How should we evaluate the quality of generative models? Many existing metrics focus on a model's producibility, i.e. the quality and breadth of outputs it can generate. However, the actual value from using a generative model stems not just from what it can produce but whether a user with a specific goal can produce an output that satisfies that goal. We refer to this property as steerability. In this paper, we first introduce a mathematical framework for evaluating steerability independently from producibility. Steerability is more challenging to evaluate than producibility because it requires knowing a user's goals. We address this issue by creating a benchmark task that relies on one key idea: sample an output from a generative model and ask users to reproduce it. We implement this benchmark in a large-scale user study of text-to-image models and large language models. Despite the ability of these models to produce high-quality outputs, they all perform poorly on steerabilty. This suggests that we need to focus on improving the steerability of generative models. We show such improvements are indeed possible: through reinforcement learning techniques, we create an alternative steering mechanism for image models that achieves more than 2x improvement on this benchmark.

How can we use the novel capacities of large language models (LLMs) in empirical research? And how can we do so while accounting for their limitations, which are themselves only poorly understood? We develop an econometric framework to answer this question that distinguishes between two types of empirical tasks. Using LLMs for prediction problems (including hypothesis generation) is valid under one condition: no ``leakage'' between the LLM's training dataset and the researcher's sample. No leakage can be ensured by using open-source LLMs with documented training data and published weights. Using LLM outputs for estimation problems to automate the measurement of some economic concept (expressed either by some text or from human subjects) requires the researcher to collect at least some validation data: without such data, the errors of the LLM's automation cannot be assessed and accounted for. As long as these steps are taken, LLM outputs can be used in empirical research with the familiar econometric guarantees we desire. Using two illustrative applications to finance and political economy, we find that these requirements are stringent; when they are violated, the limitations of LLMs now result in unreliable empirical estimates. Our results suggest the excitement around the empirical uses of LLMs is warranted -- they allow researchers to effectively use even small amounts of language data for both prediction and estimation -- but only with these safeguards in place.

Recent work suggests that large language models may implicitly learn world models. How should we assess this possibility? We formalize this question for the case where the underlying reality is governed by a deterministic finite automaton. This includes problems as diverse as simple logical reasoning, geographic navigation, game-playing, and chemistry. We propose new evaluation metrics for world model recovery inspired by the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem from language theory. We illustrate their utility in three domains: game playing, logic puzzles, and navigation. In all domains, the generative models we consider do well on existing diagnostics for assessing world models, but our evaluation metrics reveal their world models to be far less coherent than they appear. Such incoherence creates fragility: using a generative model to solve related but subtly different tasks can lead it to fail badly. Building generative models that meaningfully capture the underlying logic of the domains they model would be immensely valuable; our results suggest new ways to assess how close a given model is to that goal.

What makes large language models (LLMs) impressive is also what makes them hard to evaluate: their diversity of uses. To evaluate these models, we must understand the purposes they will be used for. We consider a setting where these deployment decisions are made by people, and in particular, people's beliefs about where an LLM will perform well. We model such beliefs as the consequence of a human generalization function: having seen what an LLM gets right or wrong, people generalize to where else it might succeed. We collect a dataset of 19K examples of how humans make generalizations across 79 tasks from the MMLU and BIG-Bench benchmarks. We show that the human generalization function can be predicted using NLP methods: people have consistent structured ways to generalize. We then evaluate LLM alignment with the human generalization function. Our results show that -- especially for cases where the cost of mistakes is high -- more capable models (e.g. GPT-4) can do worse on the instances people choose to use them for, exactly because they are not aligned with the human generalization function.

Although current large language models are complex, the most basic specifications of the underlying language generation problem itself are simple to state: given a finite set of training samples from an unknown language, produce valid new strings from the language that don't already appear in the training data. Here we ask what we can conclude about language generation using only this specification, without further assumptions. In particular, suppose that an adversary enumerates the strings of an unknown target language L that is known only to come from one of a possibly infinite list of candidates. A computational agent is trying to learn to generate from this language; we say that the agent generates from L in the limit if after some finite point in the enumeration of L, the agent is able to produce new elements that come exclusively from L and that have not yet been presented by the adversary. Our main result is that there is an agent that is able to generate in the limit for every countable list of candidate languages. This contrasts dramatically with negative results due to Gold and Angluin in a well-studied model of language learning where the goal is to identify an unknown language from samples; the difference between these results suggests that identifying a language is a fundamentally different problem than generating from it.

