In most cognitive and motor tasks, speed-accuracy tradeoffs are observed: Individuals can respond slowly and accurately, or quickly yet be prone to errors. Control mechanisms governing the initiation of behavioral responses are sensitive not only to task instructions and the stimulus being processed, but also to the recent stimulus history. When stimuli can be characterized on an easy-hard dimension (e.g., word frequency in a naming task), items preceded by easy trials are responded to more quickly, and with more errors, than items preceded by hard trials. We propose a rationally motivated mathematical model of this sequential adaptation of control, based on a diffusion model of the decision process in which difficulty corresponds to the drift rate for the correct response. The model assumes that responding is based on the posterior distribution over which response is correct, conditioned on the accumulated evidence. We derive this posterior as a function of the drift rate, and show that higher estimates of the drift rate lead to (normatively) faster responding. Trial-by-trial tracking of difficulty thus leads to sequential effects in speed and accuracy. Simulations show the model explains a variety of phenomena in human speeded decision making. We argue this passive statistical mechanism provides a more elegant and parsimonious account than extant theories based on elaborate control structures.

Cognitive control refers to the flexible deployment of memory and attention in response to task demands and current goals. Control is often studied experimentally by presenting sequences of stimuli, some demanding a response, and others modulating the stimulus-response mapping. In these tasks, participants must maintain information about the current stimulus-response mapping in working memory. Prominent theories of cognitive control use recurrent neural nets to implement working memory, and optimize memory utilization via reinforcement learning. We present a novel perspective on cognitive control in which working memory representations are intrinsically probabilistic, and control operations that maintain and update working memory are dynamically determined via probabilistic inference. We show that our model provides a parsimonious account of behavioral and neuroimaging data, and suggest that it offers an elegant conceptualization of control in which behavior can be cast as optimal, subject to limitations on learning and the rate of information processing. Moreover, our model provides insight into how task instructions can be directly translated into appropriate behavior and then efficiently refined with subsequent task experience.

Across a wide range of cognitive tasks, recent experience influences behavior. For example, when individuals repeatedly perform a simple two-alternative forced-choice task (2AFC), response latencies vary dramatically based on the immediately preceding trial sequence. These sequential effects have been interpreted as adaptation to the statistical structure of an uncertain, changing environment (e.g. Jones & Sieck, 2003; Mozer, Kinoshita, & Shettel, 2007; Yu & Cohen, 2008). The Dynamic Belief Model (DBM) (Yu & Cohen, 2008) explains sequential effects in 2AFC tasks as a rational consequence of a dynamic internal representation that tracks second-order statistics of the trial sequence (repetition rates) and predicts whether the upcoming trial will be a repetition or an alternation of the previous trial. Experimental results suggest that first-order statistics (base rates) also influence sequential effects. We propose a model that learns both first- and second-order sequence properties, each according to the basic principles of the DBM but under a unified inferential framework. This model, the Dynamic Belief Mixture Model (DBM2), obtains precise, parsimonious fits to data. Furthermore, the model predicts dissociations in behavioral (Maloney, Dal Martello, Sahm, & Spillmann, 2005) and electrophysiological studies (Jentzsch & Sommer, 2002), supporting the psychological and neurobiological reality of its two components.

When individuals learn facts (e.g., foreign language vocabulary) over multiple study sessions, the temporal spacing of study has a significant impact on memory retention. Behavioral experiments have shown a nonmonotonic relationship between spacing and retention: short or long intervals between study sessions yield lower cued-recall accuracy than intermediate intervals. Appropriate spacing of study can double retention on educationally relevant time scales. We introduce a Multiscale Context Model (MCM) that is able to predict the influence of a particular study schedule on retention for specific material. MCMs prediction is based on empirical data characterizing forgetting of the material following a single study session. MCM is a synthesis of two existing memory models (Staddon, Chelaru, & Higa, 2002; Raaijmakers, 2003). On the surface, these models are unrelated and incompatible, but we show they share a core feature that allows them to be integrated. MCM can determine study schedules that maximize the durability of learning, and has implications for education and training. MCM can be cast either as a neural network with inputs that fluctuate over time, or as a cascade of leaky integrators. MCM is intriguingly similar to a Bayesian multiscale model of memory (Kording, Tenenbaum, Shadmehr, 2007), yet MCM is better able to account for human declarative memory.

