Technology
A Missing statements and proofs 521 A.1 Statements for Section 3.1
Let a two-player Markov game where both players affect the transition. As we have seen in Section 2.1, in the case of unilateral deviation from joint policy Let a (possibly correlated) joint policy ˆ σ . By Lemma A.1, we know that Where the equality holds due to the zero-sum property, (1). An approximate NE is an approximate global minimum. An approximate global minimum is an approximate NE.
Zero-sum Polymatrix Markov Games: Equilibrium Collapse and Efficient Computation of Nash Equilibria
One such example is two-player zero-sum Markov games, in which efficient ways to compute a Nash equilibrium are known. Inspired by zero-sum polymatrix normal-form games (Cai et al., 2016), we define a class of zero-sum
Towards a theory of how the structure of language is acquired by deep neural networks
How much data is required to learn the structure of a language via next-token prediction?
Maduro raid questions trigger Pentagon review of top AI firm as potential 'supply chain risk'
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InsActor: Instruction-driven Physics-based Characters
Our framework empowers InsActor to capture complex relationships between high-level human instructions and character motions by employing diffusion policies for flexibly conditioned motion planning.