We introduce Gemma 3, a multimodal addition to the Gemma family of lightweight open models, ranging in scale from 1 to 27 billion parameters. This version introduces vision understanding abilities, a wider coverage of languages and longer context - at least 128K tokens. We also change the architecture of the model to reduce the KV-cache memory that tends to explode with long context. This is achieved by increasing the ratio of local to global attention layers, and keeping the span on local attention short. The Gemma 3 models are trained with distillation and achieve superior performance to Gemma 2 for both pre-trained and instruction finetuned versions. In particular, our novel post-training recipe significantly improves the math, chat, instruction-following and multilingual abilities, making Gemma3-4B-IT competitive with Gemma2-27B-IT and Gemma3-27B-IT comparable to Gemini-1.5-Pro across benchmarks. We release all our models to the community.

Post-training of language models (LMs) increasingly relies on the following two stages: (i) knowledge distillation, where the LM is trained to imitate a larger teacher LM, and (ii) reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), where the LM is aligned by optimizing a reward model. In the second RLHF stage, a well-known challenge is reward hacking, where the LM over-optimizes the reward model. Such phenomenon is in line with Goodhart's law and can lead to degraded performance on the true objective. In this paper, we investigate whether a similar phenomenon, that we call teacher hacking, can occur during knowledge distillation. This could arise because the teacher LM is itself an imperfect approximation of the true distribution. To study this, we propose a controlled experimental setup involving: (i) an oracle LM representing the ground-truth distribution, (ii) a teacher LM distilled from the oracle, and (iii) a student LM distilled from the teacher. Our experiments reveal the following insights. When using a fixed offline dataset for distillation, teacher hacking occurs; moreover, we can detect it by observing when the optimization process deviates from polynomial convergence laws. In contrast, employing online data generation techniques effectively mitigates teacher hacking. More precisely, we identify data diversity as the key factor in preventing hacking. Overall, our findings provide a deeper understanding of the benefits and limitations of distillation for building robust and efficient LMs.

While large language models perform well on a range of complex tasks (e.g., text generation, question answering, summarization), robust multi-step planning and reasoning remains a considerable challenge for them. In this paper we show that search-based planning can significantly improve LLMs' playing strength across several board games (Chess, Fischer Random / Chess960, Connect Four, and Hex). We introduce, compare and contrast two major approaches: In external search, the model guides Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) rollouts and evaluations without calls to an external engine, and in internal search, the model directly generates in-context a linearized tree of potential futures and a resulting final choice. Both build on a language model pre-trained on relevant domain knowledge, capturing the transition and value functions across these games. We find that our pre-training method minimizes hallucinations, as our model is highly accurate regarding state prediction and legal moves. Additionally, both internal and external search indeed improve win-rates against state-of-the-art bots, even reaching Grandmaster-level performance in chess while operating on a similar move count search budget per decision as human Grandmasters. The way we combine search with domain knowledge is not specific to board games, suggesting direct extensions into more general language model inference and training techniques.

Generative models are transforming creative domains such as music generation, with inference-time strategies like Classifier-Free Guidance (CFG) playing a crucial role. However, CFG doubles inference cost while limiting originality and diversity across generated contents. In this paper, we introduce diversity-rewarded CFG distillation, a novel finetuning procedure that distills the strengths of CFG while addressing its limitations. Our approach optimises two training objectives: (1) a distillation objective, encouraging the model alone (without CFG) to imitate the CFG-augmented predictions, and (2) an RL objective with a diversity reward, promoting the generation of diverse outputs for a given prompt. By finetuning, we learn model weights with the ability to generate high-quality and diverse outputs, without any inference overhead. This also unlocks the potential of weight-based model merging strategies: by interpolating between the weights of two models (the first focusing on quality, the second on diversity), we can control the quality-diversity trade-off at deployment time, and even further boost performance. We conduct extensive experiments on the MusicLM (Agostinelli et al., 2023) text-to-music generative model, where our approach surpasses CFG in terms of quality-diversity Pareto optimality. According to human evaluators, our finetuned-then-merged model generates samples with higher quality-diversity than the base model augmented with CFG. Explore our generations at https://google-research.github.io/seanet/musiclm/diverse_music/.

