As data marketplaces become increasingly central to the digital economy, it is crucial to design efficient pricing mechanisms that optimize revenue while ensuring fair and adaptive pricing. We introduce the Maximum Auction-to-Posted Price (MAPP) mechanism, a novel two-stage approach that first estimates the bidders' value distribution through auctions and then determines the optimal posted price based on the learned distribution. We establish that MAPP is individually rational and incentive-compatible, ensuring truthful bidding while balancing revenue maximization with minimal price discrimination. MAPP achieves a regret of $O_p(n^{-1})$ when incorporating historical bid data, where $n$ is the number of bids in the current round. It outperforms existing methods while imposing weaker distributional assumptions. For sequential dataset sales over $T$ rounds, we propose an online MAPP mechanism that dynamically adjusts pricing across datasets with varying value distributions. Our approach achieves no-regret learning, with the average cumulative regret converging at a rate of $O_p(T^{-1/2}(\log T)^2)$. We validate the effectiveness of MAPP through simulations and real-world data from the FCC AWS-3 spectrum auction.

The kidney paired donation (KPD) program provides an innovative solution to overcome incompatibility challenges in kidney transplants by matching incompatible donor-patient pairs and facilitating kidney exchanges. To address unequal access to transplant opportunities, there are two widely used fairness criteria: group fairness and individual fairness. However, these criteria do not consider protected patient features, which refer to characteristics legally or ethically recognized as needing protection from discrimination, such as race and gender. Motivated by the calibration principle in machine learning, we introduce a new fairness criterion: the matching outcome should be conditionally independent of the protected feature, given the sensitization level. We integrate this fairness criterion as a constraint within the KPD optimization framework and propose a computationally efficient solution. Theoretically, we analyze the associated price of fairness using random graph models. Empirically, we compare our fairness criterion with group fairness and individual fairness through both simulations and a real-data example.

Experience replay is a foundational technique in reinforcement learning that enhances learning stability by storing past experiences in a replay buffer and reusing them during training. Despite its practical success, its theoretical properties remain underexplored. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework that models experience replay using resampled $U$- and $V$-statistics, providing rigorous variance reduction guarantees. We apply this framework to policy evaluation tasks using the Least-Squares Temporal Difference (LSTD) algorithm and a Partial Differential Equation (PDE)-based model-free algorithm, demonstrating significant improvements in stability and efficiency, particularly in data-scarce scenarios. Beyond policy evaluation, we extend the framework to kernel ridge regression, showing that the experience replay-based method reduces the computational cost from the traditional $O(n^3)$ in time to as low as $O(n^2)$ in time while simultaneously reducing variance. Extensive numerical experiments validate our theoretical findings, demonstrating the broad applicability and effectiveness of experience replay in diverse machine learning tasks.

Kidney exchange programs have significantly increased transplantation rates but raise pressing questions about fairness in organ allocation. We present a novel framework leveraging Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate multiple fairness criteria--Priority, Access, and Outcome--within a single model, capturing complexities that may be overlooked in single-metric analyses. Using data from the United Network for Organ Sharing, we analyze these criteria individually, measuring Priority fairness through waitlist durations, Access fairness through Kidney Donor Profile Index scores, and Outcome fairness through graft lifespan. We then apply our DEA model to demonstrate significant disparities in kidney allocation efficiency across ethnic groups. To quantify uncertainty, we employ conformal prediction within the DEA framework, yielding group-conditional prediction intervals with finite sample coverage guarantees. Our findings show notable differences in efficiency distributions between ethnic groups. Our study provides a rigorous framework for evaluating fairness in complex resource allocation systems, where resource scarcity and mutual compatibility constraints exist. All code for using the proposed method and reproducing results is available on GitHub.

Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products or services. However, designing effective recommender systems faces two key challenges: (1) the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in balancing new product exploration against exploiting known preferences, and (2) dynamic incentive compatibility in accounting for users' self-interested behaviors and heterogeneous preferences. This paper formalizes these challenges into a Dynamic Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Recommendation Protocol (DBICRP). To address the DBICRP, we propose a two-stage algorithm (RCB) that integrates incentivized exploration with an efficient offline learning component for exploitation. In the first stage, our algorithm explores available products while maintaining dynamic incentive compatibility to determine sufficient sample sizes. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling integrated with an arbitrary machine learning method to ensure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that RCB achieves $O(\sqrt{KdT})$ regret and satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) under a Gaussian prior assumption. Empirically, we validate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through simulations and a real-world application on personalized warfarin dosing. Our work provides a principled approach for incentive-aware recommendation in online preference learning settings.

