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First provide a summary of the paper, and then address the following criteria: Quality, clarity, originality and significance. Motivated by the practical problem of designing a security deployment strategy to protect targets from an adversary the author(s) model and study this as a Stackelberg game. The main result of the author(s) is that the defender can efficiently learn the payoffs of the adversary by carefully deploying resources and observing the adversary's attacks. Clearly, this setting may not be viable in the cases where the cost incurred by the defender on a successful attack is large (such as a terrorist attack) but perhaps is a reasonable strategy for other cases such as drug smuggling. The main result of the paper is a probably approximately optimal algorithm that finds a defender optimal strategy by learning from polynomial (in the number of targets and encoding length of the problem) number of attacks from the adversary.