We establish finite-time last-iterate guarantees for vanilla stochastic gradient descent in co-coercive games under noisy feedback. This is a broad class of games that is more general than strongly monotone games, allows for multiple Nash equilibria, and includes examples such as quadratic games with negative semidefinite interaction matrices and potential games with smooth concave potentials. Prior work in this setting has relied on relative noise models, where the noise vanishes as iterates approach equilibrium, an assumption that is often unrealistic in practice. We work instead under a substantially more general noise model in which the second moment of the noise is allowed to scale affinely with the squared norm of the iterates, an assumption natural in learning with unbounded action spaces. Under this model, we prove a last-iterate bound of order $O(\log(t)/t^{1/3})$, the first such bound for co-coercive games under non-vanishing noise. We additionally establish almost sure convergence of the iterates to the set of Nash equilibria and derive time-average convergence guarantees.

Knowledge distillation (KD) aims to train a lightweight classifier suitable to provide accurate inference with constrained resources in multi-label learning. Instead of directly consuming feature-label pairs, the classifier is trained by a teacher, i.e., a high-capacity model whose training may be resource-hungry. The accuracy of the classifier trained this way is usually suboptimal because it is difficult to learn the true data distribution from the teacher. An alternative method is to adversarially train the classifier against a discriminator in a two-player game akin to generative adversarial networks (GAN), which can ensure the classifier to learn the true data distribution at the equilibrium of this game. However, it may take excessively long time for such a two-player game to reach equilibrium due to high-variance gradient updates.

Self-play is a technique for machine learning in multi-agent systems where a learning algorithm learns by interacting with copies of itself.

We study the price of anarchy of first-price auctions in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i.e., autobidders).

LP-based techniques struggling to scale favorably in large instances.

In this paper, we develop efficient parameterized algorithms for regimes between these two extremes.