Although the integration of large language models (LLMs) into robotics has unlocked transformative capabilities, it has also introduced significant safety concerns, ranging from average-case LLM errors (e.g., hallucinations) to adversarial jailbreaking attacks, which can produce harmful robot behavior in real-world settings. Traditional robot safety approaches do not address the novel vulnerabilities of LLMs, and current LLM safety guardrails overlook the physical risks posed by robots operating in dynamic real-world environments. In this paper, we propose RoboGuard, a two-stage guardrail architecture to ensure the safety of LLM-enabled robots. RoboGuard first contextualizes pre-defined safety rules by grounding them in the robot's environment using a root-of-trust LLM, which employs chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to generate rigorous safety specifications, such as temporal logic constraints. RoboGuard then resolves potential conflicts between these contextual safety specifications and a possibly unsafe plan using temporal logic control synthesis, which ensures safety compliance while minimally violating user preferences. Through extensive simulation and real-world experiments that consider worst-case jailbreaking attacks, we demonstrate that RoboGuard reduces the execution of unsafe plans from 92% to below 2.5% without compromising performance on safe plans. We also demonstrate that RoboGuard is resource-efficient, robust against adaptive attacks, and significantly enhanced by enabling its root-of-trust LLM to perform CoT reasoning. These results underscore the potential of RoboGuard to mitigate the safety risks and enhance the reliability of LLM-enabled robots.

Large language models (LLMs) are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, wherein adversarial prompts are designed to elicit harmful responses. While existing defenses effectively mitigate single-turn attacks by detecting and filtering unsafe inputs, they fail against multi-turn jailbreaks that exploit contextual drift over multiple interactions, gradually leading LLMs away from safe behavior. To address this challenge, we propose a safety steering framework grounded in safe control theory, ensuring invariant safety in multi-turn dialogues. Our approach models the dialogue with LLMs using state-space representations and introduces a novel neural barrier function (NBF) to detect and filter harmful queries emerging from evolving contexts proactively. Our method achieves invariant safety at each turn of dialogue by learning a safety predictor that accounts for adversarial queries, preventing potential context drift toward jailbreaks. Extensive experiments under multiple LLMs show that our NBF-based safety steering outperforms safety alignment baselines, offering stronger defenses against multi-turn jailbreaks while maintaining a better trade-off between safety and helpfulness under different multi-turn jailbreak methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/HanjiangHu/NBF-LLM .

The recent introduction of large language models (LLMs) has revolutionized the field of robotics by enabling contextual reasoning and intuitive human-robot interaction in domains as varied as manipulation, locomotion, and self-driving vehicles. When viewed as a stand-alone technology, LLMs are known to be vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, wherein malicious prompters elicit harmful text by bypassing LLM safety guardrails. To assess the risks of deploying LLMs in robotics, in this paper, we introduce RoboPAIR, the first algorithm designed to jailbreak LLM-controlled robots. Unlike existing, textual attacks on LLM chatbots, RoboPAIR elicits harmful physical actions from LLM-controlled robots, a phenomenon we experimentally demonstrate in three scenarios: (i) a white-box setting, wherein the attacker has full access to the NVIDIA Dolphins self-driving LLM, (ii) a gray-box setting, wherein the attacker has partial access to a Clearpath Robotics Jackal UGV robot equipped with a GPT-4o planner, and (iii) a black-box setting, wherein the attacker has only query access to the GPT-3.5-integrated Unitree Robotics Go2 robot dog. In each scenario and across three new datasets of harmful robotic actions, we demonstrate that RoboPAIR, as well as several static baselines, finds jailbreaks quickly and effectively, often achieving 100% attack success rates. Our results reveal, for the first time, that the risks of jailbroken LLMs extend far beyond text generation, given the distinct possibility that jailbroken robots could cause physical damage in the real world. Indeed, our results on the Unitree Go2 represent the first successful jailbreak of a deployed commercial robotic system. Addressing this emerging vulnerability is critical for ensuring the safe deployment of LLMs in robotics. Additional media is available at: https://robopair.org

Jailbreak attacks cause large language models (LLMs) to generate harmful, unethical, or otherwise objectionable content. Evaluating these attacks presents a number of challenges, which the current collection of benchmarks and evaluation techniques do not adequately address. First, there is no clear standard of practice regarding jailbreaking evaluation. Second, existing works compute costs and success rates in incomparable ways. And third, numerous works are not reproducible, as they withhold adversarial prompts, involve closed-source code, or rely on evolving proprietary APIs. To address these challenges, we introduce JailbreakBench, an open-sourced benchmark with the following components: (1) an evolving repository of state-of-the-art adversarial prompts, which we refer to as jailbreak artifacts; (2) a jailbreaking dataset comprising 100 behaviors -- both original and sourced from prior work (Zou et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2023, 2024) -- which align with OpenAI's usage policies; (3) a standardized evaluation framework at https://github.com/JailbreakBench/jailbreakbench that includes a clearly defined threat model, system prompts, chat templates, and scoring functions; and (4) a leaderboard at https://jailbreakbench.github.io/ that tracks the performance of attacks and defenses for various LLMs. We have carefully considered the potential ethical implications of releasing this benchmark, and believe that it will be a net positive for the community.

