The exposure of security vulnerabilities in safety-aligned language models, e.g., susceptibility to adversarial attacks, has shed light on the intricate interplay between AI safety and AI security. Although the two disciplines now come together under the overarching goal of AI risk management, they have historically evolved separately, giving rise to differing perspectives. Therefore, in this paper, we advocate that stakeholders in AI risk management should be aware of the nuances, synergies, and interplay between safety and security, and unambiguously take into account the perspectives of both disciplines in order to devise mostly effective and holistic risk mitigation approaches. Unfortunately, this vision is often obfuscated, as the definitions of the basic concepts of "safety" and "security" themselves are often inconsistent and lack consensus across communities. With AI risk management being increasingly cross-disciplinary, this issue is particularly salient. In light of this conceptual challenge, we introduce a unified reference framework to clarify the differences and interplay between AI safety and AI security, aiming to facilitate a shared understanding and effective collaboration across communities.

Mortgages account for the largest portion of household debt in the United States, totaling around \$12 trillion nationwide. In times of financial hardship, alleviating mortgage burdens is essential for supporting affected households. The mortgage servicing industry plays a vital role in offering this assistance, yet there has been limited research modelling the complex relationship between households and servicers. To bridge this gap, we developed an agent-based model that explores household behavior and the effectiveness of relief measures during financial distress. Our model represents households as adaptive learning agents with realistic financial attributes. These households experience exogenous income shocks, which may influence their ability to make mortgage payments. Mortgage servicers provide relief options to these households, who then choose the most suitable relief based on their unique financial circumstances and individual preferences. We analyze the impact of various external shocks and the success of different mortgage relief strategies on specific borrower subgroups. Through this analysis, we show that our model can not only replicate real-world mortgage studies but also act as a tool for conducting a broad range of what-if scenario analyses. Our approach offers fine-grained insights that can inform the development of more effective and inclusive mortgage relief solutions.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have exhibited promising performance in solving sequential decision-making problems. By imitating few-shot examples provided in the prompts (i.e., in-context learning), an LLM agent can interact with an external environment and complete given tasks without additional training. However, such few-shot examples are often insufficient to generate high-quality solutions for complex and long-horizon tasks, while the limited context length cannot consume larger-scale demonstrations with long interaction horizons. To this end, we propose an offline learning framework that utilizes offline data at scale (e.g, logs of human interactions) to improve LLM-powered policies without finetuning. The proposed method O3D (Offline Data-driven Discovery and Distillation) automatically discovers reusable skills and distills generalizable knowledge across multiple tasks based on offline interaction data, advancing the capability of solving downstream tasks. Empirical results under two interactive decision-making benchmarks (ALFWorld and WebShop) verify that O3D can notably enhance the decision-making capabilities of LLMs through the offline discovery and distillation process, and consistently outperform baselines across various LLMs.

Multi-agent artificial intelligence research promises a path to develop intelligent technologies that are more human-like and more human-compatible than those produced by "solipsistic" approaches, which do not consider interactions between agents. Melting Pot is a research tool developed to facilitate work on multi-agent artificial intelligence, and provides an evaluation protocol that measures generalization to novel social partners in a set of canonical test scenarios. Each scenario pairs a physical environment (a "substrate") with a reference set of co-players (a "background population"), to create a social situation with substantial interdependence between the individuals involved. For instance, some scenarios were inspired by institutional-economics-based accounts of natural resource management and public-good-provision dilemmas. Others were inspired by considerations from evolutionary biology, game theory, and artificial life. Melting Pot aims to cover a maximally diverse set of interdependencies and incentives. It includes the commonly-studied extreme cases of perfectly-competitive (zero-sum) motivations and perfectly-cooperative (shared-reward) motivations, but does not stop with them. As in real-life, a clear majority of scenarios in Melting Pot have mixed incentives. They are neither purely competitive nor purely cooperative and thus demand successful agents be able to navigate the resulting ambiguity. Here we describe Melting Pot 2.0, which revises and expands on Melting Pot. We also introduce support for scenarios with asymmetric roles, and explain how to integrate them into the evaluation protocol. This report also contains: (1) details of all substrates and scenarios; (2) a complete description of all baseline algorithms and results. Our intention is for it to serve as a reference for researchers using Melting Pot 2.0.

