Structure Learning in Human Causal Induction

We use graphical models to explore the question of how people learn simple causalrelationships from data. The two leading psychological theories canboth be seen as estimating the parameters of a fixed graph. We argue that a complete account of causal induction should also consider how people learn the underlying causal graph structure, and we propose to model this inductive process as a Bayesian inference. Our argument is supported through the discussion of three data sets. 1 Introduction Causality plays a central role in human mental life. Our behavior depends upon our understanding ofthe causal structure of our environment, and we are remarkably good at inferring causation from mere observation. Constructing formal models of causal induction is currently a major focus of attention in computer science [7], psychology [3,6], and philosophy [5].This paper attempts to connect these literatures, by framing the debate between two major psychological theories in the computational language of graphical models. We show that existing theories equate human causal induction with maximum likelihood parameter estimationon a fixed graphical structure, and we argue that to fully account for human behavioral data, we must also postulate that people make Bayesian inferences about the underlying causal graph structure itself.