Non-cooperative and cooperative games with a very large number of players have many applications but remain generally intractable when the number of players increases. Introduced by Lasry and Lions, and Huang, Caines and Malham\'e, Mean Field Games (MFGs) rely on a mean-field approximation to allow the number of players to grow to infinity. Traditional methods for solving these games generally rely on solving partial or stochastic differential equations with a full knowledge of the model. Recently, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has appeared promising to solve complex problems at scale. The combination of RL and MFGs is promising to solve games at a very large scale both in terms of population size and environment complexity. In this survey, we review the quickly growing recent literature on RL methods to learn equilibria and social optima in MFGs. We first identify the most common settings (static, stationary, and evolutive) of MFGs. We then present a general framework for classical iterative methods (based on best-response computation or policy evaluation) to solve MFGs in an exact way. Building on these algorithms and the connection with Markov Decision Processes, we explain how RL can be used to learn MFG solutions in a model-free way. Last, we present numerical illustrations on a benchmark problem, and conclude with some perspectives.

The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has long been known that the core (and approximations, such as the least-core) are hard to compute. This limits our ability to analyze cooperative games in general, and to fully embrace cooperative game theory contributions in domains such as explainable AI (XAI), where the core can complement the Shapley values to identify influential features or instances supporting predictions by black-box models. We propose novel iterative algorithms for computing variants of the core, which avoid the computational bottleneck of many other approaches; namely solving large linear programs. As such, they scale better to very large problems as we demonstrate across different classes of cooperative games, including weighted voting games, induced subgraph games, and marginal contribution networks. We also explore our algorithms in the context of XAI, providing further evidence of the power of the core for such applications.

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game theoretic analysis becomes effectively infeasible beyond a low number of players. Recent approaches have gone around this limitation by instead considering Mean-Field games, an approximation of anonymous $N$-player games, where the number of players is infinite and the population's state distribution, instead of every individual player's state, is the object of interest. The practical computability of Mean-Field Nash equilibria, the most studied Mean-Field equilibrium to date, however, typically depends on beneficial non-generic structural properties such as monotonicity or contraction properties, which are required for known algorithms to converge. In this work, we provide an alternative route for studying Mean-Field games, by developing the concepts of Mean-Field correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria. We show that they can be efficiently learnt in \emph{all games}, without requiring any additional assumption on the structure of the game, using three classical algorithms. Furthermore, we establish correspondences between our notions and those already present in the literature, derive optimality bounds for the Mean-Field - $N$-player transition, and empirically demonstrate the convergence of these algorithms on simple games.

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or $q$-values. This is far from being trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, e.g. neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

We present a method enabling a large number of agents to learn how to flock, which is a natural behavior observed in large populations of animals. This problem has drawn a lot of interest but requires many structural assumptions and is tractable only in small dimensions. We phrase this problem as a Mean Field Game (MFG), where each individual chooses its acceleration depending on the population behavior. Combining Deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Normalizing Flows (NF), we obtain a tractable solution requiring only very weak assumptions. Our algorithm finds a Nash Equilibrium and the agents adapt their velocity to match the neighboring flock's average one. We use Fictitious Play and alternate: (1) computing an approximate best response with Deep RL, and (2) estimating the next population distribution with NF. We show numerically that our algorithm learn multi-group or high-dimensional flocking with obstacles.

We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online Mirror Descent (OMD). We show that continuous-time OMD provably converges to a Nash equilibrium under a natural and well-motivated set of monotonicity assumptions. This theoretical result nicely extends to multi-population games and to settings involving common noise. A thorough experimental investigation on various single and multi-population MFGs shows that OMD outperforms traditional algorithms such as Fictitious Play (FP). We empirically show that OMD scales up and converges significantly faster than FP by solving, for the first time to our knowledge, examples of MFGs with hundreds of billions states. This study establishes the state-of-the-art for learning in large-scale multi-agent and multi-population games.