In social psychology, Social Value Orientation (SVO) describes an individual's propensity to allocate resources between themself and others. In reinforcement learning, SVO has been instantiated as an intrinsic motivation that remaps an agent's rewards based on particular target distributions of group reward. Prior studies show that groups of agents endowed with heterogeneous SVO learn diverse policies in settings that resemble the incentive structure of Prisoner's dilemma. Our work extends this body of results and demonstrates that (1) heterogeneous SVO leads to meaningfully diverse policies across a range of incentive structures in sequential social dilemmas, as measured by task-specific diversity metrics; and (2) learning a best response to such policy diversity leads to better zero-shot generalization in some situations. We show that these best-response agents learn policies that are conditioned on their co-players, which we posit is the reason for improved zero-shot generalization results.

We study the problem of multi-agent control of a dynamical system with known dynamics and adversarial disturbances. Our study focuses on optimal control without centralized precomputed policies, but rather with adaptive control policies for the different agents that are only equipped with a stabilizing controller. We give a reduction from any (standard) regret minimizing control method to a distributed algorithm. The reduction guarantees that the resulting distributed algorithm has low regret relative to the optimal precomputed joint policy. Our methodology involves generalizing online convex optimization to a multi-agent setting and applying recent tools from nonstochastic control derived for a single agent. We empirically evaluate our method on a model of an overactuated aircraft. We show that the distributed method is robust to failure and to adversarial perturbations in the dynamics.

The cooperative bandit problem is increasingly becoming relevant due to its applications in large-scale decision-making. However, most research for this problem focuses exclusively on the setting with perfect communication, whereas in most real-world distributed settings, communication is often over stochastic networks, with arbitrary corruptions and delays. In this paper, we study cooperative bandit learning under three typical real-world communication scenarios, namely, (a) message-passing over stochastic time-varying networks, (b) instantaneous reward-sharing over a network with random delays, and (c) message-passing with adversarially corrupted rewards, including byzantine communication. For each of these environments, we propose decentralized algorithms that achieve competitive performance, along with near-optimal guarantees on the incurred group regret as well. Furthermore, in the setting with perfect communication, we present an improved delayed-update algorithm that outperforms the existing state-of-the-art on various network topologies. Finally, we present tight network-dependent minimax lower bounds on the group regret. Our proposed algorithms are straightforward to implement and obtain competitive empirical performance.

In cooperative bandits, a framework that captures essential features of collective sequential decision making, agents can minimize group regret, and thereby improve performance, by leveraging shared information. However, sharing information can be costly, which motivates developing policies that minimize group regret while also reducing the number of messages communicated by agents. Existing cooperative bandit algorithms obtain optimal performance when agents share information with their neighbors at \textit{every time step}, i.e., full communication. This requires $\Theta(T)$ number of messages, where $T$ is the time horizon of the decision making process. We propose \textit{ComEx}, a novel cost-effective communication protocol in which the group achieves the same order of performance as full communication while communicating only $O(\log T)$ number of messages. Our key step is developing a method to identify and only communicate the information crucial to achieving optimal performance. Further we propose novel algorithms for several benchmark cooperative bandit frameworks and show that our algorithms obtain \textit{state-of-the-art} performance while consistently incurring a significantly smaller communication cost than existing algorithms.

We study the decentralized multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem for agents that communicate with probability over a network defined by a $d$-regular graph. Every edge in the graph has probabilistic weight $p$ to account for the ($1\!-\!p$) probability of a communication link failure. At each time step, each agent chooses an arm and receives a numerical reward associated with the chosen arm. After each choice, each agent observes the last obtained reward of each of its neighbors with probability $p$. We propose a new Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) based algorithm and analyze how agent-based strategies contribute to minimizing group regret in this probabilistic communication setting. We provide theoretical guarantees that our algorithm outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms. We illustrate our results and validate the theoretical claims using numerical simulations.

We investigate the benefits of heterogeneity in multi-agent explore-exploit decision making where the goal of the agents is to maximize cumulative group reward. To do so we study a class of distributed stochastic bandit problems in which agents communicate over a multi-star network and make sequential choices among options in the same uncertain environment. Typically, in multi-agent bandit problems, agents use homogeneous decision-making strategies. However, group performance can be improved by incorporating heterogeneity into the choices agents make, especially when the network graph is irregular, i.e. when agents have different numbers of neighbors. We design and analyze new heterogeneous explore-exploit strategies, using the multi-star as the model irregular network graph. The key idea is to enable center agents to do more exploring than they would do using the homogeneous strategy, as a means of providing more useful data to the peripheral agents. In the case all agents broadcast their reward values and choices to their neighbors with the same probability, we provide theoretical guarantees that group performance improves under the proposed heterogeneous strategies as compared to under homogeneous strategies. We use numerical simulations to illustrate our results and to validate our theoretical bounds.