Many elections are conducted sequentially, where interim results are known to the electorate and can be used by voters to inform their decisions. Given empirical work showing that voters tend to vote for the leading candidates when votes are public [MM+15; ZM+15; RR+17; MG+20; AG22], it is natural to consider the strategic aspect of choosing when to vote in such settings. The power of strategic vote timing is illustrated by the commonplace show-of-hands vote: "early bird" voters may sway undecided voters to follow in their direction. Furthermore, if there are costs associated with voting (e. g., having to commute to a distant polling station), waiting to observe interim results allows voters to save costs, if their preferred outcome appears to have garnered enough support to win. In particular, previous work found that voting costs affect voter turnout in blockchain governance voting, where votes are irrevocable and interim results are public [DY+23; MP+23]. This also applies to settings in which costs may be implicit, such as in democratic deliberation dialogues [FP+23] and social networks [AB+12], where voters may face social consequences if their vote does not conform to the accepted norms (e. g., liking a controversial social media post). 1

Online social lending is the Web 2.0's response to classical bank loans. Borrowers publish credit applications on websites which match them with private investors. We point to a conflict between economic interests and privacy goals in online social lending, empirically analyze the effect of data disclosure on credit conditions, and outline directions towards efficient yet privacy-friendly alternative credit markets.