Experiments were performed to reveal some of the computational properties of the human motor memory system. We show that as humans practice reaching movements while interacting with a novel mechanical environment, they learn an internal model of the inverse dynamics of that environment. The representation of the internal model in memory is such that there is interference when there is an attempt to learn a new inverse dynamics map immediately after an anticorrelated mapping was learned. We suggest that this interference is an indication that the same computational elements used to encode the first inverse dynamics map are being used to learn the second mapping. We predict that this leads to a forgetting of the initially learned skill. 1 Introduction In tasks where we use our hands to interact with a tool, our motor system develops a model of the dynamics of that tool and uses this model to control the coupled dynamics of our arm and the tool (Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi 1994). In physical systems theory, the tool is a mechanical analogue of an admittance, mapping a force as input onto a change in state as output (Hogan 1985).

Experiments were performed to reveal some of the computational properties of the human motor memory system. We show that as humans practice reaching movements while interacting with a novel mechanical environment, they learn an internal model of the inverse dynamics of that environment. The representation of the internal model in memory is such that there is interference when there is an attempt to learn a new inverse dynamics map immediately after an anticorrelated mapping was learned. We suggest that this interference is an indication that the same computational elements used to encode the first inverse dynamics map are being used to learn the second mapping. We predict that this leads to a forgetting of the initially learned skill. 1 Introduction In tasks where we use our hands to interact with a tool, our motor system develops a model of the dynamics of that tool and uses this model to control the coupled dynamics of our arm and the tool (Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi 1994). In physical systems theory, the tool is a mechanical analogue of an admittance, mapping a force as input onto a change in state as output (Hogan 1985).

Biological sensorimotor systems are not static maps that transform input (sensory information) into output (motor behavior). Evidence frommany lines of research suggests that their representations are plastic, experience-dependent entities. While this plasticity is essential for flexible behavior, it presents the nervous system with difficult organizational challenges. If the sensorimotor system adapts itself to perform well under one set of circumstances, will it then perform poorly when placed in an environment with different demands (negative transfer)? Will a later experience-dependent change undo the benefits of previous learning (catastrophic interference)?

Experiments were performed to reveal some of the computational properties of the human motor memory system. We show that as humans practice reaching movements while interacting with a novel mechanical environment, they learn an internal model of the inverse dynamics of that environment. The representation of the internal model in memory is such that there is interference when there is an attempt to learn a new inverse dynamics map immediately after an anticorrelated mapping was learned. We suggest that this interference is an indication that the same computational elements used to encode the first inverse dynamics map are being used to learn the second mapping. We predict that this leads to a forgetting of the initially learned skill. 1 Introduction In tasks where we use our hands to interact with a tool, our motor system develops a model of the dynamics of that tool and uses this model to control the coupled dynamics of our arm and the tool (Shadmehr and Mussa-Ivaldi 1994).

Biological sensorimotor systems are not static maps that transform input (sensory information) into output (motor behavior). Evidence from many lines of research suggests that their representations are plastic, experience-dependent entities. While this plasticity is essential for flexible behavior, it presents the nervous system with difficult organizational challenges. If the sensorimotor system adapts itself to perform well under one set of circumstances, will it then perform poorly when placed in an environment with different demands (negative transfer)? Will a later experience-dependent change undo the benefits of previous learning (catastrophic interference)?