This paper proposes the conformal online auction design (COAD), a novel mechanism for maximizing revenue in online auctions by quantifying the uncertainty in bidders' values without relying on assumptions about value distributions. COAD incorporates both the bidder and item features and leverages historical data to provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for online auctions. Unlike traditional methods for online auctions, COAD employs a distribution-free, prediction interval-based approach using conformal prediction techniques. This novel approach ensures that the expected revenue from our mechanism can achieve at least a constant fraction of the revenue generated by the optimal mechanism. Additionally, COAD admits the use of a broad array of modern machine-learning methods, including random forests, kernel methods, and deep neural nets, for predicting bidders' values. It ensures revenue performance under any finite sample of historical data. Moreover, COAD introduces bidder-specific reserve prices based on the lower confidence bounds of bidders' valuations, which is different from the uniform reserve prices commonly used in the literature. We validate our theoretical predictions through extensive simulations and a real-data application. All code for using COAD and reproducing results is made available on GitHub.

We study the problem of dynamic matching in heterogeneous networks, where agents are subject to compatibility restrictions and stochastic arrival and departure times. In particular, we consider networks with one type of easy-to-match agents and multiple types of hard-to-match agents, each subject to its own compatibility constraints. Such a setting arises in many real-world applications, including kidney exchange programs and carpooling platforms. We introduce a novel approach to modeling dynamic matching by establishing the ordinary differential equation (ODE) model, which offers a new perspective for evaluating various matching algorithms. We study two algorithms, namely the Greedy and Patient Algorithms, where both algorithms prioritize matching compatible hard-to-match agents over easy-to-match agents in heterogeneous networks. Our results demonstrate the trade-off between the conflicting goals of matching agents quickly and optimally, offering insights into the design of real-world dynamic matching systems. We provide simulations and a real-world case study using data from the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network to validate theoretical predictions.

In this paper, we propose a new algorithm for addressing the problem of matching markets with complementary preferences, where agents' preferences are unknown a priori and must be learned from data. The presence of complementary preferences can lead to instability in the matching process, making this problem challenging to solve. To overcome this challenge, we formulate the problem as a bandit learning framework and propose the Multi-agent Multi-type Thompson Sampling (MMTS) algorithm. The algorithm combines the strengths of Thompson Sampling for exploration with a double matching technique to achieve a stable matching outcome. Our theoretical analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of MMTS as it is able to achieve stability at every matching step, satisfies the incentive-compatibility property, and has a sublinear Bayesian regret over time. Our approach provides a useful method for addressing complementary preferences in real-world scenarios.

This paper presents a novel mechanism design for multi-item auction settings with uncertain bidders' type distributions. Our proposed approach utilizes nonparametric density estimation to accurately estimate bidders' types from historical bids, and is built upon the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, ensuring satisfaction of Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and $\delta$-individual rationality (IR). To further enhance the efficiency of our mechanism, we introduce two novel strategies for query reduction: a filtering method that screens potential winners' value regions within the confidence intervals generated by our estimated distribution, and a classification strategy that designates the lower bound of an interval as the estimated type when the length is below a threshold value. Simulation experiments conducted on both small-scale and large-scale data demonstrate that our mechanism consistently outperforms existing methods in terms of revenue maximization and query reduction, particularly in large-scale scenarios. This makes our proposed mechanism a highly desirable and effective option for sellers in the realm of multi-item auctions.

Online platforms in the Internet Economy commonly incorporate recommender systems that recommend arms (e.g., products) to agents (e.g., users). In such platforms, a myopic agent has a natural incentive to exploit, by choosing the best product given the current information rather than to explore various alternatives to collect information that will be used for other agents. We propose a novel recommender system that respects agents' incentives and enjoys asymptotically optimal performances expressed by the regret in repeated games. We model such an incentive-aware recommender system as a multi-agent bandit problem in a two-sided market which is equipped with an incentive constraint induced by agents' opportunity costs. If the opportunity costs are known to the principal, we show that there exists an incentive-compatible recommendation policy, which pools recommendations across a genuinely good arm and an unknown arm via a randomized and adaptive approach. On the other hand, if the opportunity costs are unknown to the principal, we propose a policy that randomly pools recommendations across all arms and uses each arm's cumulative loss as feedback for exploration. We show that both policies also satisfy an ex-post fairness criterion, which protects agents from over-exploitation.