It is well known that strategic behavior in elections is essentially unavoidable; we therefore ask: how bad can the rational outcome be? We answer this question via the notion of the price of anarchy, using the scores of alternatives as a proxy for their quality and bounding the ratio between the score of the optimal alternative and the score of the winning alternative in Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we are interested in Nash equilibria that are obtained via sequences of rational strategic moves. Focusing on three common voting rules — plurality, veto, and Borda — we provide very positive results for plurality and very negative results for Borda, and place veto in the middle of this spectrum.

Decentralized POMDPs (Dec-POMDPs) provide a rich, attractive model for planning under uncertainty and partial observability in cooperative multi-agent domains with a growing body of research. In this paper we formulate a qualitative, propositional model for multi-agent planning under uncertainty with partial observability, which we call Qualitative Dec-POMDP (QDec-POMDP). We show that the worst-case complexity of planning in QDec-POMDPs is similar to that of Dec-POMDPs. Still, because the model is more “classical” in nature, it is more compact and easier to specify. Furthermore, it eases the adaptation of methods used in classical and contingent planning to solve problems that challenge current Dec-POMDPs solvers. In particular, in this paper we describe a method based on compilation to classical planning, which handles multi-agent planning problems significantly larger than those handled by current Dec-POMDP algorithms.

The Multiagent Disjunctive Temporal Problem (MaDTP) is a general constraint-based formulation for scheduling problems that involve interdependent agents. Decoupling agents' interdependent scheduling problems, so that each agent can manage its schedule independently, requires agents to adopt additional local constraints that effectively subsume their interdependencies. In this paper, we present the first algorithm for decoupling MaDTPs. Our distributed algorithm is provably sound and complete. Our experiments show that the relative efficiency of using temporal decoupling to find solution spaces for MaDTPs, compared to algorithms that find complete solution spaces, improves with the interconnectedness between agents schedules, leading to orders of magnitude relative speeedup. However, decoupling by its nature restricts agents' scheduling flexibility; we define novel flexibility metrics for MaDTPs, and show empirically how the flexibility sacrificed depends on the degree of coupling between agents' schedules.

While great strides have been made in multiagent teamwork, existing approaches typically assume extensive information exists about teammates and how to coordinate actions. This paper addresses how robust teamwork can still be created even if limited or no information exists about a specific group of teammates, as in the ad hoc teamwork scenario. The main contribution of this paper is the first empirical evaluation of an agent cooperating with teammates not created by the authors, where the agent is not provided expert knowledge of its teammates. For this purpose, we develop a general-purpose teammate modeling method and test the resulting ad hoc team agent's ability to collaborate with more than 40 unknown teams of agents to accomplish a benchmark task. These agents were designed by people other than the authors without these designers planning for the ad hoc teamwork setting. A secondary contribution of the paper is a new transfer learning algorithm, TwoStageTransfer, that can improve results when the ad hoc team agent does have some limited observations of its current teammates.

We address the problem of transferring causal knowledge learned in one environment to another, potentially different environment, when only limited experiments may be conducted at the source. This generalizes the treatment of transportability introduced in [Pearl and Bareinboim, 2011; Bareinboim and Pearl, 2012b], which deals with transferring causal information when any experiment can be conducted at the source. Given that it is not always feasible to conduct certain controlled experiments, we consider the decision problem whether experiments on a selected subset Z of variables together with qualitative assumptions encoded in a diagram may render causal effects in the target environment computable from the available data. This problem, which we call z-transportability, reduces to ordinary transportability when Z is all-inclusive, and, like the latter, can be given syntactic characterization using the do-calculus [Pearl, 1995; 2000]. This paper establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for causal effects in the target domain to be estimable from both the non-experimental information available and the limited experimental information transferred from the source. We further provides a complete algorithm for computing the transport formula, that is, a way of fusing experimental and observational information to synthesize an unbiased estimate of the desired causal relation.

Decentralized partially observable Markov decision processes (Dec-POMDPs) offer a powerful modeling technique for realistic multi-agent coordination problems under uncertainty. Prevalent solution techniques are centralized and assume prior knowledge of the model. Recently a Monte Carlo based distributed reinforcement learning approach was proposed, where agents take turns to learn best responses to each other’s policies. This promotes decentralization of the policy computation problem, and relaxes reliance on the full knowledge of the problem parameters. However, this Monte Carlo approach has a large sample complexity, which we address in this paper. In particular, we propose and analyze a modified version of the previous algorithm that adaptively eliminates parts of the experience tree from further exploration, thus requiring fewer samples while ensuring unchanged confidence in the learned value function. Experiments demonstrate significant reduction in sample complexity – the maximum reductions ranging from 61% to 91% over different benchmark Dec-POMDP problems – with the final policies being often better due to more focused exploration.

Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is computationally to optimize and solve such games. One prominent such language is the simple yet expressive Weighted Graph Games (WGGs) representation (Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994), which maintains knowledge about synergies between agents in the form of an edge weighted graph. We consider the problem of finding the optimal coalition structure in WGGs. The agents in such games are vertices in a graph, and the value of a coalition is the sum of the weights of the edges present between coalition members. The optimal coalition structure is a partition of the agents to coalitions, that maximizes the sum of utilities obtained by the coalitions. We show that finding the optimal coalition structure is not only hard for general graphs, but is also intractable for restricted families such as planar graphs which are amenable for many other combinatorial problems. We then provide algorithms with constant factor approximations for planar, minor-free and bounded degree graphs.

We study the impact on strategic voting of tie-breaking by means of considering the order of tied candidates within a random vote. We compare this to another non deterministic tie-breaking rule where we simply choose candidate uniformly at random. In general, we demonstrate that there is no connection between the computational complexity of computing a manipulating vote with the two different types of tie-breaking. However, we prove that for some scoring rules, the computational complexity of computing a manipulation can increase from polynomial to NP-hard. We also discuss the relationship with the computational complexity of computing a manipulating vote when we ask for a candidate to be the unique winner, or to be among the set of co-winners.

We describe a model for competitive online scheduling algorithms. Two servers, each with a single observable queue, compete for customers. Upon arrival, each customer strategically chooses the queue with minimal expected wait time. Each scheduler wishes to maximize its number of customers, and can strategically select which scheduling algorithm, such as First-Come-First-Served (FCFS), to use for its queue. This induces a game played by the servers and the customers. We consider a non-Bayesian setting, where servers and customers play to maximize worst-case payoffs. We show that there is a unique subgame perfect safety-level equilibrium and we describe the associated scheduling algorithm (which is not FCFS). The uniqueness result holds for both randomized and deterministic algorithms, with a different equilibrium algorithm in each case. When the goal of the servers is to minimize competitive ratio, we prove that it is an equilibrium for each server to apply FCFS: each server obtains the optimal competitive ratio of 2.

It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoffs) can be computed in polynomial time, as follows: according to the folk theorem, we compute minimax strategies for both players to calculate the punishment values, and subsequently find a mixture over outcomes that exceeds these punishment values. However, for very large games, even computing minimax strategies can be prohibitive. In this paper, we propose an algorithmic framework for computing equilibria of repeated games that does not require linear programming and that does not necessarily need to inspect all payoffs of the game. This algorithm necessarily sometimes fails to compute an equilibrium, but we mathematically demonstrate that most of the time it succeeds quickly on uniformly random games, and experimentally demonstrate this for other classes of games. This also holds for games with more than two players, for which no efficient general algorithms are known.