The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games

It turns out there are a number of reasons why imperfect recall is relevant for AI agents; moreover, in cases where it is We study single-player extensive-form games with relevant, it is clear what the agent will and will not remember imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem - unlike in the case of human memory, which is harder to predict or the Absentminded Driver game. For such and consequently to model in standard representations of games, two natural equilibrium concepts have been imperfect recall. Imperfect-recall games already appear in the proposed as alternative solution concepts to ex-ante AI literature in the context of solving very large games such optimality. One equilibrium concept uses generalized as poker: one technique for solving such games is abstraction double halving (GDH) as a belief system and - i.e., reducing the game to a smaller, simplified one to solve evidential decision theory (EDT), and another one instead - and this process can give rise to imperfect recall in uses generalized thirding (GT) as a belief system the abstracted game [Waugh et al., 2009; Lanctot et al., 2012; and causal decision theory (CDT).