The Complexity of Symmetric Equilibria in Min-Max Optimization and Team Zero-Sum Games

We consider the problem of computing stationary points in min-max optimization, with a focus on the special case of Nash equilibria in (two-)team zero-sum games. We first show that computing ϵ-Nash equilibria in 3-player adversarial team games--wherein a team of 2players competes against a single adversary-- is CLS-complete, resolving the complexity of Nash equilibria in such settings. Our proof proceeds by reducing from symmetric ϵ-Nash equilibria in symmetric, identical-payoff, two-player games, by suitably leveraging the adversarial player so as to enforce symmetry--without disturbing the structure of the game. In particular, the class of instances we construct comprises solely polymatrix games, thereby also settling a question left open by Hollender, Maystre, and Nagarajan (2024). Moreover, we establish that computing symmetric (first-order) equilibria in symmetric min-max optimization is PPAD-complete, even for quadratic functions. Building on this reduction, we show that computing symmetric ϵ-Nash equilibria in symmetric, 6-player (3 vs. 3) team zero-sum games is also PPAD-complete, even for ϵ = poly(1/n). As a corollary, this precludes the existence of symmetric dynamics--which includes many of the algorithms considered in the literature-- converging to stationary points. Finally, we prove that computing a non-symmetric poly(1/n)-equilibrium in symmetric min-max optimization is FNP-hard.