Alignment of Large Language models (LLMs) is crucial for safe and trustworthy deployment in applications. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as an effective technique to align LLMs to human preferences and broader utilities, but it requires updating billions of model parameters, which is computationally expensive. Controlled Decoding, by contrast, provides a mechanism for aligning a model at inference time without retraining. However, single-agent decoding approaches often struggle to adapt to diverse tasks due to the complexity and variability inherent in these tasks. To strengthen the test-time performance w.r.t the target task, we propose a mixture of agent-based decoding strategies leveraging the existing off-the-shelf aligned LLM policies. Treating each prior policy as an agent in the spirit of mixture of agent collaboration, we develop a decoding method that allows for inference-time alignment through a token-level selection strategy among multiple agents. For each token, the most suitable LLM is dynamically chosen from a pool of models based on a long-term utility metric. This policy-switching mechanism ensures optimal model selection at each step, enabling efficient collaboration and alignment among LLMs during decoding. Theoretical analysis of our proposed algorithm establishes optimal performance with respect to the target task represented via a target reward for the given off-the-shelf models. We conduct comprehensive empirical evaluations with open-source aligned models on diverse tasks and preferences, which demonstrates the merits of this approach over single-agent decoding baselines. Notably, Collab surpasses the current SoTA decoding strategy, achieving an improvement of up to 1.56x in average reward and 71.89% in GPT-4 based win-tie rate.

Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the aim of maximizing social welfare while enforcing incentive compatibility (IC), i.e., agents cannot inflate allocations by misreporting their utilities. The well-known proportional fairness (PF) mechanism achieves the maximum possible social welfare but incurs an undesirably high exploitability (the maximum unilateral inflation in utility from misreport and a measure of deviation from IC). In fact, it is known that no mechanism can achieve the maximum social welfare and exact incentive compatibility (IC) simultaneously without the use of monetary incentives (Cole et al., 2013). Motivated by this fact, we propose learning an approximate mechanism that desirably trades off the competing objectives. Our main contribution is to design an innovative neural network architecture tailored to the resource allocation problem, which we name Regularized Proportional Fairness Network (RPF-Net). RPF-Net regularizes the output of the PF mechanism by a learned function approximator of the most exploitable allocation, with the aim of reducing the incentive for any agent to misreport. We derive generalization bounds that guarantee the mechanism performance when trained under finite and out-of-distribution samples and experimentally demonstrate the merits of the proposed mechanism compared to the state-of-the-art.

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. (2013). Prior work has established that fully-substitutable preferences guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria which can be centrally computed. Our motivation comes from the fact that prices in markets such as over-the-counter markets and used car markets arise from \textit{decentralized} negotiation among agents, which has left open an important question as to whether equilibrium prices can emerge from agent-to-agent bilateral negotiations. We design a best response dynamic intended to capture such negotiations between market participants. We assume fully substitutable preferences for market participants. In this setting, we provide proofs of convergence for sparse markets ({covering many real world markets of interest}), and experimental results for more general cases, demonstrating that prices indeed reach equilibrium, quickly, via bilateral negotiations. Our best response dynamic, and its convergence behavior, forms an important first step in understanding how decentralized markets reach, and retain, equilibrium.

Equivariant neural networks have shown great success in reinforcement learning, improving sample efficiency and generalization when there is symmetry in the task. However, in many problems, only approximate symmetry is present, which makes imposing exact symmetry inappropriate. Recently, approximately equivariant networks have been proposed for supervised classification and modeling physical systems. In this work, we develop approximately equivariant algorithms in reinforcement learning (RL). We define approximately equivariant MDPs and theoretically characterize the effect of approximate equivariance on the optimal Q function. We propose novel RL architectures using relaxed group convolutions and experiment on several continuous control domains and stock trading with real financial data. Our results demonstrate that approximate equivariance matches prior work when exact symmetries are present, and outperforms them when domains exhibit approximate symmetry. As an added byproduct of these techniques, we observe increased robustness to noise at test time.

We study learning-based design of fair allocation mechanisms for divisible resources, using proportional fairness (PF) as a benchmark. The learning setting is a significant departure from the classic mechanism design literature, in that, we need to learn fair mechanisms solely from data. In particular, we consider the challenging problem of learning one-shot allocation mechanisms -- without the use of money -- that incentivize strategic agents to be truthful when reporting their valuations. It is well-known that the mechanism that directly seeks to optimize PF is not incentive compatible, meaning that the agents can potentially misreport their preferences to gain increased allocations. We introduce the notion of "exploitability" of a mechanism to measure the relative gain in utility from misreport, and make the following important contributions in the paper: (i) Using sophisticated techniques inspired by differentiable convex programming literature, we design a numerically efficient approach for computing the exploitability of the PF mechanism. This novel contribution enables us to quantify the gap that needs to be bridged to approximate PF via incentive compatible mechanisms. (ii) Next, we modify the PF mechanism to introduce a trade-off between fairness and exploitability. By properly controlling this trade-off using data, we show that our proposed mechanism, ExPF-Net, provides a strong approximation to the PF mechanism while maintaining low exploitability. This mechanism, however, comes with a high computational cost. (iii) To address the computational challenges, we propose another mechanism ExS-Net, which is end-to-end parameterized by a neural network. ExS-Net enjoys similar (slightly inferior) performance and significantly accelerated training and inference time performance. (iv) Extensive numerical simulations demonstrate the robustness and efficacy of the proposed mechanisms.

We consider online reinforcement learning in Mean-Field Games (MFGs). Unlike traditional approaches, we alleviate the need for a mean-field oracle by developing an algorithm that approximates the Mean-Field Equilibrium (MFE) using the single sample path of the generic agent. We call this {\it Sandbox Learning}, as it can be used as a warm-start for any agent learning in a multi-agent non-cooperative setting. We adopt a two time-scale approach in which an online fixed-point recursion for the mean-field operates on a slower time-scale, in tandem with a control policy update on a faster time-scale for the generic agent. Given that the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP) of the agent is communicating, we provide finite sample convergence guarantees in terms of convergence of the mean-field and control policy to the mean-field equilibrium. The sample complexity of the Sandbox learning algorithm is $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-4})$ where $\epsilon$ is the MFE approximation error. This is similar to works which assume access to oracle. Finally, we empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of the sandbox learning algorithm in diverse scenarios, including those where the MDP does not necessarily have a single communicating class.

We consider a multi-armed bandit problem motivated by situations where only the extreme values, as opposed to expected values in the classical bandit setting, are of interest. We propose distribution free algorithms using robust statistics and characterize the statistical properties. We show that the provided algorithms achieve vanishing extremal regret under weaker conditions than existing algorithms. Performance of the algorithms is demonstrated for the finite-sample setting using numerical experiments. The results show superior performance of the proposed algorithms compared to the well known algorithms.