Evaluating the Robustness of Game Theoretic Solutions When Using Abstraction

Veliz, Oscar Samuel (University of Texas at El Paso)

AAAI Conferences 

Games that model real world interactions are often complex, with huge numbers of possible strategies and information states. We are interested in better understanding the effect of abstraction in game-theoretic analysis. In particular, we focus on the strategy selection problem: how should an agent choose a strategy to play in a game, based on an abstracted game model? This problem has three interacting Figure 1: 2-players asymmetric abstractions components: (1) the method for abstracting the game, (2) the method for selecting a strategy based on the abstraction, and An example of an abstraction meta-game is shown in Figure (3) the method for mapping this strategy back to the original 1. In this example, we have two players who are playing game. This approach has been studied extensively for the one-shot normal form game shown at the top of the poker, which is a 2-player, zero-sum game. However, much figure; this is the base game. They each perform their own less is known about how abstraction interacts with strategy (unspecified) abstraction to reduce the game.

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