The partial alignment and conflict of autonomous agents lead to mixed-motive scenarios in many real-world applications. However, agents may fail to cooperate in practice even when cooperation yields a better outcome. One well known reason for this failure comes from non-credible commitments. To facilitate commitments among agents for better cooperation, we define Markov Commitment Games (MCGs), a variant of commitment games, where agents can voluntarily commit to their proposed future plans. Based on MCGs, we propose a learnable commitment protocol via policy gradients. We further propose incentive-compatible learning to accelerate convergence to equilibria with better social welfare. Experimental results in challenging mixed-motive tasks demonstrate faster empirical convergence and higher returns for our method compared with its counterparts. Our code is available at https://github.com/shuhui-zhu/DCL.

Information design (ID) explores how a sender influence the optimal behavior of receivers to achieve specific objectives. While ID originates from everyday human communication, existing game-theoretic and machine learning methods often model information structures as numbers, which limits many applications to toy games. This work leverages LLMs and proposes a verbalized framework in Bayesian persuasion (BP), which extends classic BP to real-world games involving human dialogues for the first time. Specifically, we map the BP to a verbalized mediator-augmented extensive-form game, where LLMs instantiate the sender and receiver. To efficiently solve the verbalized game, we propose a generalized equilibrium-finding algorithm combining LLM and game solver. The algorithm is reinforced with techniques including verbalized commitment assumptions, verbalized obedience constraints, and information obfuscation. Numerical experiments in dialogue scenarios, such as recommendation letters, courtroom interactions, and law enforcement, validate that our framework can both reproduce theoretical results in classic BP and discover effective persuasion strategies in more complex natural language and multi-stage scenarios.

Adaptive Moment Estimation (Adam) is a cornerstone optimization algorithm in deep learning, widely recognized for its flexibility with adaptive learning rates and efficiency in handling large-scale data. However, despite its practical success, the theoretical understanding of Adam's convergence has been constrained by stringent assumptions, such as almost surely bounded stochastic gradients or uniformly bounded gradients, which are more restrictive than those typically required for analyzing stochastic gradient descent (SGD). In this paper, we introduce a novel and comprehensive framework for analyzing the convergence properties of Adam. This framework offers a versatile approach to establishing Adam's convergence. Specifically, we prove that Adam achieves asymptotic (last iterate sense) convergence in both the almost sure sense and the \(L_1\) sense under the relaxed assumptions typically used for SGD, namely \(L\)-smoothness and the ABC inequality. Meanwhile, under the same assumptions, we show that Adam attains non-asymptotic sample complexity bounds similar to those of SGD.

To understand the complexity of the dynamic of learning in differential games, we decompose the game into components where the dynamic is well understood. One of the possible tools is Helmholtz's theorem, which can decompose a vector field into a potential and a harmonic component. This has been shown to be effective in finite and normal-form games. However, applying Helmholtz's theorem by connecting it with the Hodge theorem on $\mathbb{R}^n$ (which is the strategy space of differential game) is non-trivial due to the non-compactness of $\mathbb{R}^n$. Bridging the dynamic-strategic disconnect through Hodge/Helmoltz's theorem in differential games is then left as an open problem \cite{letcher2019differentiable}. In this work, we provide two decompositions of differential games to answer this question: the first as an exact scalar potential part, a near vector potential part, and a non-strategic part; the second as a near scalar potential part, an exact vector potential part, and a non-strategic part. We show that scalar potential games coincide with potential games proposed by \cite{monderer1996potential}, where the gradient descent dynamic can successfully find the Nash equilibrium. For the vector potential game, we show that the individual gradient field is divergence-free, in which case the gradient descent dynamic may either be divergent or recurrent.

Effective communication is an essential component in collaborative multi-agent systems. Situations where explicit messaging is not feasible have been common in human society throughout history, which motivate the study of implicit communication. Previous works on learning implicit communication mostly rely on theory of mind (ToM), where agents infer the mental states and intentions of others by interpreting their actions. However, ToM-based methods become less effective in making accurate inferences in complex tasks. In this work, we propose the Implicit Channel Protocol (ICP) framework, which allows agents to construct implicit communication channels similar to the explicit ones. ICP leverages a subset of actions, denoted as the scouting actions, and a mapping between information and these scouting actions that encodes and decodes the messages. We propose training algorithms for agents to message and act, including learning with a randomly initialized information map and with a delayed information map. The efficacy of ICP has been tested on the tasks of Guessing Number, Revealing Goals, and Hanabi, where ICP significantly outperforms baseline methods through more efficient information transmission.