People perform a remarkable range of tasks that require search of the visual environment fora target item among distractors. The Guided Search model (Wolfe, 1994, 2007), or GS, is perhaps the best developed psychological account of human visualsearch. To prioritize search, GS assigns saliency to locations in the visual field. Saliency is a linear combination of activations from retinotopic maps representing primitive visual features. GS includes heuristics for setting the gain coefficient associated with each map.

Categorization is a central activity of human cognition. When an individual is asked to categorize asequence of items, context effects arise: categorization of one item influences category decisions for subsequent items. Specifically, when experimental subjects are shown an exemplar of some target category, the category prototype appears to be pulled toward the exemplar, and the prototypes of all nontarget categories appear to be pushed away. These push and pull effects diminish with experience, and likely reflect long-term learning of category boundaries. We propose and evaluate four principled probabilistic (Bayesian) accounts ofcontext effects in categorization.

Theories of visual attention commonly posit that early parallel processes extract conspicuous features such as color contrast and motion from the visual field. These features are then combined into a saliency map, and attention is directed to the most salient regions first. Top-down attentional control is achieved by modulating the contribution of different feature types to the saliency map. A key source of data concerning attentional control comes from behavioral studies in which the effect of recent experience is examined as individuals repeatedly perform a perceptual discrimination task (e.g., "what shape is the odd-colored object?"). The robust finding is that repetition of features of recent trials (e.g., target color) facilitates performance. We view this facilitation as an adaptation to the statistical structure of the environment. We propose a probabilistic model of the environment that is updated after each trial. Under the assumption that attentional control operates so as to make performance more efficient for more likely environmental states, we obtain parsimonious explanations for data from four different experiments. Further, our model provides a rational explanation for why the influence of past experience on attentional control is short lived.

Theories of visual attention commonly posit that early parallel processes extract conspicuous featuressuch as color contrast and motion from the visual field. These features are then combined into a saliency map, and attention is directed to the most salient regions first. Top-down attentional control is achieved by modulating the contribution of different feature types to the saliency map. A key source of data concerning attentional control comes from behavioral studies in which the effect of recent experience is examined asindividuals repeatedly perform a perceptual discrimination task (e.g., "what shape is the odd-colored object?"). The robust finding is that repetition of features of recent trials (e.g., target color) facilitates performance. We view this facilitation as an adaptation to the statistical structure of the environment. We propose a probabilistic model of the environment that is updated after each trial. Under the assumption that attentional control operates so as to make performance more efficient for more likely environmental states, we obtain parsimonious explanations for data from four different experiments. Further, our model provides a rational explanation for why the influence of past experience on attentional control is short lived.

Experimental studies have observed synaptic potentiation when a presynaptic neuron fires shortly before a postsynaptic neuron, and synaptic depression when the presynaptic neuron fires shortly after. Thedependence of synaptic modulation on the precise timing of the two action potentials is known as spike-timing dependent plasticityor STDP. We derive STDP from a simple computational principle:synapses adapt so as to minimize the postsynaptic neuron's variability to a given presynaptic input, causing the neuron's output to become more reliable in the face of noise. Using an entropy-minimization objective function and the biophysically realisticspike-response model of Gerstner (2001), we simulate neurophysiological experiments and obtain the characteristic STDP curve along with other phenomena including the reduction in synaptic plasticity as synaptic efficacy increases. We compare our account to other efforts to derive STDP from computational principles, andargue that our account provides the most comprehensive coverage of the phenomena. Thus, reliability of neural response in the face of noise may be a key goal of cortical adaptation.

Theories of access consciousness address how it is that some mental states but not others are available for evaluation, choice behavior, and verbal report. Farah, O'Reilly, and Vecera (1994) argue that quality of representation is critical; Dehaene, Sergent,and Changeux (2003) argue that the ability to communicate representations iscritical. We present a probabilistic information transmission or PIT model that suggests both of these conditions are essential for access consciousness. Havingsuccessfully modeled data from the repetition priming literature in the past, we use the PIT model to account for data from two experiments on subliminal priming, showing that the model produces priming even in the absence ofaccessibility and reportability of internal states. The model provides a mechanistic basis for understanding the dissociation of priming and awareness. Philosophy has made many attempts to identify distinct aspects of consciousness. Perhaps the most famous effort is Block's (1995) delineation of phenomenal and access consciousness. Phenomenalconsciousness has to do with "what it is like" to experience chocolate or a pin prick. Access consciousness refers to internal states whose content is "(1) inferentially promiscuous,i.e., poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, (2) poised for control of action, and (3) poised for rational control of speech."