This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

This study empirically investigates claims of the increasing ubiquity of artificial intelligence (AI) within roughly 80 million research publications across 20 diverse scientific fields, by examining the change in scholarly engagement with AI from 1985 through 2022. We observe exponential growth, with AI-engaged publications increasing approximately thirteenfold (13x) across all fields, suggesting a dramatic shift from niche to mainstream. Moreover, we provide the first empirical examination of the distribution of AI-engaged publications across publication venues within individual fields, with results that reveal a broadening of AI engagement within disciplines. While this broadening engagement suggests a move toward greater disciplinary integration in every field, increased ubiquity is associated with a semantic tension between AI-engaged research and more traditional disciplinary research. Through an analysis of tens of millions of document embeddings, we observe a complex interplay between AI-engaged and non-AI-engaged research within and across fields, suggesting that increasing ubiquity is something of an oil-and-water phenomenon -- AI-engaged work is spreading out over fields, but not mixing well with non-AI-engaged work.

Computation is central to contemporary mathematics. Many accept that we can acquire genuine mathematical knowledge of the Four Color Theorem from Appel and Haken's program insofar as it is simply a repetitive application of human forms of mathematical reasoning. Modern LLMs / DNNs are, by contrast, opaque to us in significant ways, and this creates obstacles in obtaining mathematical knowledge from them. We argue, however, that if a proof-checker automating human forms of proof-checking is attached to such machines, then we can obtain apriori mathematical knowledge from them, even though the original machines are entirely opaque to us and the proofs they output are not human-surveyable.

Transformer-based masked language models such as BERT, trained on general corpora, have shown impressive performance on downstream tasks. It has also been demonstrated that the downstream task performance of such models can be improved by pretraining larger models for longer on more data. In this work, we empirically evaluate the extent to which these results extend to tasks in science. We use 14 domain-specific transformer-based models (including ScholarBERT, a new 770M-parameter science-focused masked language model pretrained on up to 225B tokens) to evaluate the impact of training data, model size, pretraining and finetuning time on 12 downstream scientific tasks. Interestingly, we find that increasing model sizes, training data, or compute time does not always lead to significant improvements (i.e., >1% F1), if at all, in scientific information extraction tasks and offered possible explanations for the surprising performance differences.

This paper aims to clarify the representational status of Deep Learning Models (DLMs). While commonly referred to as 'representations', what this entails is ambiguous due to a conflation of functional and relational conceptions of representation. This paper argues that while DLMs represent their targets in a relational sense, they are best understood as highly idealized models. This result has immediate implications for explainable AI (XAI) and directs philosophical attention toward examining the idealized nature of DLM representations and their role in future scientific investigation.