A carbon market is a market-based tool that incentivizes economic agents to align individual profits with the global utility, i.e., reducing carbon emissions to tackle climate change. Cap and trade stands as a critical principle based on allocating and trading carbon allowances (carbon emission credit), enabling economic agents to follow planned emissions and penalizing excess emissions. A central authority is responsible for introducing and allocating those allowances in cap and trade. However, the complexity of carbon market dynamics makes accurate simulation intractable, which in turn hinders the design of effective allocation strategies. To address this, we propose an adaptive mechanism design framework, simulating the market using hierarchical, model-free multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Government agents allocate carbon credits, while enterprises engage in economic activities and carbon trading. This framework illustrates agents' behavior comprehensively. Numerical results show MARL enables government agents to balance productivity, equality, and carbon emissions. Our project is available at https://github.com/xwanghan/Carbon-Simulator.

In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably converges to the Nash equilibrium while attaining sublinear regret for each individual player. Our algorithm simultaneously achieves a Nash regret and a regret bound of $O(T^{4/5})$ for potential games, which matches the best available result, without using additional projection steps. Through carefully balancing the reuse of past samples and exploration of new samples, we then extend the results to Markov potential games and improve the best available Nash regret from $O(T^{5/6})$ to $O(T^{4/5})$. Moreover, our algorithm requires no knowledge of the game, such as the distribution mismatch coefficient, which provides more flexibility in its practical implementation. Experimental results corroborate our theoretical findings and underscore the practical effectiveness of our method.

We consider the problem of policy transfer between two Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). We introduce a lemma based on existing theoretical results in reinforcement learning to measure the relativity gap between two arbitrary MDPs, that is the difference between any two cumulative expected returns defined on different policies and environment dynamics. Based on this lemma, we propose two new algorithms referred to as Relative Policy Optimization (RPO) and Relative Transition Optimization (RTO), which offer fast policy transfer and dynamics modelling, respectively. RPO transfers the policy evaluated in one environment to maximize the return in another, while RTO updates the parameterized dynamics model to reduce the gap between the dynamics of the two environments. Integrating the two algorithms results in the complete Relative Policy-Transition Optimization (RPTO) algorithm, in which the policy interacts with the two environments simultaneously, such that data collections from two environments, policy and transition updates are completed in one closed loop to form a principled learning framework for policy transfer. We demonstrate the effectiveness of RPTO on a set of MuJoCo continuous control tasks by creating policy transfer problems via variant dynamics.

In this work, we study the low-rank MDPs with adversarially changed losses in the full-information feedback setting. In particular, the unknown transition probability kernel admits a low-rank matrix decomposition \citep{REPUCB22}, and the loss functions may change adversarially but are revealed to the learner at the end of each episode. We propose a policy optimization-based algorithm POLO, and we prove that it attains the $\widetilde{O}(K^{\frac{5}{6}}A^{\frac{1}{2}}d\ln(1+M)/(1-\gamma)^2)$ regret guarantee, where $d$ is rank of the transition kernel (and hence the dimension of the unknown representations), $A$ is the cardinality of the action space, $M$ is the cardinality of the model class, and $\gamma$ is the discounted factor. Notably, our algorithm is oracle-efficient and has a regret guarantee with no dependence on the size of potentially arbitrarily large state space. Furthermore, we also prove an $\Omega(\frac{\gamma^2}{1-\gamma} \sqrt{d A K})$ regret lower bound for this problem, showing that low-rank MDPs are statistically more difficult to learn than linear MDPs in the regret minimization setting. To the best of our knowledge, we present the first algorithm that interleaves representation learning, exploration, and exploitation to achieve the sublinear regret guarantee for RL with nonlinear function approximation and adversarial losses.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is inspired by the way human infants and animals learn from the environment. The setting is somewhat idealized because, in actual tasks, other agents in the environment have their own goals and behave adaptively to the ego agent. To thrive in those environments, the agent needs to influence other agents so their actions become more helpful and less harmful. Research in computational economics distills two ways to influence others directly: by providing tangible goods (mechanism design) and by providing information (information design). This work investigates information design problems for a group of RL agents. The main challenges are two-fold. One is the information provided will immediately affect the transition of the agent trajectories, which introduces additional non-stationarity. The other is the information can be ignored, so the sender must provide information that the receiver is willing to respect. We formulate the Markov signaling game, and develop the notions of signaling gradient and the extended obedience constraints that address these challenges. Our algorithm is efficient on various mixed-motive tasks and provides further insights into computational economics. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YueLin301/InformationDesignMARL.