Theories of Access Consciousness

Theories of access consciousness address how it is that some mental states but not others are available for evaluation, choice behavior, and verbal report. Farah, O'Reilly, and Vecera (1994) argue that quality of representation is critical; Dehaene, Sergent,and Changeux (2003) argue that the ability to communicate representations iscritical. We present a probabilistic information transmission or PIT model that suggests both of these conditions are essential for access consciousness. Havingsuccessfully modeled data from the repetition priming literature in the past, we use the PIT model to account for data from two experiments on subliminal priming, showing that the model produces priming even in the absence ofaccessibility and reportability of internal states. The model provides a mechanistic basis for understanding the dissociation of priming and awareness. Philosophy has made many attempts to identify distinct aspects of consciousness. Perhaps the most famous effort is Block's (1995) delineation of phenomenal and access consciousness. Phenomenalconsciousness has to do with "what it is like" to experience chocolate or a pin prick. Access consciousness refers to internal states whose content is "(1) inferentially promiscuous,i.e., poised to be used as a premise in reasoning, (2) poised for control of action, and (3) poised for rational control of speech."