Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space attacks on reinforcement learning agents have a common weakness: while effective, their lack of temporal consistency makes them detectable using automated means or human inspection. Detectability is undesirable to adversaries as it may trigger security escalations. We introduce perfect illusory attacks, a novel form of adversarial attack on sequential decision-makers that is both effective and provably statistically undetectable. We then propose the more versatile R-attacks, which result in observation transitions that are consistent with the state-transition function of the adversary-free environment and can be learned end-to-end. Compared to existing attacks, we empirically find R-attacks to be significantly harder to detect with automated methods, and a small study with human subjects suggests they are similarly harder to detect for humans. We propose that undetectability should be a central concern in the study of adversarial attacks on mixed-autonomy settings.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) requires agents to explore to learn to cooperate. Existing value-based MARL algorithms commonly rely on random exploration, such as $\epsilon$-greedy, which is inefficient in discovering multi-agent cooperation. Additionally, the environment in MARL appears non-stationary to any individual agent due to the simultaneous training of other agents, leading to highly variant and thus unstable optimisation signals. In this work, we propose ensemble value functions for multi-agent exploration (EMAX), a general framework to extend any value-based MARL algorithm. EMAX trains ensembles of value functions for each agent to address the key challenges of exploration and non-stationarity: (1) The uncertainty of value estimates across the ensemble is used in a UCB policy to guide the exploration of agents to parts of the environment which require cooperation. (2) Average value estimates across the ensemble serve as target values. These targets exhibit lower variance compared to commonly applied target networks and we show that they lead to more stable gradients during the optimisation. We instantiate three value-based MARL algorithms with EMAX, independent DQN, VDN and QMIX, and evaluate them in 21 tasks across four environments. Using ensembles of five value functions, EMAX improves sample efficiency and final evaluation returns of these algorithms by 53%, 36%, and 498%, respectively, averaged all 21 tasks.

Applying machine learning to combinatorial optimization problems has the potential to improve both efficiency and accuracy. However, existing learning-based solvers often struggle with generalization when faced with changes in problem distributions and scales. In this paper, we propose a new approach called ASP: Adaptive Staircase Policy Space Response Oracle to address these generalization issues and learn a universal neural solver. ASP consists of two components: Distributional Exploration, which enhances the solver's ability to handle unknown distributions using Policy Space Response Oracles, and Persistent Scale Adaption, which improves scalability through curriculum learning. We have tested ASP on several challenging COPs, including the traveling salesman problem, the vehicle routing problem, and the prize collecting TSP, as well as the real-world instances from TSPLib and CVRPLib. Our results show that even with the same model size and weak training signal, ASP can help neural solvers explore and adapt to unseen distributions and varying scales, achieving superior performance. In particular, compared with the same neural solvers under a standard training pipeline, ASP produces a remarkable decrease in terms of the optimality gap with 90.9% and 47.43% on generated instances and real-world instances for TSP, and a decrease of 19% and 45.57% for CVRP.

Rating strategies in a game is an important area of research in game theory and artificial intelligence, and can be applied to any real-world competitive or cooperative setting. Traditionally, only transitive dependencies between strategies have been used to rate strategies (e.g. Elo), however recent work has expanded ratings to utilize game theoretic solutions to better rate strategies in non-transitive games. This work generalizes these ideas and proposes novel algorithms suitable for N-player, general-sum rating of strategies in normal-form games according to the payoff rating system. This enables well-established solution concepts, such as equilibria, to be leveraged to efficiently rate strategies in games with complex strategic interactions, which arise in multiagent training and real-world interactions between many agents. We empirically validate our methods on real world normal-form data (Premier League) and multiagent reinforcement learning agent evaluation.

In competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods based on the \emph{Double Oracle (DO)} algorithm, such as \emph{Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)} and \emph{Anytime PSRO (APSRO)}, iteratively add RL best response policies to a population. Eventually, an optimal mixture of these population policies will approximate a Nash equilibrium. However, these methods might need to add all deterministic policies before converging. In this work, we introduce \emph{Self-Play PSRO (SP-PSRO)}, a method that adds an approximately optimal stochastic policy to the population in each iteration. Instead of adding only deterministic best responses to the opponent's least exploitable population mixture, SP-PSRO also learns an approximately optimal stochastic policy and adds it to the population as well. As a result, SP-PSRO empirically tends to converge much faster than APSRO and in many games converges in just a few iterations.

