Who Needs to Know? Minimal Knowledge for Optimal Coordination

Lauffer, Niklas, Shah, Ameesh, Carroll, Micah, Dennis, Michael, Russell, Stuart

arXiv.org Artificial Intelligence 

If much of the information is irrelevant, it's easy to To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative imagine how this could lead to significant increases in efficiency games, it is often crucial to have information for finding optimal policies. For example, this could about one's collaborators: successful driving requires allow a focused effort on few-shot or zero-shot adaptation to understanding which side of the road to co-players (Zand et al., 2022; Albrecht & Stone, 2017; Stone drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2020) or more efficient DecPOMDP is strategically relevant: the fine-grained planning algorithms (Szer & Charpillet, 2006; Seuken & acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining Zilberstein, 2007). In order to leverage these benefits, we optimal coordination. We show that there build the theory, data structures, and algorithms required to is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information.

Duplicate Docs Excel Report

Title
None found

Similar Docs  Excel Report  more

TitleSimilaritySource
None found