Balancing Utility and Deal Probability for Auction-based Negotiations in Highly Nonlinear Utility Spaces
Marsa-Maestre, Ivan (Universidad de Alcala) | Lopez-Carmona, Miguel A. (Universidad de Alcala) | Velasco, Juan R. (Universidad de Alcala) | Ito, Takayuki (MIT Sloan School of Management) | Klein, Mark (MIT Sloan School of Management) | Fujita, Katsuhide (Nagoya Institute of Technology)
Experiments show that these approaches achieve high effectiveness Negotiation scenarios involving nonlinear utility (measured as high optimality rates and low failure rates functions are specially challenging, because traditional for the negotiations) in the evaluation scenario they describe negotiation mechanisms cannot be applied. (Section 2). However, as we will show empirically in Section Even mechanisms designed and proven useful for 5.2, these approaches perform worse as the circumstances of nonlinear utility spaces may fail if the utility space the scenario turn harder (that is, when the utility functions is highly nonlinear. For example, although both are highly nonlinear, like in B2B interactions or distributed contract sampling and constraint sampling have automated control systems). Under these circumstances, the been successfully used in auction based negotiations failure rate increases drastically, raising the need for an alternative with constraint-based utility spaces, they tend approach.
Jun-23-2009
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- Honshū > Chūbu > Aichi Prefecture > Nagoya (0.04)
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