from critical limitations, either requiring the exchange of sensitive node embeddings, thereby posing privacy risks, or relying on computationally-intensive steps, which hinders scalability. To tackle these challenges, we propose FEDLAP, a novel framework that leverages global structure information via Laplacian smoothing in the spectral domain to effectively capture inter-node dependencies while ensuring privacy and scalability. We provide a formal analysis of the privacy of FEDLAP, demonstrating that it preserves privacy. Notably, FEDLAP is the first subgraph FL scheme with strong privacy guarantees. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets demonstrate that FEDLAP achieves competitive or superior utility compared to existing techniques.

Recently, traffic sign recognition (TSR) systems have become a prominent target for physical adversarial attacks. These attacks typically rely on conspicuous stickers and projections, or using invisible light and acoustic signals that can be easily blocked. In this paper, we introduce a novel attack medium, i.e., fluorescent ink, to design a stealthy and effective physical adversarial patch, namely FIPatch, to advance the state-of-the-art. Specifically, we first model the fluorescence effect in the digital domain to identify the optimal attack settings, which guide the realworld fluorescence parameters. By applying a carefully designed fluorescence perturbation to the target sign, the attacker can later trigger a fluorescent effect using invisible ultraviolet light, causing the TSR system to misclassify the sign and potentially leading to traffic accidents. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation to investigate the effectiveness of FIPatch, which shows a success rate of 98.31% in low-light conditions. Furthermore, our attack successfully bypasses five popular defenses and achieves a success rate of 96.72%.

Proprietary large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong generalization capabilities across diverse tasks and are increasingly deployed on edge devices for efficiency and privacy reasons. However, deploying proprietary LLMs at the edge without adequate protection introduces critical security threats. Attackers can extract model weights and architectures, enabling unauthorized copying and misuse. Even when protective measures prevent full extraction of model weights, attackers may still perform advanced attacks, such as fine-tuning, to further exploit the model. Existing defenses against these threats typically incur significant computational and communication overhead, making them impractical for edge deployment. To safeguard the edge-deployed LLMs, we introduce CoreGuard, a computationand communication-efficient protection method. CoreGuard employs an efficient protection protocol to reduce computational overhead and minimize communication overhead via a propagation protocol. Extensive experiments show that CoreGuard achieves upper-bound security protection with negligible overhead.

Agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, without assuming that the attacker can directly modify the memory bank of the agent. The attacker injects malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps corresponding to a different target query during the agent's execution of the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link victim queries to the malicious reasoning steps. During the memory injection, we propose an indication prompt that guides the agent to autonomously generate similar bridging steps, with a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing later victim queries. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJAin compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting the risk.

Game-theoretic algorithms are commonly benchmarked on recreational games, classical constructs from economic theory such as congestion and dispersion games, or entirely random game instances. While the past two decades have seen the rise of security games - grounded in real-world scenarios like patrolling and infrastructure protection - their practical evaluation has been hindered by limited access to the datasets used to generate them. In particular, although the structural components of these games (e.g., patrol paths derived from maps) can be replicated, the critical data defining target values - central to utility modeling - remain inaccessible. In this paper, we introduce a flexible framework that leverages open-access datasets to generate realistic matrix and security game instances. These include animal movement data for modeling anti-poaching scenarios and demographic and infrastructure data for infrastructure protection. Our framework allows users to customize utility functions and game parameters, while also offering a suite of preconfigured instances. We provide theoretical results highlighting the degeneracy and limitations of benchmarking on random games, and empirically compare our generated games against random baselines across a variety of standard algorithms for computing Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, including linear programming, incremental strategy generation, and self-play with no-regret learners.

We consider a decentralized setup in which the participants collaboratively train and serve a large neural network, and where each participant only processes a subset of the model. In this setup, we explore the possibility of unmaterializable weights, where a full weight set is never available to any one participant. We introduce Unextractable Protocol Models (UPMs): a training and inference framework that leverages the sharded model setup to ensure model shards (i.e., subsets) held by participants are incompatible at different time steps. UPMs periodically inject timevarying, random, invertible transforms at participant boundaries; preserving the overall network function yet rendering cross-time assemblies incoherent. On Qwen2.5-0.5B and Llama-3.2-1B, 10 000 transforms leave FP32 perplexity unchanged ( PPL< 0.01; Jensen-Shannon drift < 4 10 5), and we show how to control growth for lower precision datatypes. Applying a transform every 30s adds 3% latency, 0.1% bandwidth, and 10% GPU-memory overhead at inference, while training overhead falls to 1.6% time and < 1% memory. We consider several attacks, showing that the requirements of direct attacks are impractical and easy to defend against, and that gradient-based fine-tuning of stitched partitions consumes 60% of the tokens required to train from scratch. By enabling models to be collaboratively trained yet not extracted, UPMs make it practical to embed programmatic incentive mechanisms in community-driven decentralized training.