Goal recognition design involves the offline analysis of goal recognition models by formulating measures that assess the ability to perform goal recognition within a model and finding efficient ways to compute and optimize them. In this work we present goal recognition design for non-optimal agents, which extends previous work by accounting for agents that behave non-optimally either intentionally or naıvely. The analysis we present includes a new generalized model for goal recognition design and the worst case distinctiveness (wcd) measure. For two special cases of sub-optimal agents we present methods for calculating the wcd, part of which are based on novel compilations to classical planning problems. Our empirical evaluation shows the proposed solutions to be effective in computing and optimizing the wcd.

Many multiagent applications require an agent to learn quickly how to interact with previously unknown other agents. To address this problem, researchers have studied learning algorithms which compute posterior beliefs over a hypothesised set of policies, based on the observed actions of the other agents. The posterior belief is complemented by the prior belief, which specifies the subjective likelihood of policies before any actions are observed. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive empirical study on the practical impact of prior beliefs over policies in repeated interactions. We show that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on the long-term performance of such methods, and that the magnitude of the impact depends on the depth of the planning horizon. Moreover, our results demonstrate that automatic methods can be used to compute prior beliefs with consistent performance effects. This indicates that prior beliefs could be eliminated as a manual parameter and instead be computed automatically.

Belief revision games (BRGs) are concerned with the dynamics of the beliefs of a group of communicating agents. BRGs are "zero-player" games where at each step every agent revises her own beliefs by taking account for the beliefs of her acquaintances. Each agent is associated with a belief state defined on some finite propositional language. We provide a general definition for such games where each agent has her own revision policy, and show that the belief sequences of agents can always be finitely characterized. We then define a set of revision policies based on belief merging operators. We point out a set of appealing properties for BRGs and investigate the extent to which these properties are satisfied by the merging-based policies under consideration.

In order to properly regulate iterated belief revision, Darwiche and Pearl (1997) model belief revision as revising epistemic states by propositions. An epistemic state in their sense consists of a belief set and a set of conditional beliefs. Although the denotation of an epistemic state can be indirectly captured by a total preorder on the set of worlds, it is unclear how to directly capture the structure in terms of the beliefs and conditional beliefs it contains. In this paper, we first provide an axiomatic characterisation for epistemic states by using nine rules about beliefs and conditional beliefs, and then argue that the last two rules are too strong and should be eliminated for characterising the belief state of an agent. We call a structure which satisfies the first seven rules a general epistemic state (GEP). To provide a semantical characterisation of GEPs, we introduce a mathematical structure called belief algebra, which is in essence a certain binary relation defined on the power set of worlds.We then establish a 1-1 correspondence between GEPs and belief algebras, and show that total preorders on worlds are special cases of belief algebras. Furthermore, using the notion of belief algebras, we extend the classical iterated belief revision rules of Darwiche and Pearl to our setting of general epistemic states.

Maintaining an accurate set of beliefs in a partially observable scenario, particularly with respect to other agents operating in the same space, is a vital aspect of multiagent planning. We analyze how the beliefs of an agent can be updated for fast adaptivity to changes in the behavior of an unknown teammate. The main contribution of this paper is the empirical evaluation of an agent cooperating with a teammate whose goals change periodically. We test our approach in a collaborative multiagent domain where identification of goals is necessary for successful completion. The belief revision technique we propose outperforms the traditional approach in a majority of test cases. Additionally, our results suggest the ability to approximate a higher level model by utilizing a belief distribution over a set of lower level behaviors, particularly when the belief update strategy identifies changes in the behavior in a responsive manner.

This article proposes a solution to the problem of obtaining plausibility information, which is necessary to perform belief revision: given a sequence of revisions, together with their results, derive a possible initial order that has generated them; this is different from the usual assumption of starting from an all-equal initial order and modifying it by a sequence of revisions. Four semantics for iterated revision are considered: natural, restrained, lexicographic and reinforcement. For each, a necessary and sufficient condition to the existence of an order generating a given history of revisions and results is proved. Complexity is proved coNP complete in all cases but one (reinforcement revision with unbounded sequence length).

In this section, I propose another, quite different view about the nature To choose their actions, reasoning programs must be able to make assumptions and subsequently of reasoning. I incorporate some new concepts into this view, and the combination revise their beliefs when discoveries contradict these assumptions. The Truth Maintenance System overcomes the problems exhibited by the conventional view.

When you lose a game of chess to a computer then don't pretend that you didn't think at the game.

In this paper we will be concerned with such reasoning in its most general form, that is, in inferences that are defeasible: given more information, we may retract them. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a form of non-monotonic inference based on the notion of a partial model of the world. We take partial models to reflect our partial knowledge of the true state of affairs. We then define non-monotonic inference as the process of filling in unknown parts of the model with conjectures: statements that could turn out to be false, given more complete knowledge. To take a standard example from default reasoning: since most birds can fly, if Tweety is a bird it is reasonable to assume that she can fly, at least in the absence of any information to the contrary. We thus have some justification for filling in our partial picture of the world with this conjecture. If our knowledge includes the fact that Tweety is an ostrich, then no such justification exists, and the conjecture must be retracted.

This paper describes some work on automatically generating finite counterexamples in topology, and the use of counterexamples to speed up proof discovery in intermediate analysis, and gives some examples theorems where human provers are aided in proof discovery by the use of examples.