A tournament is a method to decide the winner in a competition, and describes the overall sequence in which matches between the players are held. While deciding a worthy winner is the primary goal of a tournament, a close second is to maximize the value generated for the matches played, with value for a match measured either in terms of tickets sold, television viewership, advertising revenue, or other means. Tournament organizers often seed the players -- i.e., decide which matches are played -- to increase this value. We study the value maximization objective in a particular tournament format called Challenge the Champ. This is a simple tournament format where an ordering of the players is decided. The first player in this order is the initial champion. The remaining players in order challenge the current champion; if a challenger wins, she replaces the current champion. We model the outcome of a match between two players using a complete directed graph, called a strength graph, with each player represented as a vertex, and the direction of an edge indicating the winner in a match. The value-maximization objective has been recently explored for knockout tournaments when the strength graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG). We extend the investigation to Challenge the Champ tournaments and general strength graphs. We study different representations of the value of each match, and completely characterize the computational complexity of the problem.

We study a generalization of the Online Convex Optimization (OCO) framework with time-varying adversarial constraints. In this problem, after selecting a feasible action from the convex decision set $X,$ a convex constraint function is revealed alongside the cost function in each round. Our goal is to design a computationally efficient learning policy that achieves a small regret with respect to the cost functions and a small cumulative constraint violation (CCV) with respect to the constraint functions over a horizon of length $T$. It is well-known that the projection step constitutes the major computational bottleneck of the standard OCO algorithms. However, for many structured decision sets, linear functions can be efficiently optimized over the decision set. We propose a *projection-free* online policy which makes a single call to a Linear Program (LP) solver per round. Our method outperforms state-of-the-art projection-free online algorithms with adversarial constraints, achieving improved bounds of $\tilde{O}(T^{\frac{3}{4}})$ for both regret and CCV. The proposed algorithm is conceptually simple - it first constructs a surrogate cost function as a non-negative linear combination of the cost and constraint functions. Then, it passes the surrogate costs to a new, adaptive version of the online conditional gradient subroutine, which we propose in this paper.

News outlets, surveyors, and other organizations often conduct polls on social networks to gain insights into public opinion. Such a poll is typically started by someone on a social network who sends it to her friends. If a person participates in the poll, the poll information gets published on her wall, which in turn enables her friends to participate, and the process continues. Eventually, a subset of the population participates in the poll, and the pollster learns the outcome of that poll. We initiate the study of a new but natural type of election control in such online elections. We study how difficult/easy it is to sway the outcome of such polls in one's favor/against (aka constructive vs destructive) by any malicious influencer who nudges/bribes people for seemingly harmless actions like non-participation. These questions are important from the standpoint of studying the power of resistance of online voting against malicious behavior. The destructive version is also important to quantify the robustness of the winner of an online voting. We show that both problems are computationally intractable even if the election is over only two candidates and the influencer has an infinite amount of money to spend (that is, every voter can be persuaded to not participate). We strengthen this result by proving that the computational task remains substantially challenging even if the underlying network is a tree. Finally, we show that there is a polynomial-time algorithm for the constructive version of the problem when we have O(1) candidates, and the treewidth of the underlying graph is O(1); the algorithm for the destructive version does not even need to assume O(1) number of candidates. Hence, we observe that the destructive version is computationally easier than the constructive version.

A directed graph where there is exactly one edge between every pair of vertices is called a {\em tournament}. Finding the "best" set of vertices of a tournament is a well studied problem in social choice theory. A {\em tournament solution} takes a tournament as input and outputs a subset of vertices of the input tournament. However, in many applications, for example, choosing the best set of drugs from a given set of drugs, the edges of the tournament are given only implicitly and knowing the orientation of an edge is costly. In such scenarios, we would like to know the best set of vertices (according to some tournament solution) by "querying" as few edges as possible. We, in this paper, precisely study this problem for commonly used tournament solutions: given an oracle access to the edges of a tournament T, find $f(T)$ by querying as few edges as possible, for a tournament solution f. We first show that the set of Condorcet non-losers in a tournament can be found by querying $2n-\lfloor \log n \rfloor -2$ edges only and this is tight in the sense that every algorithm for finding the set of Condorcet non-losers needs to query at least $2n-\lfloor \log n \rfloor -2$ edges in the worst case, where $n$ is the number of vertices in the input tournament. We then move on to study other popular tournament solutions and show that any algorithm for finding the Copeland set, the Slater set, the Markov set, the bipartisan set, the uncovered set, the Banks set, and the top cycle must query $\Omega(n^2)$ edges in the worst case. On the positive side, we are able to circumvent our strong query complexity lower bound results by proving that, if the size of the top cycle of the input tournament is at most $k$, then we can find all the tournament solutions mentioned above by querying $O(nk + \frac{n\log n}{\log(1-\frac{1}{k})})$ edges only.

We study the knapsack problem with graph theoretic constraints. That is, we assume that there exists a graph structure on the set of items of knapsack and the solution also needs to satisfy certain graph theoretic properties on top of knapsack constraints. In particular, we need to compute in the connected knapsack problem a connected subset of items which has maximum value subject to the size of knapsack constraint. We show that this problem is strongly NP-complete even for graphs of maximum degree four and NP-complete even for star graphs. On the other hand, we develop an algorithm running in time $O\left(2^{tw\log tw}\cdot\text{poly}(\min\{s^2,d^2\})\right)$ where $tw,s,d$ are respectively treewidth of the graph, size, and target value of the knapsack. We further exhibit a $(1-\epsilon)$ factor approximation algorithm running in time $O\left(2^{tw\log tw}\cdot\text{poly}(n,1/\epsilon)\right)$ for every $\epsilon>0$. We show similar results for several other graph theoretic properties, namely path and shortest-path under the problem names path-knapsack and shortestpath-knapsack. Our results seems to indicate that connected-knapsack is computationally hardest followed by path-knapsack and shortestpath-knapsack.