Machine learning models depend on the quality of input data. As electronic health records are widely adopted, the amount of data in health care is growing, along with complaints about the quality of medical notes. We use two prediction tasks, readmission prediction and in-hospital mortality prediction, to characterize the value of information in medical notes. We show that as a whole, medical notes only provide additional predictive power over structured information in readmission prediction. We further propose a probing framework to select parts of notes that enable more accurate predictions than using all notes, despite that the selected information leads to a distribution shift from the training data ("all notes"). Finally, we demonstrate that models trained on the selected valuable information achieve even better predictive performance, with only 6.8% of all the tokens for readmission prediction.

On a variety of high-stakes tasks, machine learning algorithms are on the threshold of doing what human experts do with such high fidelity that we are contemplating using their predictions as a substitute for human output. For example, convolutional neural networks are close to diagnosing pneumonia from chest X-rays better than radiologists can [14, 15]; examples like these underpin much of the widespread discussion of algorithmic automation in these tasks. In assessing the potential for algorithms, however, the community has implicitly equated the specific task of prediction with the general task of automation. We argue here that this implicit correspondence misses key aspects of the automation problem; a broader conceptualization of automation can lead directly to concrete benefits in some of the key application areas where this process is unfolding. We start from the premise that automation is more than just the replacement of human effort on a task; it is also the meta-decision of which instances of the task to automate. And it is here that algorithms distinguish themselves from earlier technology used for automation, because they can actively take part in this decision of what to automate. But as currently constructed, they are not set up to help with this second part of the problem. The automation problem, then, should involve an algorithm that on any given instance both (i) produces a prediction output; and (ii) additionally also produces a triage judgment of its effectiveness relative to the human effort it would replace on that instance.

But the ambiguity of human decision-making often makes it extraordinarily hard for the legal system to know whether anyone has actually discriminated. To understand how algorithms affect discrimination, we must therefore also understand how they affect the problem of detecting discrimination. By one measure, algorithms are fundamentally opaque, not just cognitively but even mathematically. Yet for the task of proving discrimination, processes involving algorithms can provide crucial forms of transparency that are otherwise unavailable. These benefits do not happen automatically. But with appropriate requirements in place, the use of algorithms will make it possible to more easily examine and interrogate the entire decision process, thereby making it far easier to know whether discrimination has occurred. By forcing a new level of specificity, the use of algorithms also highlights, and makes transparent, central tradeoffs among competing values. Algorithms are not only a threat to be regulated; with the right safeguards in place, they have the potential to be a positive force for equity.

Databases of electronic health records (EHRs) are increasingly used to inform clinical decisions. Machine learning methods can find patterns in EHRs that are predictive of future adverse outcomes. However, statistical models may be built upon patterns of health-seeking behavior that vary across patient subpopulations, leading to poor predictive performance when training on one patient population and predicting on another. This note proposes two tests to better measure and understand model generalization. We use these tests to compare models derived from two data sources: (i) historical medical records, and (ii) electrocardiogram (EKG) waveforms. In a predictive task, we show that EKG-based models can be more stable than EHR-based models across different patient populations.

An electrocardiogram (EKG) is a common, non-invasive test that measures the electrical activity of a patient's heart. EKGs contain useful diagnostic information about patient health that may be absent from other electronic health record (EHR) data. As multi-dimensional waveforms, they could be modeled using generic machine learning tools, such as a linear factor model or a variational autoencoder. We take a different approach:~we specify a model that directly represents the underlying electrophysiology of the heart and the EKG measurement process. We apply our model to two datasets, including a sample of emergency department EKG reports with missing data. We show that our model can more accurately reconstruct missing data (measured by test reconstruction error) than a standard baseline when there is significant missing data. More broadly, this physiological representation of heart function may be useful in a variety of settings, including prediction, causal analysis, and discovery.