Prompt engineering is effective for controlling the output of text-to-image (T2I) generative models, but it is also laborious due to the need for manually crafted prompts. This challenge has spurred the development of algorithms for automated prompt generation. However, these methods often struggle with transferability across T2I models, require white-box access to the underlying model, and produce non-intuitive prompts. In this work, we introduce PRISM, an algorithm that automatically identifies human-interpretable and transferable prompts that can effectively generate desired concepts given only black-box access to T2I models. Inspired by large language model (LLM) jailbreaking, PRISM leverages the in-context learning ability of LLMs to iteratively refine the candidate prompts distribution for given reference images. Our experiments demonstrate the versatility and effectiveness of PRISM in generating accurate prompts for objects, styles, and images across multiple T2I models, including Stable Diffusion, DALL-E, and Midjourney.

Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, indemnifying public interest safety research and protecting it from the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks, which bypass the safeguards of targeted LLMs and fool them into generating objectionable content. While initial defenses show promise against token-based threat models, there do not exist defenses that provide robustness against semantic attacks and avoid unfavorable trade-offs between robustness and nominal performance. To meet this need, we propose SEMANTICSMOOTH, a smoothing-based defense that aggregates the predictions of multiple semantically transformed copies of a given input prompt. Experimental results demonstrate that SEMANTICSMOOTH achieves state-of-the-art robustness against GCG, PAIR, and AutoDAN attacks while maintaining strong nominal performance on instruction following benchmarks such as InstructionFollowing and AlpacaEval. The codes will be publicly available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/SemanticSmooth.

Lipschitz constants of neural networks allow for guarantees of robustness in image classification, safety in controller design, and generalizability beyond the training data. As calculating Lipschitz constants is NP-hard, techniques for estimating Lipschitz constants must navigate the trade-off between scalability and accuracy. In this work, we significantly push the scalability frontier of a semidefinite programming technique known as LipSDP while achieving zero accuracy loss. We first show that LipSDP has chordal sparsity, which allows us to derive a chordally sparse formulation that we call Chordal-LipSDP. The key benefit is that the main computational bottleneck of LipSDP, a large semidefinite constraint, is now decomposed into an equivalent collection of smaller ones: allowing Chordal-LipSDP to outperform LipSDP particularly as the network depth grows. Moreover, our formulation uses a tunable sparsity parameter that enables one to gain tighter estimates without incurring a significant computational cost. We illustrate the scalability of our approach through extensive numerical experiments.

This paper addresses the problem of data-driven modeling and verification of perception-based autonomous systems. We assume the perception model can be decomposed into a canonical model (obtained from first principles or a simulator) and a noise model that contains the measurement noise introduced by the real environment. We focus on two types of noise, benign and adversarial noise, and develop a data-driven model for each type using generative models and classifiers, respectively. We show that the trained models perform well according to a variety of evaluation metrics based on downstream tasks such as state estimation and control. Finally, we verify the safety of two systems with high-dimensional data-driven models, namely an image-based version of mountain car (a reinforcement learning benchmark) as well as the F1/10 car, which uses LiDAR measurements to navigate a racing track.

We assume that a model of the system dynamics and a state estimator are available along with corresponding error bounds, e.g., estimated from data in practice. We first propose robust output control barrier functions (ROCBFs) as a means to guarantee safety, as defined through controlled forward invariance of a safe set. We then formulate an optimization problem to learn ROCBFs from expert demonstrations that exhibit safe system behavior, e.g., data collected from a human operator or an expert controller. When the parametrization of the ROCBF is linear, then we show that, under mild assumptions, the optimization problem is convex. Along with the optimization problem, we provide verifiable conditions in terms of the density of the data, smoothness of the system model and state estimator, and the size of the error bounds that guarantee validity of the obtained ROCBF. Towards obtaining a practical control algorithm, we propose an algorithmic implementation of our theoretical framework that accounts for assumptions made in our framework in practice. We empirically validate our algorithm in the autonomous driving simulator CARLA and demonstrate how to learn safe control laws from RGB camera images.