In district-based multi-party elections, electors cast votes in their respective districts. In each district, the party with maximum votes wins the corresponding seat in the governing body. Election Surveys try to predict the election outcome (vote shares and seat shares of parties) by querying a random sample of electors. However, the survey results are often inconsistent with the actual results, which could be due to multiple reasons. The aim of this work is to estimate a posterior distribution over the possible outcomes of the election, given one or more survey results. This is achieved using a prior distribution over vote shares, election models to simulate the complete election from the vote share, and survey models to simulate survey results from a complete election. The desired posterior distribution over the space of possible outcomes is constructed using Synthetic Dirichlet Likelihoods, whose parameters are estimated from Monte Carlo sampling of elections using the election models. We further show the same approach can also use be used to evaluate the surveys - whether they were biased or not, based on the true outcome once it is known. Our work offers the first-ever probabilistic model to analyze district-based election surveys. We illustrate our approach with extensive experiments on real and simulated data of district-based political elections in India.

Ensuring fairness in machine learning algorithms is a challenging and essential task. We consider the problem of clustering a set of points while satisfying fairness constraints. While there have been several attempts to capture group fairness in the $k$-clustering problem, fairness at an individual level is relatively less explored. We introduce a new notion of individual fairness in $k$-clustering based on features not necessarily used for clustering. We show that this problem is NP-hard and does not admit a constant factor approximation. Therefore, we design a randomized algorithm that guarantees approximation both in terms of minimizing the clustering distance objective and individual fairness under natural restrictions on the distance metric and fairness constraints. Finally, our experimental results against six competing baselines validate that our algorithm produces individually fairer clusters than the fairest baseline by 12.5% on average while also being less costly in terms of the clustering objective than the best baseline by 34.5% on average.

Voting has served as a fundamental tool for aggregating preferences of a set of people over a set of alternatives from centuries. A typical voting system consists of a set of alternatives, a set of voters each having a linear order over the set of alternatives as her preference, and a voting rule which selects a set of alternatives as winners depending on the voters' preferences. However, classical results show that every reasonable voting system with at least 3 alternatives can suffer from manipulation [Gib73, Sat75] -- an agent may be able to make her more favored alternative win by misreporting her preference. Bartholdi et al. pioneered the idea of using computational intractability as a barrier to safe guard elections against manipulation [BTT89, BO91]. Indeed, if we have m alternatives and even if the manipulator exactly knows the preferences of all other voters, na ıvely going over all ( m! 1) possible preferences and report the one which results in best outcome for the manipulator is not feasible for any computationally bounded manipulator . Although the idea of Bartholdi et al. was to use computational intractability as a barrier against manipulation, the computational problem of manipulation turns out to be polynomial time solvable for most of the commonly used voting rules such as the scoring rules, maximin, Copeland, etc. with prominent exception being the single transferable (STV) voting rule. Even for voting rules (STV for example) for which the computational barrier exists against manipulation, it seems that the barrier, in reality, may be substantially weak due to existence of heuristics which work well in practice [FP10, FKKN11, MR15, and references there in]. Motivation: The computational problem of manipulation has mostly been studied in what is called the complete information setting -- the manipulator exactly knows the preferences of all other voters.

We study the parameterized complexity of the optimal defense and optimal attack problems in voting. In both the problems, the input is a set of voter groups (every voter group is a set of votes) and two integers $k_a$ and $k_d$ corresponding to respectively the number of voter groups the attacker can attack and the number of voter groups the defender can defend. A voter group gets removed from the election if it is attacked but not defended. In the optimal defense problem, we want to know if it is possible for the defender to commit to a strategy of defending at most $k_d$ voter groups such that, no matter which $k_a$ voter groups the attacker attacks, the outcome of the election does not change. In the optimal attack problem, we want to know if it is possible for the attacker to commit to a strategy of attacking $k_a$ voter groups such that, no matter which $k_d$ voter groups the defender defends, the outcome of the election is always different from the original (without any attack) one.

Studying complexity of various bribery problems has been one of the main research focus in computational social choice. In all the models of bribery studied so far, the briber has to pay every voter some amount of money depending on what the briber wants the voter to report and the briber has some budget at her disposal. Although these models successfully capture many real world applications, in many other scenarios, the voters may be unwilling to deviate too much from their true preferences. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of the problem of finding a preference profile which is as close to the true preference profile as possible and still achieves the briber's goal subject to budget constraints. We call this problem Optimal Bribery. We consider three important measures of distances, namely, swap distance, footrule distance, and maximum displacement distance, and resolve the complexity of the optimal bribery problem for many common voting rules. We show that the problem is polynomial time solvable for the plurality and veto voting rules for all the three measures of distance. On the other hand, we prove that the problem is NP-complete for a class of scoring rules which includes the Borda voting rule, maximin, Copeland$^\alpha$ for any $\alpha\in[0,1]$, and Bucklin voting rules for all the three measures of distance even when the distance allowed per voter is $1$ for the swap and maximum displacement distances and $2$ for the footrule distance even without the budget constraints (which corresponds to having an infinite budget). For the $k$-approval voting rule for any constant $k>1$ and the simplified Bucklin voting rule, we show that the problem is NP-complete for the swap distance even when the distance allowed is $2$ and for the footrule distance even when the distance allowed is $4$ even without the budget constraints.