We introduce DeepNash, an autonomous agent capable of learning to play the imperfect information game Stratego from scratch, up to a human expert level. Stratego is one of the few iconic board games that Artificial Intelligence (AI) has not yet mastered. This popular game has an enormous game tree on the order of $10^{535}$ nodes, i.e., $10^{175}$ times larger than that of Go. It has the additional complexity of requiring decision-making under imperfect information, similar to Texas hold'em poker, which has a significantly smaller game tree (on the order of $10^{164}$ nodes). Decisions in Stratego are made over a large number of discrete actions with no obvious link between action and outcome. Episodes are long, with often hundreds of moves before a player wins, and situations in Stratego can not easily be broken down into manageably-sized sub-problems as in poker. For these reasons, Stratego has been a grand challenge for the field of AI for decades, and existing AI methods barely reach an amateur level of play. DeepNash uses a game-theoretic, model-free deep reinforcement learning method, without search, that learns to master Stratego via self-play. The Regularised Nash Dynamics (R-NaD) algorithm, a key component of DeepNash, converges to an approximate Nash equilibrium, instead of 'cycling' around it, by directly modifying the underlying multi-agent learning dynamics. DeepNash beats existing state-of-the-art AI methods in Stratego and achieved a yearly (2022) and all-time top-3 rank on the Gravon games platform, competing with human expert players.

Soft Actor-Critic (SAC) is considered the state-of-the-art algorithm in continuous action space settings. It uses the maximum entropy framework for efficiency and stability, and applies a heuristic temperature Lagrange term to tune the temperature $\alpha$, which determines how "soft" the policy should be. It is counter-intuitive that empirical evidence shows SAC does not perform well in discrete domains. In this paper we investigate the possible explanations for this phenomenon and propose Target Entropy Scheduled SAC (TES-SAC), an annealing method for the target entropy parameter applied on SAC. Target entropy is a constant in the temperature Lagrange term and represents the target policy entropy in discrete SAC. We compare our method on Atari 2600 games with different constant target entropy SAC, and analyze on how our scheduling affects SAC.

Temporal-Difference (TD) learning methods, such as Q-Learning, have proven effective at learning a policy to perform control tasks. One issue with methods like Q-Learning is that the value update introduces bias when predicting the TD target of a unfamiliar state. Estimation noise becomes a bias after the max operator in the policy improvement step, and carries over to value estimations of other states, causing Q-Learning to overestimate the Q value. Algorithms like Soft Q-Learning (SQL) introduce the notion of a soft-greedy policy, which reduces the estimation bias via soft updates in early stages of training. However, the inverse temperature $\beta$ that controls the softness of an update is usually set by a hand-designed heuristic, which can be inaccurate at capturing the uncertainty in the target estimate. Under the belief that $\beta$ is closely related to the (state dependent) model uncertainty, Entropy Regularized Q-Learning (EQL) further introduces a principled scheduling of $\beta$ by maintaining a collection of the model parameters that characterizes model uncertainty. In this paper, we present Unbiased Soft Q-Learning (UQL), which extends the work of EQL from two action, finite state spaces to multi-action, infinite state space Markov Decision Processes. We also provide a principled numerical scheduling of $\beta$, extended from SQL and using model uncertainty, during the optimization process. We show the theoretical guarantees and the effectiveness of this update method in experiments on several discrete control environments.

Machine learning algorithms often make decisions on behalf of agents with varied and sometimes conflicting interests. In domains where agents can choose to take their own action or delegate their action to a central mediator, an open question is how mediators should take actions on behalf of delegating agents. The main existing approach uses delegating agents to punish non-delegating agents in an attempt to get all agents to delegate, which tends to be costly for all. We introduce a Pareto Mediator which aims to improve outcomes for delegating agents without making any of them worse off. Our experiments in random normal form games, a restaurant recommendation game, and a reinforcement learning sequential social dilemma show that the Pareto Mediator greatly increases social welfare. Also, even when the Pareto Mediator is based on an incorrect model of agent utility, performance gracefully degrades to the pre-intervention level, due to the individual autonomy preserved by the voluntary mediator.