The AGM theory of belief revision is based on propositional belief sets. In this paper we develop a logic for revision of temporal belief bases, containing expressions about temporal propositions (tomorrow it will rain), possibility (it may rain tomorrow), actions (the robot enters the room) and pre- and post-conditions of these actions. We prove the Katsuno-Mendelzon and the Darwiche-Pearl representation theorems by restricting the logic to formulas representing beliefs up to certain time. We illustrate our belief change model through several examples.

An Enterprise Architecture (EA) provides a holistic view of an enterprise. In creating or changing an EA, multiple decisions have to be made, which are based on assumptions about the situation at hand. In this thesis, we develop a framework for reasoning about changing decisions and assumptions, based on logical theories of intentions. This framework serves as the underlying formalism for a recommender system for EA decision making.

Belief propagation over Markov random fields has been successfully used in many AI applications since it yields accurate inference results by iteratively updating messages between nodes. However, its high computation costs are a barrier to practical use. This paper presents an efficient approach to belief propagation. Our approach, Quiet, dynamically detects converged messages to skip unnecessary updates in each iteration while it theoretically guarantees to output the same results as the standard approach used to implement belief propagation. Experiments show that our approach is significantly faster than existing approaches without sacrificing inference quality.

Classic entrenchment-based contraction is not applicable to many useful logics, such as description logics. This is because the semantic construction refers to arbitrary disjunctions of formulas, while many logics do not fully support disjunction. In this paper, we present a new entrenchment-based contraction which does not rely on any logical connectives except conjunction. This contraction is applicable to all fragments of first-order logic that support conjunction. We provide a representation theorem for the contraction which shows that it satisfies all the AGM postulates except for the controversial Recovery Postulate, and is a natural generalisation of entrenchment-based contraction.

For instance, does it form a "nice" class, which can be characterized A formal framework is given for the postulate characterizability by postulates? of a class of belief revision operators, Proving non-characterizability presupposes a formal definition obtained from a class of partial preorders using of a postulate. However, as noted in the survey [Fermé minimization. It is shown that for classes of posets and Hansson, 2011] characterizability is equivalent to a special kind of "theories of belief change developed in the AGM definability in monadic second-order logic, which tradition are not logics in a strict sense, but rather turns out to be incomparable to first-order definability.

Fundamental to reasoning about actions and beliefs is the projection problem: to decide what is believed after a sequence of actions is performed. Progression is one widely applied technique to solve this problem. In this paper we propose a novel framework for computing progression in the epistemic situation calculus. In particular, we model an agent's preferential belief structure using conditional statements and provide a technique for updating these conditional statements as actions are performed and sensing information is received. Moreover, we show, by using the concepts of natural revision and only-believing, that the progression of a conditional knowledge base can be represented by only-believing the revised set of conditional statements. These results lay the foundations for feasible belief progression due to the unique-model property of only-believing.

Parameterized complexity is a well recognized vehicle for understanding the multitude of complexity AI problems typically exhibit. However, the prominent problem of belief revision has not undergone a systematic investigation in this direction yet. This is somewhat surprising, since by its very nature of involving a knowledge base and a revision formula, this problem provides a perfect playground for investigating novel parameters. Among our results on the parameterized complexity of revision is thus a versatile fpt algorithm which is based on the parameter of the number of atoms shared by the knowledge base and the revision formula. Towards identifying the frontier between parameterized tractability and intractability, we also give hardness results for classes such as co-W[1], para-Theta 2 P and FPT NP[f(k)]

The AGM paradigm of belief change studies the dynamics of belief states in light of new information. Finding, or even approximating, dependent or relevant beliefs to a change is valuable because, for example, it can narrow the set of beliefs considered during belief change operations. Gärdenfors' preservation criterion (GPC) suggests that formulas independent of a belief change should remain intact. GPC allows to build dependence relations that are theoretically linked with belief change. Such dependence relations can in turn be used as a theoretical benchmark against which to evaluate other approximate dependence or relevance relations. There are already some studies, based on GPC, on the parallelism between belief change and dependence. One study offers a dependence relation parallel to AGM contraction for belief sets. Another study links base dependence relation to a more general belief base contraction, saturated kernel contraction. Here we offer yet a more general parallelism between kernel contraction and base dependence. At this level of generalization, different types of base dependence emerge. We prove that this differentiation of base dependence types is a result of possible redundancy in the base. This provides a theoretical means to distinguish between redundant and informative parts of a belief base.

Belief revision is concerned with incorporating new information into a pre-existing set of beliefs. When the new information comes from another agent, we must first determine if that agent should be trusted. In this paper, we define trust as a pre-processing step before revision. We emphasize that trust in an agent is often restricted to a particular domain of expertise. We demonstrate that this form of trust can be captured by associating a state partition with each agent, then relativizing all reports to this partition before revising.  We position the resulting family of trust-sensitive revision operators within the class of selective revision operators of Ferme and Hansson, and we examine its properties. In particular, we show how trust-sensitive revision is manipulable, in the sense that agents can sometimes have incentive to pass on misleading information.  When multiple reporting agents are involved, we use a distance function over states to represent differing degrees of trust; this ensures that the most trusted reports will be believed.

Belief merging is a central operation within the field of belief change and addresses the problem of combining multiple, possibly mutually inconsistent knowledge bases into a single, consistent one. A current research trend in belief change is concerned with tailored representation theorems for fragments of logic, in particular Horn logic. Hereby, the goal is to guarantee that the result of the change operations stays within the fragment under consideration. While several such results have been obtained for Horn revision and Horn contraction, merging of Horn theories has been neglected so far. In this paper, we provide a novel representation theorem for Horn merging by strengthening the standard merging postulates. Moreover, we present a concrete Horn merging operator satisfying all postulates.